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AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY

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A N
ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
AS A
PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE

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P R E F A C E

THE following essay is intended to illustrate a philosophical principle, not to establish a philosophical conclusion. The only legitimate principle of philosophy is experience, of which philosophy professes to be the interpretation. But it is rash to assume that we know what we mean by experience without explicit statement and discussion. Some particular aspect of experience we are each of us sure to emphasize. It is well to describe clearly the aspect under which we are disposed to assert that experience should *primâ facie* be viewed. This will be the philosophical principle. If the principle or the aspect of experience which we wish to present happens to involve differences from the views commonly assumed in philosophical literature, this full and free description of the point of view at starting is the more necessary. In any case an hypothesis must be entertained before it can be proved, and it must be stated before it can be entertained. And a philosophical principle is such an hypothesis. This, then, is the object, to present a certain aspect of experience in such a way as to secure that it may be entertained as a

philosophical principle, a principle to be hereafter justified and established.

As to the manner in which the subject is treated, I am afraid I must be prepared for criticism from two points of view. In the first place, it will be said that the treatment is rhetorical rather than scientific, popular rather than philosophical. I would venture to point out that this is a consequence of the aim of the book. I think philosophy has travelled away from life, and that it is a misfortune that reflection on the deepest principles of life should not be kept as far as possible within the reach of the very large body of people who are asking themselves the philosophic question, and who find themselves repelled by the form in which the answer to the question is offered for their acceptance. I think also, as will appear, that philosophy still suffers, in spite of many protests, from the vice of intellectualism,* and that the adequate presentation of philosophical truth must always include appeals to imagination and emotion. This neither is, nor is intended to be, an apology for faults of style in this direction, of which I am conscious, and for which I must bear the blame. On the other hand, if any one, glancing at the preceding paragraph, should turn to the book itself, it may well be that he will find himself entangled in abstruse technicalities, such as I have seemed to condemn. The

* Cf. Seth, "Man's Place in the Cosmos," articles on Bradley and Münsterberg. Also Ward, "Mind," N.S., 5.

passages where these occur—and they occupy no inconsiderable space—are defensive passages. I am attempting, in such passages, to disengage what seems to me to be the natural view of experience from certain philosophical presumptions and traditions by which it is obscured. Again I cannot pretend to disclaim responsibility for difficulties in expression which I have not been able to avoid.

Two remarks should be made as to the actual subject matter of the essay. The title is "Personality." As the subject is treated, I may be told that "fellowship" would more nearly describe the principle I am trying to illustrate.* But my enterprise is a kind of philosophical socialism. I wish to claim as the due of the social fellowship capacities which are usually treated as prerogatives of the individual. I should not have said my say, unless I had attacked the individualism, against which I protest, in its own citadel, the conception of the individual personal being.

Lastly, I wish to say something as to the frequent allusions, direct and indirect, to Christianity and Christian experience. No assumption as to the historical basis of Christianity in facts, such as are contained in the Gospel record, is in any way necessary to the argument of this essay. But Christianity, Christian experience, the Christian way of looking

* The Greek word *κοινωνία* covers the variety of meaning which neither "fellowship" nor any other English word would adequately represent.

at things, is itself a fact, however it may have arisen. The experience of modern civilised humanity is the experience from which we start, and the experience of modern civilised humanity is largely Christian. Sometimes it is where it is most Christian that it has best exemplified the principle which I wished to illustrate. Where this was so I have taken and used the Christian view of life and the universe. Nor have I been afraid to speak of the Christian view of experience, as it were, from the inside. Such a view of experience can be properly understood from no other point of view. But for the purposes of the argument of this book Christianity would be the same fact that it is, if the claim of the Gospels to be authentic and historical were disproved. It would remain the fact that under whatever inspiration the experience of mankind had been shaped by the principles, beliefs, and emotions which have supplied to modern Europe its working philosophy of life.

ANALYSIS

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PART I
EXPERIENCE AND PERSONALITY

CHAPTER I

EXPERIENCE

EXPERIENCE is the beginning and the end of philosophy. Philosophy takes its rise in experience. It is itself a feature in experience. Its origin is due to an impulse that arises in experience itself. Experience asks the question which philosophy has to answer. Philosophy is not an alien, a visitor from another world. In philosophy experience challenges its own validity. In the inquiry which results from the challenge, if we ask what are the subject matter of the investigation, the method of reasoning adopted, the principles assumed as the source of all our conclusions, the answer is still the same. Experience itself is the subject matter of the investigation—nothing less, certainly nothing more. Experience is the method of inquiry.* The *primâ facie* view of experience gives rise to a further, a deeper, at least a different view; different, and yet arising from the first. On a survey of the one we experience the other. Proof in the last resort all resolves itself into this. Philosophical principles can claim no higher origin than this, that they arise inevitably on a survey, the simplest, or the completest, from a scrutiny, the deepest, or the most superficial, of experience itself.

* See Note A, Appendix, p. 181, on "Proof."

Experience itself is the only ultimate first principle of philosophy. And the entire process in the development of philosophy, the process by which we find out what experience means, is a form of experience. To the philosopher his philosophising is an experience, his experience of what experience turns out to be. And the end of his philosophy is an experience, that into which experience resolves itself, the whole into which it rounds itself, the depth which it discovers within itself. And this final experience of the philosopher, his philosophy, returns for verification to the experience of the ordinary man from which it arose. This is the test of the achievement of the philosopher, that his philosophy should be adequate to the experience of life. The historical origin of his philosophy may seem to be in a development or a revolt from a previous philosophy. But this means that he finds the previous philosophy inadequate to his experience of life. To the common human experience he goes back as the source of his inspiration. And to that he must return as the arbiter of his failure or success.

Philosophy, then, begins with a comprehensive assumption. This cannot be too clearly allowed. As

Philosophy begins
with the assumption
of experience, Leibnitz said, "Toutes les hypothèses
sont faites exprès, et tous les systèmes
viennent après coup, pour sauver les
phénomènes ou les apparences."*

Philosophy does not profess to begin outside experience. It does not profess to begin with nothing and to create experience. It begins with the experience of the ordinary man. This does not mean that we beg the question of philosophy,

* "Éclaircissement du Nouveau Système de la Communication des Substances."

that we assume what we ought to prove, and exclude a sceptical result. We merely state what is the matter for question. All questions must be answered, all doubts resolved, out of experience itself, as within experience the questions and the doubts arise. No answer this way or that to any question or doubt about experience is assumed when we say that we begin with experience as it is. It may turn out that experience will compel us to doubt experience. Experience may furnish us with a standard which experience does not satisfy. Tried by its own law and at its own bar, it may, on its own accusation, in the end stand self-condemned. Self-condemnation is the only condemnation to which experience is liable. The assumption of experience as it stands is the assumption of the only premiss from which a sceptical conclusion could be drawn. And the possibility of a sceptical conclusion is necessarily faced when we start with experience and undertake to follow whithersoever it may lead.

Nor, again, when we say that in philosophy experience is the beginning and the end, does this mean that philosophy can never pass beyond experience as it presents itself *primâ facie* to philosophical inquiry. It remains to be seen what experience will lead us to see to be involved in itself, what rational basis experience may itself afford for the beliefs of which it may be said to consist, to what deeper or more comprehensive judgments of reality it may open the way. What we do say is, that it is in and through experience, as it presents itself *primâ facie* to philosophical inquiry, that

though it does not
therefore exclude a
sceptical conclusion,

or confine itself to
the *primâ facie* limits
of experience,

any deeper and more rationally grounded beliefs must be discovered.

In the experience with which we begin, no element in experience is taken as the exclusive test and final authority. No single mode of experience is isolated as the one road to reality. No faculty is enthroned in an arbitrary supremacy. The experience of man in all its width and wealth is the source on which we have to draw. Reason and sense, intellect and emotion, feeling and will, all play their part in the reality with which we deal.

The philosophical theories of the past have appealed to mankind by their presentation of some aspect of experience. Each has left, even in language, some deposit which testifies to a vital connection with the lives of men. Their real influence lives through subtler transformations, in the common forms of thought, and contributes to the common consciousness of the realities of life. And in each endeavour of philosophy once more to interpret experience to itself, philosophy starts with the faith, which may thus be reinforced from its own history, that experience is capable of self-interpretation, that the attempt will not leave us where we stand. The fact of experience with which we start will open and reveal the deeper fact of reality and truth.

But it is from the experience of the ordinary man unsophisticated by philosophical theory that philosophy must begin. The historical origin of nearly every philosophy is in a development or a revolt from some previous philosophy. But this means that the

But the starting-point is experience as it is experienced unwarpd by philosophical theories,

philosopher has found the previous philosophy inadequate to the experience of life. To justify the advance or the divergence, he must go back to the common ground, the common matter, the common source of inspiration, experience as it is experienced—the experience of men who, though the philosophical speculation of the past may unconsciously to themselves enable them to define their intellectual grasp on the realities of life, are not schooling themselves to fit their experience into this or that philosophical theory, are not consciously endeavouring, as the philosopher in the end is bound to endeavour, to accommodate speculation and fact to one another.

For instance, it is a philosophical definition of experience to say experience means my experience, my such as, e.g., that sensations, my thoughts, my feelings, experience means the the events of my consciousness. Given events of the individual consciousness, this definition of experience, the task of philosophy will appear to be to enable us, starting from the events of our own consciousness, to arrive at a knowledge of the real world. But this way of presenting the task of philosophy depends entirely on the construction previously put upon experience. The theory that we know nothing but the events of our own consciousness may be the *result* of philosophical inquiry, but it is not the starting-point. The ordinary man might complain with justice that he is not fairly treated when philosophy, professing to start from experience, puts a construction on experience, and presents him with a possible conclusion, as though it were an indisputable principle. His experience, he may truly plead, does not consist of the events of his consciousness. Experience as he knows it does not consist of feelings,

but of facts. It does not consist of facts which can fairly be described as feelings, however the philosopher, when he is let loose upon them, may analyse them and explain them into feelings. The experience of the ordinary man consists of facts, things and persons, living and breathing realities, the whole inevitable world in which man without philosophy lives his life.

Nor has the ordinary man less reason to complain when, imprisoned by one philosophy in the narrow world of his own feelings, he is offered
 or that experience is thought.

an escape by another which tells him that, since thought alone gives reality to feeling, he must start by accepting the doctrine that experience is thought.* The doctrine is not without attractions. We all know a form of experience in which, when we have reflected intently on some subject in which our minds have been absorbed, we at length reach a conclusion which is something more than a conclusion. The whole matter in all its bearings seems to clear itself in our minds, and the mind itself seems to be no more than the scene, the place where the matter thus thinks itself out. In the case of practical people, such a stage of reflection is generally the outcome of long experience, and the man who feels that he has in him the root of the matter is very little able to give articulate expression to his experience, or to expound to others with any degree of completeness the thought with which his own mind is possessed. At the best, indeed, we are unable any of us perfectly to convey to others this balanced wholeness of view, this intensity of grounded conviction,

* See Note B, Appendix, p. 188, on "The Hegelian Identification of Experience with Thought."

as of a truth self-established, independent of the mind, to which the fact of our perception is indifferent, this real achievement of thought in matters where we dare to say we *know*, where we speak with authority just because we feel it is not we who speak but truth itself, vivid, comprehensive, absolute, that in our minds comes to the knowledge of itself. The practical man will allow that there is such an experience as this, that this intimate completeness of knowledge is a real achievement of thought. But if you ask him to accept this as the type of experience, he will reasonably demur. You are offering him no narrow, ignoble, or material conception of his life. The prison walls seem to have disappeared which threatened to enclose him for ever within the circle of his own individual feelings. But the price of his escape is that he should, to start with, accept as the summary or essential account of experience that spirit means self-consciousness, and self-consciousness in the form of thought, and this will seem to him a partial and inadequate account of the matter. He may say, indeed, on the first blush, that a self-consciousness, in which self and the object on which self is bent are alike lost in one another, contains to him no longer the possibility or the object of self-sacrifice, and that with the disappearance of the condition of self-sacrificing love the vital reality of life is gone. And even if his objection may be shown to be ill grounded, if the definition of experience as thought may be capable of justification as a conclusion of philosophy, it is not—and this is here the point—by any means capable of justification as an assumption of philosophy. Philosophy may not *start* with saying, spirit is self-consciousness,

experience is thought; we must go back to the facts. And of the facts of common experience this definition of reality is certainly not the primary account to be given.

The criticism of a philosophy generally traces back its failure to its beginning. It is the first assumption which vitiates the conclusion—the first misreading of the facts, the failure to come truly face to face with experience as it is experienced. We start from experience, and say that this must surely mean from a survey of the whole wide field of knowledge. Philosophy is then the great generalisation. Or we start from experience, and say that any and every experience will serve our turn alike to find and define the essential elements in experience, to say what in itself experience is. Philosophy is then the definition of experience, of that essential nature of experience which is to be found in any and every experience alike. But generalisation and definition seem alike to miss their mark. Confronted with experience as it is experienced, brought to the test of fact and life, they present to the ordinary man the same result. The vital element of experience and reality seems to have escaped the grasp of thought. The crucial point is, that at starting we should mean by experience not less than what experience is, that we should be in touch with the essential nature of the fact, that we should be in sympathy with the common feeling of fact and reality. What in this sense we omit or neglect from the beginning we shall not recover in the end. The philosophy which starts from a narrow and inadequate conception

The beginning is the critical point. The first question to be answered is, What is the vital element in experience?

of experience is haunted for ever by a ghost of reality which no logical spells can lay. This, then, is the question which I contend must be the starting-point of philosophy. Philosophy must ask what experience is, not in the sense of asking what is the generalised outcome of the sciences, or the characteristic of any, even the most elementary experience, but in the sense of asking—What element is there in experience which is most vital to experience? What is the dominant experience to which all others are secondary and subordinate? What is the experience which carries the utmost meaning of experience? What is it which experience pre-eminently is?

CHAPTER II

PERSONALITY—THE MEANINGS OF THE WORD

WHAT, then, is the experience which gives the utmost meaning to experience, the reality which is pre-eminently real? We may answer in a word—personality.* And there would probably be a very wide agreement that the supreme reality of life is to be found in the region of experience to which the word “personality” points the way. But least of all in philosophy does a word explain itself. To define and

The pre-eminent reality in experience is in a word—“personality.” It will pave the way to a definition of its meaning to consider some phases in the history of the word.

* It may be well to say briefly at once what I do *not* mean by personality. I do *not* mean (as Momerie, “Personality the Beginning and End of Metaphysics”) that “metaphysics, like charity, should begin at home.” I do not profess to ask, “What is personality?” and by way of answer to take a person and look inside him and see what I find there. This would give me the “personality” of psychology (see Note D, on “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness,” p. 191), “the concept” (Ward, *Encyc. Brit.*, art. “Psychology”) “which every intelligent being more or less distinctly forms of himself, as a person, M. or N., having such and such a character, tastes, and convictions, and such and such a history, and such and such an aim in life.” In so far as I begin with the individual person at all, I take a person and look *outside* him, and ask, “What is personal life?” “What are the facts, obvious in experience, which indicate the nature of personality?” Or, to put the same thing in another way, I take experience as it stands, and I maintain that it shows personality to be presupposed in, to be constituent of it, and I ask, “What is the character of the personality which experience thus presents as a vital element in experience, as that without which experience would not be the experience that it is?”

expand in this connection the meaning of the word "personality" is the purpose of this essay. The subject, indeed, cannot be limited by the current conception of the meaning of a word. Current language is a fair exponent, it is true, of current conceptions, but of current misconceptions too. In philosophy, as elsewhere, it is the first business of those who set themselves to the serious study of a subject to deepen and define the vague and superficial meaning of terms, borrowed by scientific and philosophical language from popular speech. It will, however, be a useful introduction to the subject if we first draw out some aspects of the meaning actually borne by the word "personality" in some of the phases through which the history of its use may be traced.

The earliest meaning of "persona," the actor's "mask," has long ceased to be current. Even the secondary

The dramatic meaning of "person" is self-manifestation.

meaning—the "character," the "part," which the actor plays in the drama—survives only in the heading of the list of the "characters" in a play. It is suggestive, however, to find that, so far as "person" is a name for him, the individual man is viewed first under his social aspect, as playing a part in the commerce or dialogue of life, as an element in the general human scene, as fulfilling a certain function in the evolution of the drama of destiny. And the first verbal symbol for this meaning, accordingly, is the name of the outward appearance presented to others.* The bodily aspect is the first aspect in which personality presents itself; and the body is here the person as presented to others—

* Πρόσωπον, "a face," "a mask."

not the organ of sense, the means by which the soul knows, but the means by which it is known, the face in which we read the soul. Plainly, it is further to be said that to view the visible personality as a mask is to indicate an unseen reality of which it is the manifestation. There is an archetypal being within which produces this impression upon other men. But self-manifestation to others is the idea implied. There is no suggestion that the manifestation is a deception, that life is a masquerade, in which reality appears *incognito*.

The meaning with which the word "persona" took its place in common language is connected with its legal use. Here the person is primarily the subject of rights. And right is defined as a relation of persons, a faculty or privilege of one person with a correlative duty of another person. Thus to start with, and by definition, person is the correlative of person. The individual person is an abstraction, not a reality. The individual emerged into personality out of the family, where at the beginning of the individual life his rights and his personality were absorbed in the father of the family. And he emerged into personality by emerging into citizenship, into the life and society of the state. The state, the society, gave him his privileges as a citizen, and, in giving them, also conferred upon him, at any rate in fact, the liberty which, in idea, in later Roman times was his original and natural right.

In this view the power of action, and of action governed by desire, to us, perhaps, the primary characteristics of a person, are already assumed and taken for

granted. But this is only another way of saying that this use of the word "person" gives no warrant for the abstraction of the individual from the social life of the person—that the person is conceived only as a social being, and that the power of action and of action from desire is, in fact, only a "power," a potentiality; the actual personal life is the social life. The ideas represented by this definition of personality have found their way into common language through the conception of personal responsibility. The person who is personally responsible for his actions grows into his personality in the social life of the family, becomes free to act only as becoming simultaneously the subject of the obligations of duty, *i.e.* as becoming a member of the wider human family, in which each member carries in his own consciousness of himself at once the claim of freedom and the sense that he is answerable to the moral world in which this consciousness lives and moves and has its being.

Our idea of personality is next indebted for a part of its meaning to that chapter in the history of the word which introduces its use into the definitions of theology. Here the first point to notice is that the Latin word "persona" appears as the representative of the Greek word "hypostasis," of which it may be said that it had come to stand generally for the underlying or absolute reality of the world. In Greek philosophy the question had been at issue whether the absolute reality, the very being of the world, was to be thought of rather as thing or as quality. When the word "hypostasis" comes into

The theological meaning is the capacity for the communion, which the Eternal Being is.

philosophical use, we should naturally expect it to be associated rather with the underlying reality than with the qualities in which it manifests itself. But by the time the word comes into theological use, it seems to carry with it no definite or unvarying emphasis on either of these aspects of being, and to denote simply absolute real being. It is to be noted, then, at the outset that the theological use of the Latin word "persona," as the equivalent of the Greek "hypostasis," carries with it the instinctive assumption, the implicit assertion of the emphatic reality of personal being. The word "personality," with the associations with which its legal use had launched it in popular speech, is assumed to be capable of bearing the burden of the meaning of the absolute reality of the world. For this very reason it becomes the more important to note the meaning which theology imports into the term, in using it as a designation of the Being of God.

We are concerned, it is scarcely necessary to observe, not with the philosophical legitimacy of the theological definition, but only with the meaning which, as a matter of fact, it assigned to the word—a meaning which, in common with the other meanings historically borne by the word, has contributed to the conception of personality as current in general thought. It is quite immaterial for our purpose whether, in the conception of the Personality of God, men were making a correct analysis of the truths implied in their experience of the Universal Being, or were merely reflecting the image of human personality upon the misty void of human ignorance. Either hypothesis leaves us the undisputed fact that such a conception of what personality is made

its appearance upon the stage of history and in the minds of men.

It is to be observed, then, that when Christian theology conceives God as a Personal Being, it does not conceive God as *a* Person. Personality attaches to God not as one Person, but as Three. God is One, individual, in the sense that He is whole, complete in Himself, but, as it has been said, "whereas each human individual being has one personality, the Divine Being has Three." * His unity is a unity of Persons, and it is as a unity of Persons, and as a unity of Persons only, that Personality is conceived to be the supreme Reality. Personality, in the form in which it is supposed to be most intensely and unmistakably real, is a communion, a fellowship of Persons, a communion of will and character, a communion of intelligence and mind, a communion of love, implying that each Person is, in these various phases or aspects of personal life, capable of complete communion with others.

And it is further to be observed that the person thus conceived is definitely conceived as an object of knowledge. The purpose of theology in this region was to define the personality of God as *known*; not to describe His operations on the will, or to shadow forth the meaning of religious emotion, but definitely to answer the question what God *is*. The personality, that is, which we have described, had the definiteness of conception which belongs to an idea of what is conceived actually to exist. The question of theology was: What *is* God? and the answer was: God *is* a fellowship, a communion of Persons.

* Newman, "Arians," Appendix, p. 439.

Certainly there attaches to personality here, and wherever else we speak of a person, no insignificant part of the idea of individuality in the ordinary sense; not only the exclusive possession of definite individual personal attributes, but besides this the sheer spontaneity of the will, the inwardness of the mind, the sense of property in *his own* feelings and emotions, all of which belong to the individual personal life. But even so, the distinctive personal attributes designate relations of communion with other persons, and the person in each case is conceived to *own* himself, only as also *owing* himself to others, and in order to give himself to others.

When we pass to our modern use of the terms person, personal, the relation between these two aspects of personal life, the inward and the outward, the individual and the social, is inverted. It is the individuality of personal life which marks the characteristically modern idea of a person, as, *e.g.*, when we speak of personal sympathy, of personal antipathy, of personal affection, of personal religion. All these emotions are eminently personal in the sense that they are eminently individual. They intensify the sense of individual life. They are keen, vivid, emphatically accented moments of individual existence. But on a moment's consideration it is plain that, in such cases as these, what evokes and intensifies the personal life of the individual person is some relation to a person other than himself. Personal religion is perhaps the most suggestive instance. There is no stronger case of the use of the word "personal" to indicate what is genuinely and

The modern meaning, in accenting individuality, leaves it always relative to society.

thoroughly spontaneous, inward, individual. Personal religion emphatically means the religion which is one's own. There is, in fact, no region in which men have claimed so decidedly to call their souls their own. And yet it is just in regard to their own relation to a person other than themselves that they make the claim. It is in regard to faith, the dependence of the soul on God ; to belief, the formulation of the soul's own knowledge of God ; to love, the devotion of the soul to God. The very quarrel of the champions of personal religion with the ecclesiastical system from which they wished to make good their escape, has been that by these systems the spiritual relationship and communion between the soul and God had been obscured and clogged. Religion is here conceived as a relation between the personal being of God and the personal being of man ; and the complaint is that, God being shut off, the personal life of man is impoverished and starved. The closer consideration, indeed, of this and similar uses of the word would suggest the hypothesis, that the word "personal" is only rightly applied to any feeling of the individual, when the feeling is a consciousness of relation to another person. There are uses of the word which seem to be exceptions from this rule : sometimes the relation to another person, though it may be shown to be implied, is not obvious on the surface. Personal liberty, for instance, and personal property are assertions of the claim of one person against others. Personal wants are those which bear upon the individual, as he consciously sets himself up against the community. Sometimes individuality amounts to a withdrawal from the privilege, or a failure to realise the life, or an incapacity to

exercise the faculties which are the distinction of personal beings. The most personal feelings, *e.g.*, those of melancholy and depression, are the sheer protest of the individual soul against his isolation from that communion with his spiritual kind in which a personal being lives the truly personal life.

CHAPTER III

THE DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY

THE purpose of the preceding chapter has been to suggest rather than to justify, from the recognised uses of the word, what is to be set forth in this essay as the true definition of personality, namely, that personality in the individual is the capacity for society, fellowship, communion.*

Such an idea of personality stands in broad contrast with current modern philosophical utterances on the subject. In modern philosophical

The current philosophical idea that personality is "limited individuality" may be checked by an appeal to experience. literature, personality is assumed to be essentially individual, essentially limited.† But such expressions as

imply this conception are not really the outcome of any very serious analysis of personality as it is realised in personal life. They only echo the instinctive protest of individual persons against the practical limitations which bar the realisation of their own personal capacities. When our personality is said to be limited, it is in tones of complaint, the protest of

* The *δύναμις* of *κοινωνία*.

† *E.g.*: "For me a person is finite or is meaningless" (Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 532).

rebellion or the acquiescence of despair, the description in any case of a condition which is felt to be abnormal even while it is described as common to all.* Such language testifies to the strength of the instinctive aspiration after the perfect communion of an ideal fellowship of persons—ideal, but not unreal, because the earnest of its fulfilment is visible in the broad facts of every department of human life.

In the region of action it is obvious to view the individual person as a bundle of individual desires. But

I. In the region of action, individual desire is, in its issue, social, a bundle of desires is a bundle of insufficiencies. Desire is individual, but not its satisfaction. If the range of the desires of the individual were limited to those which could be satisfied by the efforts of the individual alone, he could not be said to attain to what we understand by personal life. As a matter of fact, the individual person wakes to desire as a fragmentary unit in a collective life, the life of the family, an organisation which owes its origin in each individual instance to the desire of individuals for close communion with their kind, and finds the scope of its activity in providing for the common satisfaction of the needs of its members. When he emerges into independent life as an individual person, his life is neither individual nor independent. He finds himself the member of a society. Individual need and individual desire act as the force that holds this society together. Under the stress of individual need and individual desire, men find themselves held in the bonds of a society whose purpose is to minister not to their own but to the common life.

* See Note C, Appendix, p. 189, on "The Sense of Isolation in the Individual Person."

But what is the common life? So far we have only dwelt on the familiar fact that individual desire, the element of the moral life, is social in its satisfaction, in its working, in the surroundings which it has created for itself. We may say that throughout the intricate process of commerce and exchange, in which the individual person helps the society and is helped by it in return, he, the individual, is seeking his own interest, and his own interest alone. The other aspect of society, as a society for mutual help, may be ignored, and the social impulses to which it naturally gives vent may be left out of view. But it will still be true that the conflict of individual interests has to be adjusted. And in this process of adjustment, at least, there appears unmistakably a new force upon the scene—a common perception, a common standard of justice and right, enforced by collective action. Law, the result, the expression of the collective action of persons, is, in the region of action, the undeniable evidence of the fellowship of persons with one another. The analysis of society on its economic side, the theory of its origin, the account of the forces that sustain it, may be matter of dispute, but law is a hard fact. And law is not a result of *common* action in which each individual might still claim his selfish share. It is the result of *collective* action. It involves, it presupposes the fusion of wills. It expresses, and it is evidence for the communion of persons with one another in a common element. It exhibits the innate tendency of individual persons to build themselves together, not into aggregations, but into wholes—into collective life. Of

and "law" is a collective fact, an evidence of the fellowship of persons, of which it is the creation,

the collective life of persons, law is the outcome and expression ; nothing else describes it or accounts for it.

And if law is a product of the collective life, it is a feature not of the collective life alone, but of the individual life also. Whatever may be the theory of its origin, conscience, be it cause or effect, the ectype or the archetype of law, is in the fully developed personal life perhaps the most pronounced, the most inevitable fact.

represented in the individual by "conscience," the impulse of collective moral life, The individual attitude towards this or that particular ordinance may be one of sympathy or of rebellion. But for submission to the control of something other than itself the individual will has the bidding of authority within, at one with the bidding of authority without. Conscience is the organ in the individual personality of the impulse towards collective life in the region of action.

Nor is this impulse satisfied with its achievement of an external expression in law. Religion is, on one side of it, the aspiration of human personality after membership in a completer moral communion, after the perfection of fellowship between the individual and the universal and collective will.

In the intellectual life, again, it seems obvious at first sight to regard the individual as an independent unit of perception. But if we are making our appeal to common experience, perception in common experience—the perception of the individual consciousness—is the perception of fact. And the individual consciousness of

II. In the intellectual region the individual perception, as perception of fact, is a perception of the individual as the organ of the collective experience.

fact is not merely individual. There are times when the individual person would say, not "such was what occurred in fact," but "such is my experience of what occurred." But the normal perception of the individual is represented by the former phrase, not by the latter. The difference is a difference of assurance. We have not to ask here how the higher degree of assurance is arrived at in the normal case. We have to ask only in what does the assurance consist which makes the former perception what it is, a perception of fact. And a part at least of our answer must be this, that in the case of the assured perception there is an absence of the sense of *merely* individual perception, described in such words as "that is my impression of what occurred." When we perceive the fact, we perceive with the consciousness or, if you will, with the assumption that it is a common perception of which our individual mind is the organ. It is not necessary to ask here how the individual consciousness can be the organ of a common perception; we are here noting the actual nature of that common experience which we call the perception of a fact. It is not necessary to maintain that the individual perception of a fact may be *defined* as an individual perception, together with the consciousness that it is not merely individual, that it has no other or more characteristic distinguishing quality. All that we need to maintain is, that among the distinguishing marks of the individual perception of fact is this, that it conceives itself to be not merely an individual perception, but a common perception of which our own individual act of perception is an instance. The idea of fact, *i.e.*, appears in ordinary experience as the creation of the collective mind;

perception of fact, as an element in common experience, is perception of the individual as the organ of the collective

mind.* As an illustration of this truth we may point to the feeling of discovery, where the discoverer's power to

enlighten mankind or to gratify his own pride depends on his assumption not merely that his testimony will be believed, but that it deserves to be believed, on his consciousness, *i.e.* that not he only but in him the intellectual society to which he belongs has made the observation and attained to the fact. The general accept-

ance of testimony, again, is witness not

testimony. to the general trust of mankind in any and every individual observer, but to the general recognition of the action of the collective through the individual mind. When we give reasons for distrusting testimony, we assign the testimony to some perverting cause which has disturbed the individual mind, and disqualified it from fulfilling its normal office as the organ of the collective intelligence. Indeed, the actual distrust of testimony itself is neither more nor less than the refusal of the collective mind to allow a particular individual mind to have acted for the collective mind in a particular case, or the refusal of an individual to join in the general acceptance of an individual perception of fact as in fact a collective perception.

The individual mind, indeed, wakes to the exercise of intelligence in an intelligent, a thinking, society. To what extent the activity of thought is dependent upon mere words may be matter of dispute. But if we can think without even virtually using words, it is only

* Cp. Note D, on "Intersubjective Intercourse," p. 191.

because we can think the meaning of words without thinking the words themselves. We shall not be exaggerating the intimacy of union between the indi-

vidual and the collective mind if we note, as an instance of it, the dependence of the individual mind on what is, in fact, the content of language. Language is the creation of the collective intelligence, in whose communion the individual intelligence lives.

Language is the creation, the expression of the collective intelligence. It is not merely the means of communication between mind and mind; it is the storehouse of common ideas, the record of the collective perception and experience of the society among which it circulates. Language is in the intellectual region what we saw law to be in the region of action—a hard fact, an undeniable result of the collective action of individual minds; an evidence, accordingly, of the intellectual communion of individual persons with another.

If, in the play of intelligence, in the intercourse of mind with mind, we lay stress on the assertion of indi-

vidual judgment, and ascribe the progress of thought to the conflict of opinion, this conflict itself concerns the issue as to *truth*. The conflict and the assertion of individual judgment alike involve and imply a common standard of truth.

Even the assertion of individual judgment implies a common standard of truth. And this standard, again, is systematically applied in argument or proof, the very nature of which implies that we start from the premisses of a *common* experience, and establish what is never a merely individual conviction, always and only a universal, in the sense of a *collective*, conclusion.

Science includes and expresses the aspiration and hope of the human mind to convert our casual and

unevenly distributed experiences into a collective whole of human knowledge, to be appropriated by any and every individual independently of his origin or nationality, finding thus an escape not merely from the bonds set to understanding by individual experience and capacity, but from whatever limitations of thought or knowledge any intellectual fellowship narrower than the communion of the universal intelligence may seem to impose or to maintain.

Science aims at realising the results of an experience that assumes itself to be, by right, collective.

The appeal to and the claim of individual judgment alike imply a recognition of the authority of the collective mind.

The authoritative claim of the collective mind, like the authoritative claim of the collective will, is recognised in the region of the individual consciousness itself, in the appeal to individual experience as the first step to the knowledge of the truth—an appeal which, by accepting it as a test, invests it with the authority of universal experience. Still more is the claim of the individual mind to attain to the generally accepted truth by genuine conviction, or else to deny it to be truth, a recognition of the collective standard as a vital element in the life of the individual mind, which contains the strongest possible assertion of the reality of the collective standard and of its authority over the individual mind.

Collective belief makes for the ideal of a creed.

Lastly, there is a higher degree of assent than even individual conviction, in the acceptance of a conclusion, as a collective possession of the intellectual community of mankind, where the truth is accepted like a scientific or a philosophical doctrine by the disciples of some great teacher of mankind as the soul and rationale of a spiritual

movement, laying hold of life, and claiming from the intellectual sphere authoritative power over the moral and emotional intercourse of spiritual beings. And this belief in a principle or a system is carried to its highest point in the religious idea of a creed, a body of truth concerning the universal being, the collective life of the universe, conceived as the rationale of the existence of this collective life itself and of our own communion with it.

In the emotional region of the life of personal beings the evidence of personal communion is of a different kind. Action is the ex-

III. In the region of emotion, which covers the whole of life—

pression of will, language is the expression of thought; emotion, we feel tempted to say, is its own expression—in fact, its expression is the whole social life of man, and his individual life in so far as it shows him to be engaged in or divorced from emotional communion with his kind; and the evidences of the social character of emotion are to be found scattered over the whole surface of human life, except in so far as religion, the expression of the supreme emotion, is realised as gathering and comprehending every phase and department of life into itself.

Pleasure is the most individual form of emotion, the moment of rest in the achievement of individual desire,

of pleasures, mutual pleasures are the keenest.

the appreciation of that which the individual mind has apprehended. It must be enough to note here that the keenest pleasures, and certainly those which are most characteristic of personal life, are social pleasures—those which not only involve, but consist in interchange of individual pleasure.* It is, indeed, in this form that

* Part II. ch. v. p. 137.

pleasure most obviously asserts its claim to be more than animal—to be human, personal, spiritual.

Art embodies and defines the social character of pleasure. In art, the individual aims at making himself

the mouthpiece and minister of the emotions of a community which in idea at least is universal. And artistic impulse or artistic appreciation, in higher or lower forms, permeates human society from end to end, and retains throughout the same essential character, individual expression or individual appropriation of what is felt to be in idea a collective emotion.

But man, the personal being, lives in a world of emotion that is evidently social. It is the element in which he finds the breath of life. The child begins to live and move and have its being in the atmosphere of love. To live in one another is the ideal of every relation of family life. And even where the ideal is apparently furthest from realisation, the life itself is still an emotional fact, an acutely conscious interchange of feeling. It is the tendency of emotion thus to make men cease to be individual units, to weld them into unities; and the capacity of the individual for thus passing out of and beyond his own individual life into union with the lives of others, is to him a source of unrest, the very inspiration of passion, which finds so many outlets in the infinite variety of the lives of men. Men find the satisfaction of this social impulse, the desire for emotional union with their kind, in very various ways. They may drug the pangs of desire by the gratification of sensual passion. They may seek

Art implies and appeals to a collective emotion of beauty.

But emotion is the very element of the social life of man,

distraction from the disease of spiritual solitude by absorption in work. Work itself may bring with it the fellowship to which work naturally leads, and therewith the affections and loyalties which accompany every kind of association—social emotions, these, which, though they only occasionally rise to the level of a passion, are nevertheless the very element of the life to which they belong. Such sympathies of association vary in the degree in which they attain to such a standard of unselfishness as entitles them to rank high in common estimation. They vary in the force which gives them effect, in the success with which they assert their claim over those who come within their range. But every individual carries with him, as a part of himself, the consciousness of a collective mind, in the “society” to which he belongs. It may assert itself in his life in very impalpable ways; but change his social atmosphere and surroundings, and we see at once how much he depended upon it, how much the individual life in the emotional region consists in membership of the collective life, of the various forms of social union into which the individual has been absorbed. These are but vague and fragmentary indications of the most deep-seated principle of personal life, that which makes sympathy in some degree the need of all men, and self-devotion the one commanding need of the best.

But there is a principle in human life, the chosen channel of the supreme emotion, an aspect, a department of life in which every aspect and
and as such has become the principle of religion. every department of life are comprehended. Religion has assumed this definite shape. It has undertaken this function in

human life. It has claimed to comprehend and to inspire every form of life by setting forth love, the emotion of mutual communion between persons, as the dominant principle, the key-fact of life and of the world, the vital secret of happiness. Quite apart from any question of the truth of Christianity, the fact that, in Christianity, religion, as the embodiment of the supreme emotion, has thus appeared upon the stage of history, that it has created a new form of fellowship, and through it has intensified every form of fellowship already existing among mankind, is a significant element in the *primâ facie* evidence which we are here passing in review, that the character of fellowship attaches to human life as a whole.

PART II

PERSONALITY AND ITS FACULTIES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PERSONALITY is the capacity for fellowship. To the theoretical recognition of this truth there is a practical

The current theory of personality reflects the fact that personality, in practice, is often a capacity for fellowship unrealised. obstacle in the simple fact that men largely fail of their destiny, and that the individual personalities of which the world is full are unrealised, or at best very imperfectly realised, capacities

for fellowship. The sense of practical failure is reflected in philosophical theory.

And there are reasons why philosophy of its own accord has been disposed to strike the note, to which

Philosophy itself too has arisen in times of social collapse. the individual experience of isolation and divorce from the reality of fellow-

ship is so ready to respond, and which this very response tends to perpetuate and to prolong as the prevailing tone of philosophic thought. European philosophy has had two births, and both have fallen in periods when what had been the great social unity was in collapse, breaking up into its component units.

The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle taught that man

Greek philosophy, born as the πόλις died, became a philosophy of individual life. was a social animal; that he had in him the tendencies of which the πόλις—the Greek society—was the

outcome. But this πόλις was already ceasing to be

a living social form. Plato's passionate protest against its decay could not avail to stay the hand of fate. With Aristotle already the delineation of the type of individual character which this social life produced is the prominent feature in his philosophy of life. And Greek philosophy after Aristotle as a philosophy of life lived and died as a philosophy of individual life.

The birth of modern philosophy, again, was a feature in that long process of wakening to a consciousness of

itself in which the mediæval Church as an effective social institution died a lingering death. Nationality and the local loyalties which grew with it had begun to take the place of that un-

earthly combination of Church and Empire which had ruled the heart and mind of Europe. But the individual sat incomparably looser to the new tie than to the old. It had neither the commanding authority of a world-wide sway which was the visible image of the Universal will, nor yet had it the intimate hold on the individual life, member as the individual had learnt to believe himself to be of a visible spiritual society that would live into eternity. Nor did the study of antiquity revive the lessons of the social philosophy of Greece.

And modern philosophy started with a logical separation of the mind from reality, Modern philosophy sprang out of the common European mind. And it was the Logic, not the Politics or even the Ethics of Aristotle, which had stamped itself on the Latin mind, and given to Europe the framework of its thought. The logical proposition, with its subject and predicate, substance and quality, hardened into that separation from one another from which the Metaphysic

of Aristotle had sought to save them, these gave to modern philosophy its root conceptions of extension and thought, which haunt us through the history of every school of modern philosophy, the embodiment of a dualism of which the modern agnostic is the last pathetic result. Modern philosophy started with a separation of the mind from reality.

And this separation of the mind from reality, the assumption borrowed by philosophy from the life out of

a separation which?
philosophy, appealing
to thought apart from
will and emotion, is
peculiarly powerless
to overcome.

which it grew, has been intensified and fixed by the operation of another cause native to philosophy itself. Philosophy is the supreme expression of the intellectual faculty in personal life. And

the intellect in philosophy naturally tends to magnify its office. That communion with reality, in which we are to maintain that the knowledge of reality consists, is not to be achieved by the intellectual faculty, except in its due relation with the moral and emotional faculties.* Philosophy, in fact, has set to thought an eminently uncongenial task where it has demanded that it should abolish single-handed the dualism which especially belongs to thought.† A sense of "bloodless" unreality

* Cp. Bradley, "Principles of Logic," p. 533: "It may come from a failure of my metaphysics or from a weakness of the flesh, which continues to blind me, but the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghostlike as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it as a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstraction, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."

† On the intimate connection of the three, as seen from the point of view of psychology, cp. Ladd, "Descr. Psych.," p. 18: "Every psychic fact is actually complex with an irreducible threefold complexity; it is at the same time a fact of intellection, a fact of feeling, and a fact of conation." So

has haunted the highest achievement of the thought which has ignored its relation to emotion and will. The analysis of the intellectual process in isolation and abstraction from the other personal faculties could not even yield a rationale of the intellectual achievement itself. It can only plausibly appear to do so because the isolation of the intellectual faculty cannot really be made complete.

It is impossible to attempt to enter on a systematic appeal to the facts of experience in order to justify the

To commend the definition of personality as the capacity for fellowship, the faculties of personality must be exhibited in their union with one another.

principle that personal fellowship is the key-fact of experience, until we have first examined the relation of the various faculties of personal life to one another, sufficiently at least to show that they are inseparable from one another, and that it is through their ordered co-operation that we experience that communion with reality in which it is to be maintained that experience consists.

The definition of experience is the object throughout. But the terms of the definition must be cleared from misunderstanding. It is personality as a whole which is the faculty for fellowship. Philosophical speculation has separated the various phases or forms of personal life from one another. They must be restored to their organic union with one another, as members of the whole individual personality, before the individual personality itself can be exhibited as the faculty for fellowship in the various regions of experience.

Ward, "Encyc. Brit.," part 77, p. 39. As to the "constituent elements" of consciousness, "there is in the main substantial agreement: the elementary facts of mind cannot, it is held, be expressed in less than three propositions—I feel somehow, I know something, I do something."

CHAPTER II

FEELING

IN analysing the individual personality, feeling first demands definition. Feeling is the background of per-

sonality, the element of "consciousness" that interpenetrates and accompanies all the different forms of "self-conscious" life.*

Feeling apart, every form of personal life is a form of self-consciousness—self-consciousness meaning here not consciousness *of* a self, but consciousness *in relation* to a self, consciousness of that which can only be defined in distinction from a self, where the self is not explicit but implicit in the consciousness, not necessarily present but necessarily involved. The intellectual consciousness of an object, for instance, or the moral consciousness of a motive are forms of self-consciousness. The object or the motive can only be defined as an object or a motive in distinction from a self. And every form of will and

* Bradley, "Mind," N.S., No. 6, p. 212: "What comes first in each of us is rather feeling (than consciousness), a state as yet without either a subject or an object. Feeling here naturally does not mean mere pleasure and pain. . . . Feeling is immediate experience without distinction or relation in itself. It is a unity complex, but without relations; and there is here no difference between the state and its content, since, in a word, the experienced and the experience are one. And a distinction between cognition and other aspects of our nature is not yet developed. Feeling is not one differentiated aspect, but it holds all aspects in one."

thought and emotion are in this sense self-conscious. But behind and along with every form of self-conscious life there is a form of consciousness which is not self-consciousness.*

Every perception, every volition, every self-conscious emotion, is dogged by its own shadow of antecedent feeling, and this feeling, like every other part of our conscious life, we observe and reflect upon. The

Feeling is observed
by intellectual self-
consciousness,

intellectual consciousness endeavours to seize and to define it. But feeling eludes definition, because in endeavouring to define it the intellectual consciousness alters feeling. In the attempt to seize and describe

which breaks up
"feeling" into
"feelings,"

feeling, the mind divides it into *feelings*, moments, phases of feeling. But feeling is in itself continuous; its phases or pulsations pass into one another, often as smoothly as the summit and the hollow of a wave in the swell of an unbroken sea. The successive phases or pulsations differ from one another. But it is not the feeling consciousness that marks off these phases from one another and contrasts them with one another. This is the work of reflection, of the intellectual consciousness that observes the stream of feeling. Feeling, again, knows neither subject nor object; it is, to the merely feeling consciousness, neither the feeling of an object causing the changes of feeling, nor the feeling of a subject of feeling undergoing changes in its consciousness, and conscious of the changes.

and describes it in
judgments,

No judgment either of perception or reflection *expresses* feeling. It is not mere feeling

* See Note E, Appendix, p. 192, on "Consciousness and Self-consciousness."

that is expressed in the perceptive judgment, "That is hot," or in the reflective judgment, "I am cold." And some such judgment as this latter, thought in observing feeling inevitably forms. If feeling could express itself directly in language, its language would have neither substantives nor adjectives. It would express itself in a series of adverbs—a series the members of which would not be more distinct from one another than the gradations by which the bee passes from the busy hum of honey-laden contentment to the angry buzz of thwarted endeavour, for the purport of these momentary giving it a subject, expressions of feeling could not be and a definite content, defined to mere feeling by any contrast of one point in the stream of consciousness with another. When the psychologist speaks of the "content"* of consciousness, he is detaching an adjective from its substantive, a quality from the thing it qualifies, a modification of the feeling consciousness from the feeling consciousness of which it is a modification. Only as qualifying the thing as the predicate of a perceptive judgment is the quality apprehended as a quality at all; only as the predicate of a reflective judgment, as the content of a moment or phase of consciousness marked off from other moments or phases of consciousness, in distinction from the feeling consciousness and in relation to it, is the modification of consciousness a content at all.† The feeling consciousness is observed

* Cp. James, "Text-book of Psychology," p. 465: "Shall we describe the experience as a quality of our feeling, or our feeling of a quality? The ambiguous word 'content' has been recently invented instead of 'object,' to escape a decision."

† On the "presentation" of psychology as still more open to this criticism, see Note E, on "Consciousness and Self-consciousness."

and described *post-mortem** by the thinking consciousness whether of the ordinary man in his reflective moments or of the psychological observer. The phase of feeling, which in the instinctive working of the intelligence of the ordinary man passes into a perception, is viewed by the self-observing intelligence in the reflecting mind as a phase of the feeling self. The feeling self, as feeling, is not a self, it does not feel itself to be a self, it is the selfhood of the thinker which is viewed (and no doubt truly viewed) by thought as the subject of successive phases of feeling. And to the observing intellect, to the self thus, as thinker, taking note of itself as feeling, the feeling appears to have a complex and indefinite content—this observation being, so to say, the obverse side of that vaguely complex world which thought presents to reflection in the perception which comes nearest to feeling. The content

which, as feeling,
before it passes into
perception, it does
not have.

of the perception is reflected back into the feeling life. Feeling as felt can never be described or expressed. It is described as reflected on by thought. Feeling as it passes is separated by the self-observing intelligence into moments or elements: in itself it is continuous, and knows neither division nor distinction. It is unified and regarded as a stream, a mass of consciousness: in feeling itself there is nothing to make it a whole. It is attributed to a subject of sentient consciousness, who is distinguished from the variety of his consciousness: feeling itself knows no distinction of a subject feeling from a feeling felt. The intellectual observer, noting

* Seth, "Man's Place in the Cosmos," p. 120: "All introspection is really retrospection; it is a *post-mortem* examination."

the emergence from feeling of the judgment of perception, and finding in the judgment of reflection into which this judgment of perception is instinctively converted a complex and various content, infers from the variety and complexity of the self-conscious life a like variety and complexity in feeling itself. At any given moment of our conscious life there is present to us as perceived a vaguely bounded world, the immediate environment of the bodily self, all that is within the range of the senses, or of such immediate and unconscious inference as the operation of the senses usually includes. Here is a perception—with a content. We reflect, *i.e.* we become conscious “I am perceiving,” and what was the content of the perceptive judgment immediately becomes the content of a reflective judgment. But reflection also tells us—“before I perceived, I felt,” and the psychologist is apt to transfer to the antecedent feeling the content of the reflective judgment.

This process, by which thought reflects back into feeling its own organised relation of variety in unity, may be said to be the converse of that by which feeling communicates to the first and instinctive judgments of perception, and in some measure to those of reflection too, a vividness and assurance, a sense of intimacy and close communion with the thing or mind observed, which becomes lost in the further development of thought.

If the question be asked, How can the feeling consciousness be observed at all by a thinking consciousness so alien from it in character? it can, I think, only be answered that we are endeavouring to describe the facts of personal life—that different phases or forms of personal life are not, as a matter of fact, separate from

one another like the limbs of a body. They are rather
 Diverse as feeling aspects or forms of personal life, the
 and perception are, activity of each one of which involves
 as a matter of fact, the activity of all the others. They
 we perceive that we feel, though feeling, are thus, so to say, internal to one
 as perceived, ceases to be felt. another.* Each as it comes to the front
 absorbs but does not obliterate the other. And so
 here, as there is a feeling of perceiving, we can also
 perceive that we feel, though in perceiving that we feel,
 we *ipso facto* cease to merely feel. Feeling, as it is
 intellectually apprehended, ceases to be felt.

Philosophical discussion has associated feeling espe-
 cially with thought, because thought is in us the observer,
 the philosopher. But feeling equally
 Volition as well as thought springs from feeling. dogs the steps of the various forms of
 moral self-consciousness, as they appear
 upon the threshold of self-conscious life. Here too
 definite consciousness often begins with a vague com-
 plex of motives, impulses, and desires, dormant or
 dominant in different degrees in different moments of
 consciousness, and it is against this vague background
 of desires that some definite motive or desire asserts
 itself. And here too the awakening desire, the impulse
 which is nearest to feeling, has a force and spontaneity
 of its own which it seems to bring with it from the
 feeling out of which it springs.

The relation of feeling to what we are in this essay
 to distinguish from it as emotion, needs to be more
 clearly marked, because the distinction does not corre-
 spond to any division recognised in popular language.

* Cp. Tertullian, "De Animâ," ii. 7: "Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem quod sentit? aut intellectum non sentientem quod intelligit."

We shall mean, then, by emotion, self-conscious feeling, and by feeling, emotion without distinction in consciousness

And feeling, as merely conscious, is to be distinguished from emotion, the self-conscious feeling, of which it is the anticipation. ness between the subject of feeling and its occasion. The things which we distinguish in self-conscious feeling as subject and object, the cause of feeling and the consciousness that feels, are

in mere feeling merged in one another. In emotion, it is essential to the feeling that we should be conscious of the thing admired, loved, abhorred, as distinct from ourselves, qualifying our feeling, causing in us love, abhorrence, admiration, and itself qualified by doing so, as beautiful, horrible, lovable. Feeling is both momentary and evanescent. Emotion comes to a climax at moments of time, but it abides, and through the fluctuations of feeling preserves an identity of its own as a relation between the subject and the object in the emotion. Feeling lacks the element of will, and is hence often described as passive, though in fact it is neither active nor passive. But emotion is purposed, deliberate, laden with the force of the will that maintains it. Feeling, so far as we can seize and describe it, is, as we have said, without any consciousness of distinction between the subject of feeling and its cause: emotion is intensely conscious of the distinction, even in the very act of overcoming it. Feeling then is the negation of any and all of the forms of self-consciousness. Emotion is the consummation of self-consciousness. Emotion carries with it, as essential to itself, the characters of will and thought. It carries them with it, and merges them in something which is not feeling, and yet is like it—a relation of communion between subject

and object, of which feeling, their unconscious union, was the prophecy and anticipation.

In the ordinary normal consciousness of the unsophisticated human person, the form of self-conscious-

The form of self-consciousness which in common experience stands in immediate contrast to feeling is consciousness of the object rather than of the self.

ness, moral, intellectual, or emotional, which seems to arise directly out of feeling, which finds itself dogged by feeling, is that in which the object is obvious, the subject implied. Self-consciousness seems to appear upon the scene, as the consciousness of an object perceived, a thing, a person, a world; or as the consciousness of a motive, a desire, an obligation, an impulse from without; or as the consciousness of an object, pleasant or repellent, qualified by emotion. I am conscious of a world, intellectual, moral, or emotional, before I am explicitly conscious of a self. Between feeling and this form of self-consciousness, the consciousness, moral, intellectual, or emotional, of an object, there is normally no intermediate stage in which the subject of consciousness is conscious of itself as the subject of a modification in its consciousness, and from which the step is made, as it were, by way of inference to an object as the cause of the modification. This immediate sequence of self-consciousness on feeling is the fact of experience as it presents itself to reflection. If we try to get behind this, we are in a highly speculative region of thought, where the psychologist may, or may not, afford us data for determining the stages in the history of a development from merely conscious to self-conscious life, from feeling to will, thought, and emotion.

Such a development might be imagined, *a priori*, to

take place in very various ways. In the merely feeling

The course of development from consciousness to self-consciousness is conjectural.

consciousness, the distinction between subject and object is latent. The feeling consciousness of any individual subject of consciousness is in a sense microcosmic; its changes reflect the history of the universe from a particular point of view; more immediately they reflect variations in its own immediate surroundings, as a centre of consciousness localised in time or space, or in whatever other sphere we suppose the individual point of consciousness to be placed. But in the feeling consciousness itself, itself and its world are in no way discriminated from one another. Under what stimulus can we conceive the conscious self to spring into distinction from its world?

To review a series of conjectural answers to this question, without professing to adduce any proof or to establish any presumption in favour of one rather than another, is a proceeding which would not seem likely in itself to lead to any useful result. But it may appear that there is a conclusion which cannot well be avoided on any and every hypothesis as to the process by which self-conscious sprang from conscious life. And it is worth while to make the attempt to show that this is so.

We may conceive, then, a condition of discord to arise in the consciousness, giving rise to a vague

We can imagine self-consciousness to arise from consciousness—from feeling—as desire,

appetency, a sense of uneasiness and want, growing into a definite desire or repulsion—the individual asserting himself, and claiming to reshape his surroundings, or to readjust himself to them. If this

were conceived to be the course of the development, the first step in self-conscious life would be very evidently volitional. But if so, it is also evident, in the first place, that the act of will has already become intellectual, as soon as an object independent of the self is apprehended as the object of desire or repulsion, and that this "desire" already contains in itself an emotional element, in the anticipated feeling of satisfaction in which desire as desire becomes complete. And further, even the vague appetency which is here supposed to precede desire, involves an intellectual recognition of the outer world as other than the self, and the emotional consciousness of its discord with the self. It "involves" them, *i.e.* these other aspects or phases of this primary volitional consciousness detach themselves from it as we reflect upon it, but seem to form a part of it, and to be inseparable from it in fact.

Or, again, we might imagine in the feeling consciousness, a condition of equipoise, of repose, in which, as perception, in the mere intensity of the pause in a moment or phase of consciousness, the object prominent at such a moment in its influence on consciousness should separate itself from the conscious self, and the first dim perception should arise. Some such phase of experience we should say that we have in moments of rest and reverie, when weariness has led us to relapse from any kind of spiritual energy into a state which brings us nearest to the primeval feeling life. If it were so that self-consciousness arose, we should say again that the virtual self-assertion, by which the object is thrust away from the self to be perceived and observed, is an element of will presupposed in this

primary perception, and that the quality under which the object is perceived—what the psychologist would call the content of this stage of consciousness—is always an apprehension of the object as affecting the self. In feeling there is no distinction of world and self; the world is felt as affecting the self, and the self as affected by the world. Here, in the first dim perception, it is under this character, as causing such and such an affection of the self, that the world, the object, is known. The primary intellectual perception then would arise out of the merely feeling life by a volitional self-assertion, and would pass into an emotional appreciation of the object, such emotional appreciation being already involved in the intellectual assertion of its quality, but passing into a definite emotional verdict by which this small cycle of personal life would be closed.

Once more we might picture the passage from consciousness—thus. We could conceive a stage of feeling in which in the fulness of contentment or as emotion, the subject of feeling should rise into consciousness of the world of feeling, the object of emotion, as a world of worship, an object of adoration. And here again the impulse of spiritual energy which asserts itself in the rise of the emotion, makes this rise of emotion itself primarily an act of will. And the apprehension of the object of love or adoration as other than the subject of the emotion, a separation involved in the very nature of emotion, shows the trace of the intellectual activity which is involved where self-conscious life thus takes its rise in emotion.

In present experience the self-conscious life of personality breaks forth abruptly from the background of

feeling as will, thought, or emotion. The foregoing analysis, in the last degree speculative and hypothetical, **but in any case the original birth of self-consciousness would seem to be volitional.** of possible stages of progress connecting conscious and self-conscious life seems to suggest the natural order in which these faculties or phases of personality are related to one another.* And the suggestion is that feeling breaks into self-consciousness always really by way of volition,† and then through the intellectual phase passes into emotion—a suggestion which will be confirmed as we pursue our analysis of these faculties of personality themselves.

* Obviously in this tentative and merely illustrative treatment of the borderland between feeling and self-consciousness we have treated volition merely as an energy of the subject of self-consciousness, ignoring the no less significant fact that this energy is asserted always in correlation with some impulse of energy from without. This, instead of the other, might have been made the prominent factor in the change.

† Cp. Ladd, "Outlines of Descr. Psych.," p. 112: "To be the subject of a conscious state is to be doing something." Cp. also the passages on Conation quoted in Note F, on "Will and Causation," p. 201.

CHAPTER III

WILL

It is with the will then—the volitional form of self-consciousness—that we begin our analysis of the

Will is observed and described by self-conscious intelligence, but it is itself self-conscious. elements or aspects of personality. The term “self-consciousness” is usually applied to knowledge. In asserting that will and emotion are

distinct modes of self-consciousness, it is necessary to note not only that intellectual self-consciousness accompanies the self-consciousness of will and emotion, but that in describing either of these latter we necessarily describe it in terms of the intellectual consciousness.

“That is beautiful,” “That is desirable,” “I ought to do this,” are intellectual judgments. Words are the language of thought. It is thought which observes and describes in perception and reflection alike. It is thought which observes and describes the action of will. But it is nevertheless not difficult to see that will is self-conscious activity, not merely in the sense that it is an activity accompanied by self-conscious intelligence. We act, and we know that we act. But we are self-conscious agents not merely because we know that we act. Our action itself, as well as our knowledge of it, is self-conscious. The activity of the will is itself a mode of

self-consciousness. We are intellectually conscious of things, of objects. We call this self-consciousness

What the object is to intelligence the motive is to volition. because we are conscious of the thing or object as distinct from ourselves. We are morally conscious of motives.

We call this self-consciousness because we are conscious of the motive as distinct from ourselves. We cannot desire an object without an intellectual perception of the object. Granted. It is nevertheless true that our moral consciousness of the object as desired, as moving the will, is distinct from our intellectual consciousness

Volition is expressed in action, described in intellectual judgments. of it as known. Of this moral consciousness, action is the *expression*, as language is of the intellectual consciousness.

The motive in operation is *described* in an intellectual judgment. Various kinds of motives are described in various types of judgment. There is a judgment of desire, of which the type is, "This is desirable." There is a judgment of obligation, of which the type is, "I ought." There are judgments, whose classification in one order is less obvious, and on which we cannot here dwell at length,* judgments which embody some harmony or mutual relation of wills as united in determining action. But in any or all of these the moral fact described is distinct from its intellectual description, and the moral fact is, motivated action.

This distinction of volition or will from intellect and emotion, the other forms of self-consciousness, and its relation to them, will be exemplified as we trace it through the three obvious forms of volition—desire,

* Cp. pp. 59-63.

duty, affection. In every form of volition alike, the self acts and acts from a motive, *i.e.* we observe ourselves

Volition in all its forms involves a "motive," *i.e.* involves—

- (1) action ;
- (2) impulse from without ;
- (3) adoption of the impulse.

to act, to be moved to act by something distinct from ourselves, and to identify ourselves with that by which we are moved. All these three elements are necessary to make the motive. Action is not motivated, and is not volitional, or, indeed, "action"

at all, unless the self that is moved identifies itself with that which moves it, and which thereby becomes a motive,

This is the *primâ facie* fact of volition.

and leads to action. Whether or not our volitional consciousness is delusive is not here the question.* We are so far describing only what our volitional consciousness *is*, what the average man means when he says, "I did it." He describes an experience of which this is *primâ facie* the account to be given. I act—something not myself prompts me to act—I adopt the prompting. It is not true to the facts to describe an action simply as moved ; it is *motived*, *i.e.* I acquiesce in, or accept, or adopt, the impulse I receive. It may turn out, on examination and analysis, that my consciousness of adopting the motive is a delusion, a delusion which can be traced to its source—a delusion whose psychological history can be written out in black and white. None the less the consciousness of adopting the impulse from without, and thereby making it a motive, is part of the *primâ facie* fact to be studied or accounted for. Nor, again, is it true to the facts to say that self-consciousness constitutes the impulse from without into a motive,

* See Note F, on "Will and Causation."

and then to ignore the fact that it is an impulse moving from without which is thus made into a motive. The primary fact, the normal experience wherever we act at all, is a combination of these two facts—we act under a motive, we make the motive our own under which we act. May it be said that sometimes, at least, we are conscious of *merely* acting? I should answer, No, always of directed action—action with an aim in it, action, *i.e.*, already involving something that moves us to act, and an identification of ourselves with that which moves us.

This then is the volitional form or aspect of self-consciousness, whose relation to thought and emotion we have to trace through and emotion we have to trace through three typical forms of volition. The form of volitional self-consciousness which naturally offers itself first for consideration is that which is generally covered by the term “desire.”* In this region of the moral consciousness a thing desired represents the impulse from without—that which moves us to act; and desire is the going forth of the mind towards the thing with strength enough to produce the action. As desired, the object becomes a motive.

The presence of an intellectual element in this type

* The use of “desire” in this general sense disregards distinctions between impulse, appetite, instinct, etc., on the one hand, and desire on the other, and indicates, what I believe to be the truth, that the normal representative of the simplest type of volition is volition directed to an object. Psychologists may discern more rudimentary forms of conative or appetitive consciousness, or they may analyse desire itself, and note the spontaneous element in desire under such names as impulse, instinct, etc.; but this does not affect the normal fact that desire for an object is, in common experience, the primary form of volition.

of moral consciousness is obvious enough. We desire an object. Desire, in its simplest form, is represented rather by a judgment of the form, "This is desirable," than by a judgment of the form, "I desire this." Desirability or desiredness in the object is the motive rather than desire in us. It is upon the object that attention is concentrated. And the "object" is, so to say, a recognised intellectual product. The "object" is an object of *intellectual* self-consciousness, of that form of intellectual self-consciousness which is commonly called perception. Here, then, is an intellectual element already involved in desire. But desire involves not only an intellectual perception of the object desired, but also an intellectual perception of the desirable quality in the object. Sometimes the matter will so present itself to the mind that we should rather say there is in the desire an intellectual perception of the object as it is and an intellectual perception of the object as it is desired to be. This only gives us the perception of the desirable quality in a different form.

But allowing for both of these as intellectual perceptions, there still remains the motive relation to the self of the object as it is desired to be. No account of the intellectual elements in desire exhausts the matter. Desire is no mere product or result of intellectual perceptions. What we loosely and generally call the object is a motive as well as an object; it is perceived by the knowing self as existing, it moves the acting self as desirable. The world is to the knowing self a world of objects, of things that are; to the acting self a world of impulses, an infinite congeries of

attractions and repulsions—a world of possible satisfactions, of points on which we depend, of focuses of force that draw us out of ourselves.

Duty represents a form of moral self-consciousness quite distinct from desire, the consciousness which we describe whenever we use the words "I ought." Here the obligation re-judgment "I ought," presents the impulse from without—an impulse not, like desire, appealing to a need, and calling up a response from the spring of action within, but authoritative, imposing itself upon the self within whose bounds it appears, and which in obeying the impulse accepts it as its own and identifies itself with it.

The judgment of obligation differs at once from the judgment of desire in the form in which it is expressed.

a judgment as to the subject of consciousness, In the judgment of desire, the thing desired is, as we saw, the subject of the judgment—"This is desirable." In the judgment of obligation, "I ought," the I, the self, is the subject of the judgment.

The question indeed occurs, in applying to this form of moral consciousness our definition of "motive," whether the "ought," the obligation, **but nevertheless describing an impulse from without ;** is not within us too—whether conscientious action is indeed, as it has been said to be, "self-movement." It is self-movement only with the proviso that something other than ourselves has found a footing in ourselves, and that conscientious action is the surrender of ourselves to be determined by it. I surrender myself to duty always with the consciousness that the self which surrenders itself is other than that to which it surrenders itself.

In other words, we must maintain that the consciousness of action in obedience to duty is a consciousness of being moved as well as of being self-moved. This is, at this stage, the *prima facie* moral fact, whatever explanation may remain to be given of it. When we act upon the impulse of duty, we obey, we are commanded, we are obliged, and the authoritative character of the impulse carries with it at once the implication that we are moved by something other than ourselves, and that we adopt the impulse as our own.

And there is an intellectual element in this form of moral consciousness, though it is different from that involving its own form of intellectual consciousness, from which again it is distinct as a motive, which we saw present in desire. The judgment which describes the consciousness of duty, the judgment "I ought," is an intellectual judgment equally with the judgment "This is desirable," though in the form of the expression it is the predicate instead of the subject which implies the perception of something different from the self. This perception is the perception of a law. Under the motive of desire, the mind is occupied with the particular thing desired at the moment. Under the motive of duty, it is occupied with a law or rule covering a number of actions. This in itself implies an intellectual apprehension of a different kind. It is a different operation of the intellect which apprehends a law governing a number of different cases. The perception involved in any generalisation is different from the "perception" commonly called perception, the perception of a fact. But it is an intellectual perception, nevertheless, which, merely as a generalisation, the law of duty involves.

That the consciousness of duty is more than an intellectual perception of a general truth is implied in the difference of meaning which attaches to law with the sense of authority as contrasted with law merely in the sense of generalisation. The law of moral consciousness is a motive. And it is a motive clearly distinct from desire. It is different not only in the intellectual operation involved.

a motive in itself
different from the
motive of desire :

The nature of the impulse as authoritative makes a difference in the moral region, in the character of the motive itself. It may be true that desire in the individual self-consciousness or in the world carries with it much of the imperative character. Impulse is authoritative. Desire has in it something of the nature of a command. Or, again, it may be true that at certain stages of the moral history of mankind we come across descriptions of the moral fact—like the Greek τὸ καλόν, where duty seems to be regarded as an object of desire, a quality in the thing to be done which draws the self into action, rather than an imperative acting upon it within. But the fact that in such cases as these we seem to catch duty in the act of disengaging itself from desire illustrates rather than confuses the distinction between the two. The facts in either case, in themselves rather baffling and difficult to describe, become clearer when viewed as lying on the borderland between the two regions of volition. The two regions of volition remain none the less distinct.

The higher motive of social affection and the higher region of the moral life to which it belongs is more difficult to describe. It may, perhaps, be indicated thus.

The history of an imaginary transition from desire to duty has often been traced by philosophers. It is to

iii. in affection— be observed, as to any such history,
 the common account that it leaves the essential distinction
 of the transition from between duty and desire untouched;
 desire to duty involves that duty as it ultimately emerges from
 a social view of desire is distinct from desire, though
 morals, which sug- duty is nevertheless the direct outcome
 gests a higher social motive,

of desire. But there is another observation to be made on these speculations. If we start from the man as a unit of desire, desire, through the sheer impotence to satisfy desire, binds men into societies,* leads them to discover this fact about themselves, that they rise to a higher level of self-satisfaction in a society, and it is social life that brings with it the new spiritual force or motive of obligation. This view of duty and the moral life of men as a *social* fact has predominated of late. The moral life is viewed, not so much as an individual doing his duty, obeying his individual conscience, satisfying his social instincts and the like; the moral life is viewed rather as the social life. The various forms of social union are studied. The fact that I have a duty to do, and a conscience to obey, is an incidental result of the fact that I am a member of society. The social view of morals, which has thus arisen out of the explanation of the progress from desire to duty, may itself point to a moral apprehension distinct from both. And, apart from any special tendencies of modern moral speculation, the moral life has by no means always been viewed from a merely individual point of view. A moral category higher than duty has actually

* Plato, "Rep.," p. 369 : ποιήσει δὲ αὐτήν (viz. πόλιν) ἡ ἡμετέρα χρεία.

been attained and realised, wherever obedience of the individual to a law which he finds incumbent on him is merged in the devotion of the individual to a society of which he forms a part. If moral theory has not formulated this type of volition into a judgment, it is certainly not because it cannot claim to be a fact of experience. Every form of social union, in which any degree of affection or loyalty is recognised as the bond, affords an example of action to which this is the motive, that the individual perceives himself to be part of a whole including other persons, and feels himself to be moved to act in this way or in that by the perception that this is so.

Neither desire nor duty make their appearance in fact, as the custom of the schools leads us first to consider them, in the mere individual. The familiar account of the origin of society in the stress of desire represents fact, only in so far as it gives a true analysis of a force tending to maintain and to forward the organisation of society. It misrepresents fact, in so far as it suggests the idea that individuals combine to form society, that society is a result whose cause is to be found in the individuals of which it is composed. It would be much more true to say that society gives birth to the individual, that the individual detaches himself from society. And the detachment, never more than a feature in the social career of the individual, in the end intensifies his social character. The individual not merely remains a social product, but becomes, because he is an individual, more and more a social being. It is as a social being, not as a mere individual, that man desires. Into almost every desire this social

character enters as a constituent element. As the child towards its mother's breast, so man yearns towards the world for sustenance and life. But among the desires of the individual, there are cravings which are directly social. Desire, we say, is of an object. But the social desires from the sexual desire upwards are not towards an object merely, towards some being other than the self, but towards some form of social union with a being other than the self, a union which shall include and combine both the object and the self.

Again, the view of the moral life to which we have alluded pictures the genesis of duty from desire. In so far as this presentation of the subject professes to resolve duty into desire, it fruitlessly obscures the facts of life, but in so far as, in the social life of the individual, it brings together these two members of the moral order, which commonly appear in opposition to one another, it opens the way to a truer view of duty. Duty is an impulse, a motive, never realised, satisfied, or fulfilled by the immolation of the whole living flesh and soul upon the altar of an empty shrine dedicated to a formless and indefinite divinity—duty, which is duty and no more. It is an impulse fully realised and obeyed only when it assumes again the character of the desire from which it sprang, and to which it has been opposed, and find its end in the life of the society, of whose demand upon him the individual sense of duty is the voice. It is this moral communion of spirit with spirit, the life, the communion, whose requirements are the laws of duty, whose achievement becomes, to the will enlightened by the discipline of conscience, the highest object of desire. This social motive is an object of desire, not

after the manner of a thing desired set over against the desiring soul as a thing distinct, apart, but as a whole, from which indeed the individual as desiring is distinct, but into which, in the satisfaction of this impulse, he is to be received and taken up, and only so to reach the satisfaction of his desire.

With this level of the moral life religion is traditionally linked. The words "piety" and "conscience"* have their origin in a period of thought of **and adopted by religion ;** life when the Divine consecration which was felt to rest upon this social tie took the shape of including the gods in the social circle into which the man was born, with the result that a unique tenderness and awe cling to these social obligations and to their fulfilment, wherever the words which stand for them face us on the page. Since the Christian era it has been an ideal not only taught with the authority of religion, but increasingly pervading general thought and opinion, that the object for which a man should live should be not the fulfilment of his own desires or of his own sense of duty, but the good or the glory of some society or fellowship in which his own individual life is involved.

The society to which the individual person belongs is in such cases the motive—a motive not less distinct from himself because he conceives himself to be included in it, and in adopting it as the motive of action identifies himself with it.

And the apprehension of the society as a whole thus including the self is plainly an intellectual apprehension, and an intellectual apprehension of by no means a low order. **once more involving a specific intellectual consciousness,**

* See Note G, Appendix, p. 207, on "Conscientia and Pietas."

Nor is it less clear that the moral relation of the society to the individual as a motive to action is quite distinct from its intellectual apprehension. As a motive, the society is a very urgent reality of practical life.

from which again it is distinct as itself a moral reality.

In the larger society, what we call public opinion bears upon the individual as a force which has a legitimate claim to be obeyed. And in any society such as the House of Commons or a Trade Union—to take two instances sufficiently remote from one another—there are a whole class of actions which may be set apart as distinctively due to the social motive, to the consciousness of the society as including the individual. The self-devotion of the Greek citizen to the *πόλις* or the *esprit de corps* of a modern public school may give perhaps the most undeniable instances of this social motive, where it can be easily disengaged from other motives with which it is combined and with which it might be confused. The Christian religion, with its conception of a Divine family into which the individual is adopted, is probably the most far-reaching influence tending to absorb the motives of desire and duty in the social motive—here called into operation by the ideal of a society, in whose membership alone all individual desires and ideals are to be realised and attained.

There is another point of view from which these three stages in the moral life may be regarded, exhibit-

II. Mediation in motives, in desire, duty, and affection—

ing once more the correspondence and the distinction between the volitional and the intellectual forms of self-consciousness. Man is said to be a rational being, often primarily in the sense that he is a reasoning being.

And his rationality in this sense is commonly illustrated in the regions both of practice and of understanding. The relation of the general principle to the particular fact is paralleled in action by the relation of the end to the means. The immediate is conceived to stand to the ultimate motive in the same relation as does the immediate to the ultimate truth.

The parallel is most obvious in the case of action done under the motive of duty, where a rule or law seems to be applied to a particular case, and where such a formula as the Aristotelian practical syllogism presents a real picture of what often passes in consciousness.* But a similar analysis may be truly given of the motives of action prompted by desire. The motive of desire is seldom even apparently simple. We desire one thing for the sake of, as a means to, another. We have seldom any difficulty in giving a reason for a desire, namely, by referring the particular desire to a general desire. And this process we could always continue until we come back to some object of desire which can at least pretend to be ultimate, and to which all desires are subordinate, in very much the same way in which all duties are subordinate to "duty," all moral principles to "principle." Action which is thus guided by a more or less conscious consideration of means and ends, of the bearing of principles upon practice, is commonly spoken of as rational. Now, it is plain that in the mental process preceding this kind of action, there is an intellectual element throughout. Desire and will are

i. and ii. most obvious
in duty, but also
present in desire.

The mediation, though
involving an intel-
lectual consciousness,
is itself moral,

* Cp. Aristotle, "Eth. Nic.," VII. iii.

moving in a world that is perceived, apprehended, reasoned about, understood. And beyond this it must once more be noted that it is the intellect, observing or reflecting what passes in another region of consciousness, which perceives that dependence of one object of desire on another which is described in such terms as "means" or "end." But in neither case is the intellect supplying to moral experience an element of rational mediation which is not in the thing itself. There is in the moral fact itself a real *moral* mediation. The thing desired moves us to act *by* moving us to desire something else. The principle of duty moves us to act *by* communicating its motive power to some particular principle or rule of duty, and this again *by* identifying itself with the thing to be done in the particular case. Or, to put the same thing in the opposite way, the particular thing desired moves us to act only in virtue of the presence in it of some further object of desire, which moves us through it. The particular duty of the moment presses on us with its unique and instant obligation only because it has behind it the majesty of duty, the sheer imperative of right, making an authoritative claim upon the whole of life.

The moral world, therefore, to recur to our former phrase, is not a mere chaos of impulses, a moving mass of suggesting an ultimate object of desire, an ultimate principle of duty : points of attraction and repulsion, from which as from a shifting background there emerge and define themselves now and again isolated objects of desire, which challenge the attention of the mind and concentrate upon themselves the force of the will. The will in responding to stimuli recognises an order, a hierarchy of motives. The world,

which presents itself to volition in one aspect as beckoning man on with a thousand allurements, speaks through all these many enticements with a voice that is recognisably one—one with the unity which we describe in the one general term, desire. Or, again, the world, which to the ear of conscience rings with the myriad claims of duty, seems to enunciate them all as clauses of one great decree. Duty behind all duties is eminently *one*. What is the ultimate object of desire, the ultimate principle of duty? It will lead the way to an answer to these questions if we indicate the presence of the principle of mediation in the region of morals where the social motive rules.

The perception of the moral whole, whatever it may be, in which the individual is included, and of his own

relation to it, is, as we have already observed, an intellectual perception, and an intellectual perception of by no means a low order. And it will be further plain on consideration, that as in the reasoning moral agent the particular object is desired as a means to a more general end, and the particular obligation of duty obeyed as in instance of a general law of duty, so here the rationality of the will is in the relation of the elements in the motive to one another, in the apprehension by the individual of the will of the society whose requirement he obeys, and of his own individual will as responding to and realising itself in obedience to this requirement.

This rational identification of the self with the larger whole in which it is included is an actual experience. In numberless instances we do realise our own

iii. in affection,
where the relation of
the individual to the
society is an example
of moral mediation,
involving an intel-
lectual consciousness
and distinct from it :

volitions and desires by identifying them with the volitions and desires of the community to which we belong. The identification takes very various shapes. The gratification of the individual desires for food and all the comforts of life is an obvious instance at one end of the moral scale. Even here the individual does not gain the gratification of his own desires without making some sacrifices of individual inclination to the society, in which in the end he obtains a fuller gratification than he could otherwise enjoy. Where the society itself becomes the end, as in a soldier fighting for his country and for the honour of his regiment, the individual has "identified himself with the society" in a sense which makes that formula an expression of the moral ideal at work in every form of human life in which self-sacrifice is an actual achievement of man. And the simple and familiar fact that self-sacrifice is the highest goal and ideal of action helps us towards the answer that still remains to be given to the final question as to each stage of volition.

If desire is rational, always of the means to an end, what, we were driven to ask, is the final end of desire?

III. The ultimate principle in desire, duty and affection—
i. in desire the ultimate principle is not self, but life, communion between the self and the world : There is nothing of which we should be satisfied to say, "It is desirable for itself." Everything is desirable for some quality in it, for some reference in it to something wider and beyond. In the whole world of desire there is no part that is not desirable for its relation to the whole. And the sum of all desires, if they could be gathered into a whole, would be desirable for the sake

of the parts. It has commonly been said that things are desirable in relation to the self, and self-satisfaction has been represented as the essential principle of desire—the end towards which, however unconsciously, desires always work, as though it were their common aim. But of the normal desires of the average healthy and right-minded man this does not seem to be the true account. In practical work-a-day fact the principle which underlies and is the motive power to desire is not self but life, a certain relation of the desiring self to the objects of desire, a certain interchange and union between the desiring self and the world of things desired. Desire is towards the world. It is outward. It moves the self to go out upon the world, to take it into itself. The life which lies behind all things desired is intercourse between the self and the world. It is in this character that the world offers itself as material for desire—in that it is material for life. All that is ever desired is desired as ministering to life.

Only, as desire leads us to recognise the social union in which it is satisfied, and brings the subject of desire

ii. in duty, without which life does not satisfy desire, the ultimate principle is obedience,	under the requirements of law and duty, life, the final object of desire, is seen to be not final. Law and duty bring the will under the power of a new motive, which interposes between the self and the objects of desire, and the question "What do I desire?" is drowned in the individual soul by the question "What ought I to do?" And here, in the world of obligation as in the world of desire, one motive is sub- ordinate to another. And here, again, we may discern one principle underlying all action prompted by duty—
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the idea, namely, of obedience as a good. The final "I ought" is "I ought to obey." This gives its motive power to every, even the most distorted, form of duty. And this again is the ideal towards whose completer realisation all the organisation of society is feeling its way. This furnishes the one problem which presents itself in various forms in various regions of practice. Obedience means "Not my will but thine," and yet it means "I am content to do it." The practical problem of politics and of morals alike is to combine freedom and law. And this problem is solved practically in politics, so far as it is solved, by the races to whom the social union, the corporate life, is an end in itself, operating upon the individual will, compelling a willing obedience. It is solved morally in practice wherever action is guided by personal affection, and there is a willing surrender of will to will. And it is solved in idea, in the religious ideal which substitutes for obedience a higher motive, the motive of love.

As to this, the final moral ideal, the same question may be asked. Wherever the ideal of social union

iii. in affection the ultimate motive is love. operates upon the individual as a motive, and leads him to regard himself, and gladly to regard himself, as

a part of the whole, what is it which attracts him? In the various forms of social union, in the devotion of husband to wife, of mother to child, in a man's devotion to his country, in the religious devotion to God, what is the common element, present in all as the motive power, present finally in that which we rank supreme, in religion? And the answer to this question is that

it is love itself, the ideal of communion, of mutual sympathy, devotion, affection, which acts as the motive force. And it is because religion identifies God Himself with this ideal that the religious life is the only one in which desire and conscience find their rest.

Once more, at this, the final stage of the moral analysis, the intellectual element in volition must be marked.

In all these the intellectual consciousness is present, but the distinct moral reality is unmistakable.

To seize, to define, to know one from another, the three great ends—life, obedience, and love—is an intellectual operation, not less so if it is in practice rather than in theory that the distinction is. To know these ideals as pervading and colouring all the various subordinate forms through which their motive power is exerted on the will, this is again an intellectual act, and not less so but more in proportion as the ideal is in its operation on the will more closely and immediately identified with the particular embodiment of it through which the will is affected. But again most of all here is it true, in the case of these final ideals, that they are in themselves commanding moral realities moving the will with insistent and unquestioned power in all the myriad forms in which they act.

There is, indeed, a stage, often a definite moment in the operation of a motive on the will, when it emerges from the condition of an inchoate impulse to act, and presents itself

The intellectual stage is a necessary step in volition ;

definitely and clearly as an object, to be apprehended, to be appreciated, to be estimated. This is the moment, the moment of pause, of suspended volition, when the motive is clearly apprehended by the intellect, and the forces bearing on the will can be

dissected and distinguished, which has been the unfortunately chosen battle-ground for the controversies of free will. It is a phase in the volitional consciousness when will has least of the character of will. But it is a stage, a step necessary for the will to gather its full force of intelligent deliberation, as it does only when the motive, having arisen as an impulse and having been clearly apprehended as an object, receives the seal of that emotional acquiescence, which marks the final identification of the self with the motive which it adopts.

The presence of the emotional element in volition may be traced through the whole moral field. The emotional and moral consciousness have, as the emotional element, present throughout in the moral consciousness, indeed, often been classed together. They are, in fact, distinct from one another. The moral consciousness is but distinct from it, a consciousness of motives to act. The emotional consciousness is a consciousness of being affected by objects in such a way as may almost immediately give rise to an impulse to act, but the emotion and the impulse are distinct. The emotion is not in itself an impulse to act. Admiration is distinct from the impulse to possess; adoration from the impulse to serve. The contentment of achieved desire is distinct as an emotion from the anticipation of such satisfaction which we have seen to be an element in desire itself. But both are distinct from the motive quality of this anticipated satisfaction—the quality of moving to act. The emotion of what is commonly and inaccurately called self-approval, which follows on a conscientious action, is distinct again from the emotion of acquiescence in the obligation, which is

a part of the operation of duty as a motive. But the emotion of either kind is plainly distinct from, though it is associated with, the motive as motive. And, in the case of actions prompted by the social motive, the emotion of loyalty or love, the medium in which the self-surrender of wills to one another takes effect, is distinct from the operation of this ideal of self-surrender as a motive on the will in each act of self-surrender.

But the emotional consciousness, though thus distinct from the moral, is closely linked with it as a step in the progress towards the fully developed and deliberate act of will. Anticipated satisfaction is an element in desire, the last step before the fiat of the will goes forth. Acquiescence in the authority of duty attends the final submission of the will to the law which it accepts. And above all, in all action governed by the social motives, the emotional identification of the self with the social whole in which it merges itself is the very life and soul of the moral ideal which compels the will.

marks the final step
in the development
of the act of will.

CHAPTER IV

INTELLECT

OF the intellectual as of the moral life of self-consciousness feeling is the background. Against the background

I. Perception—
Thought stands out
in contrast with feeling,
from which it
emerges.

of feeling thought stands out in sharp and emphatic contrast. That there is a history to be discovered of an actual historical transition from feeling to

thought, it is impossible not to believe. The time may be near or distant when, in the scientific investigation of this history, psychology and anthropology may meet. Already it is a fascinating and by no means fruitless subject of conjectural speculation. But the contribution of philosophy to this investigation is only to emphasize the distinction between the two, and to note that in present experience there are no connecting links between the feeling and the self-conscious life, in which the same self nevertheless finds itself identified and engaged. Our account of thought as a form of self-consciousness does not begin with a series or collection of simple feelings. It does not begin with analysing into its parts

Thought begins with
perception, not with
feeling—

or separating into its phases the complex stream of sentient life. It begins with perception. Feeling as we know it has no content, simple or complex. To the ordinary

man, there is no transition or intermediate stage between mere vague feeling, selfless, objectless, undefined, and the perception in which he comes upon a fact. Feeling that can be defined is not prior to perception. It is

the "feeling" of
psychology is feeling
to which reflection
has supplied

later. The psychologist,* the reflecting man, turns round upon perceptive experience, and finds that there was in it

a self, that this self perceived, and that the same self felt before he perceived, and, as he perceives and wills and loves, is feeling all the time. He endeavours to describe this feeling, and his endeavour is to find out what feeling would be if it were not already accompanied by, bound up with, a self-conscious life. The introspection of a self-conscious being can never give him this result. To mere feeling, to feeling *as felt*, that elusive thing which haunts us like the shadow of a dream at which we grasp in vain, reflection supplies

- (1) a self, (1) a feeling self, present even when its presence is disclaimed, whenever any language is used which makes successive phases or various parts of the series or complex of feeling "conscious of one another;" † and along with this (2) distinction, qualitative contrast of successive or contemporaneous elements of feeling, such as mere feeling, in so far as we know it,

* See Note E, Appendix. p. 192, on "Consciousness and Self-consciousness."

† Cp. James, "Principles of Psychology," i. 339: "Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought, dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its predecessor;" and at the conclusion of the passage in which this idea is elaborated, "It is impossible to discover any verifiable features in personal identity which this sketch does not contain." On such attempts "to extrude the Ego." Professor Ward says that "every step implies just that relation to a subject which it is supposed to supersede" ("Encyc. Brit.," part 77, p. 39).

certainly does not contain or include in itself. We self-conscious beings can say "I feel," "I felt," "I feel thus," "I felt so;" but both the distinctions between the "so" and the "thus," the "feel" and the "felt," in these judgments, and also the "I" which is their subject, are foreign—we know it as we say the words—to the feeling we endeavour to describe. And yet—if we say anything—we cannot say less than this; we cannot do less than judge. We can judge, as in perceiving, the form of judgment which arises out of feeling in the ordinary experience of ordinary men. Or we can judge, as in reflecting, the familiar exercise of the psychologist, the systematic self-observer. The psychologist may check his self-observation by the help of present perception. He may interpret it by the theories that have been handed down, and have become habitual through centuries of speculative history. He may colour it in sympathy with the reflective consciousness of those with whom he has engaged in the living intercourse of dialectic life, or again by an instinctive appeal to the reflective faculty as constantly though unsystematically exercised by ordinary men, under the thousand promptings of nature, of art, and of the agencies of the moral and religious intercourse of men. But the judgments, the observations, the descriptions of the life of consciousness, of which any manual of psychology is full, are in fact perceptions turned outside in. They are perceptions from which we have endeavoured by an effort of thought to abstract the thing perceived, the subject of the judgment of perception, and to which we have, whether consciously or not, supplied another subject, the self,

represented by a
judgment of reflection
which is a judgment
of perception turned
outside in,

converting the judgment of perception into a judgment of reflection.

This is one way of regarding experience ; it is a view of experience of absorbing interest, in itself of no small practical utility and fruitful of philosophic suggestion. The mistake comes in only where the psychologist supposes himself to be directly investigating a pre-intellectual phase of consciousness. The psychologist, like every one else, is dealing directly with intellectual experience ; he is describing it in a more or less connected train of often highly complex intellectual judgments of reflection. The direct results are of the highest value and interest. It is of interest, too, that he should proceed to conjectural speculation as to the possible steps by which feeling rose into self-conscious life. But the two investigations, the study of present experiences, regarded as phases in the life of the individual self, and the conjectural reconstruction of a history of the emergence of self-consciousness from feeling, should be clearly kept apart, and the character of fact, which rightly attaches to the former, should not be used to cloke the character of conjecture, which the latter cannot yet claim to put off.

So much it has been necessary to say in order to justify the beginning which we here make of the treatment of the intellectual side of self-perception of a thing, conscious personal life—in beginning, namely, with perception. But we must make a further claim. We begin with perception as the perception of a thing. In logic and in the theory of knowledge, it used to be common to make a beginning with that

which is the touching point between the supposed subject and the supposed object of knowledge, between mind and thing, real or imagined in either case, for sometimes it is represented that only this touching point is experience, is real, and that the thing which

not of an "idea," gives the "idea" and the mind to
 which is a sensation which the "idea" is given are only
 without a subject, a inferential 'realities. Sometimes the
 quality without a thing—

inference in one or other case is acknowledged and defended. But the point which concerns us here, is not whether, given a world of ideas, we can infer a world of things, or a world-constructing mind. The point is, whether we do begin with that which in reference to the perceiving mind is an idea, and in reference to the real thing a quality under which it is known. We have spoken of turning experience outside in, of converting a judgment of perception into a judgment of reflection, by detaching the quality under which a thing is known from the thing of which it is conceived as a predicate, and attaching it to the mind as a sensation or idea. If it is possible to go through any such process, it might seem as if it must be possible to apprehend the quality or idea by itself, and without attaching it to any subject at all. But, as a matter of fact, there is no such possibility. It does not matter for the

purpose whether we take the simple
 the simple "idea" is idea of the older psychological philo-
 not a psychological sophy or the complex content of the
 fact;

modern psychologist. The word "red" suggests an idea or a quality. To the ordinary mind it calls up some red thing—a this or a that—to be the subject of the perceptive judgment. To the mind practised in

abstraction it is possible to withdraw the attention from the thing described as having the quality, and to fix it on the mind that entertains the idea, though such an effort of abstraction is especially difficult in the case of simple sensible qualities. But to neither does the adjective without an instinctively supplied substantive describe any phase of consciousness at all. An idea of "red" is not a psychological fact, as it certainly is not a fact of ordinary experience. The form of the abstract substantive "redness" testifies to this. The adjective has to be *made* into a substantive, into a fictitious thing, in order to be talked about; it cannot stand in its own right. Be it remembered that we are considering what is the ordinary experience of men—the experience from which philosophy starts, and for which it has to account. It may account for experience by showing it to be delusive, but it must, to start with, take the facts as they stand, and the older psychological philosophy may find a test after its own heart in this consideration—that the supposed simple idea, as an idea, is no part of human experience at all.

But the "content" of modern psychology is in no better case. Even if, departing from all the habits of our sane and waking life, we follow the lure of the psychologist, and pass into a region where we have abstracted from the world of objects and the perceiving self alike, and are conceiving consciousness as a stream, a mass, the content is the content of the stream, the mass. There is no longer a conscious "I," only a consciousness, but the abstraction has become concrete enough to contain its content. And, as a matter of fact, our

the "content" is a
content of some-
thing—

instinctive revolt against this caricature of consciousness is justified. No such thing as the vague content of a moment or phase of consciousness is ever present to consciousness at all, except as the predicate of a vaguely conceived reality, a universal "this," an amorphous something of a world, a wide and indefinite "it." And the perception, which in all of us is the first step in intellectual life, and in the ordinary man is the prevalent reality for which we have to account, is a perception of things, a perception of fact.

A perception of things—the theory that experience is of ideas might suggest that we mean a perception of things as the cause of ideas. We experience is of qualified things. are asserting, on the contrary, that there is no such element in ordinary experience as an "idea" needing a thing as its cause. Experience is not of qualities but of qualified things, and experience in this first phase of it is expressed in the judgment of perception. We may proceed, then, to define more closely the nature of perception as perception of fact, the primary and normal meaning of the judgment, and to indicate the share of the other faculties of personality in this initial intellectual act.

The primary judgment of perception, then, is a judgment of fact; but it is so by assumption rather than by assertion. It is a mistake to represent the normal judgment as a judgment of truth as opposed to falsehood, of fact as opposed to fiction.*

There is a stage of judgment before the distinctions

* Cp. Note E, on "Consciousness and Self-consciousness," pp. 195, 196; Bosanquet, "Essentials of Logic," p. 66; Bradley, "Principles of Logic," ch. i.

between fact and fiction, truth and falsehood, have arisen and become explicit. The larger part of our self-conscious intellectual life consists of judgments of this character—judgments which are not judgments of truth, because the suggestion has not been raised that they are false; they are not judgments of fact as opposed to fiction, they are judgments of unquestioned fact. It is most important to avoid the mistake of denying the title of judgment to all stages or phases of intellectual life, prior to that form of judgment which contains an explicit assertion of truth as opposed to falsehood. The mistake is fatal, not only because the early unreflective and uncontroversial type of judgments fill so large a space in experience, and are the most crucial and instructive instance of perception, but also because the result is to leave apparently an undefined borderland between feeling and thought, a borderland which as a matter of fact does not exist. Perception, as soon as there is perception, is at once a judgment—never less. Nothing less is definable as a state of intellectual consciousness at all.

But, on the other hand, perception is from the first a judgment of reality, not in the sense that it affirms reality as a predicate, but in the sense that it is a judgment of fact. The judgment of perception primarily asserts something of reality (i.e. of the primary reality), something of reality. Ultimately no doubt the assertion made in a perception is an assertion which concerns the final and absolute reality. The primary reality of perception is the representative of this final reality in the earlier stages of intelligence. It will be found ultimately to involve the absolute

reality, to run back into it, to be based upon it. Perception indeed in its earliest stage includes, besides the object primarily and directly perceived, the vague background of a wider world of reality. But the universal reality is at this stage concentrated into and represented by the primary reality—the thing perceived. And the

of reality assumed as
the subject of asser-
tion.

reality of this, the primary reality, the thing of perception, is not asserted; it is rather assumed, where something else is asserted of it. But it is assumed, and the assertion would vanish into thin air without the assumption of a thing of

(Illustrations.) which something is asserted. As I

walk along the road I may perceive the country through which I am walking, without being conscious of the road on which I tread; or I may be for a time blind to the sights that are within my view, and perceive the road under my feet—perceiving, *e.g.*, that it is rough or smooth, that it is level or that it is steep, that it is hard and firm or soft and slimy. And I may perceive any or all of these things in succession, or many of them simultaneously, without the perception being articulate, not only without the judgment of perception being expressed in words, but without its asserting itself in the series of experience, as a definite and clearly separate event. Or, again, as I thus walk and perceive, say, the road on which I walk, my foot may strike against a stone, and there will then arise a judgment of perception, which is separate, definite, articulate. I probably should not even mentally put it into words at the time, but if I tried to describe its occurrence afterwards, I should describe it in some such words as these: "I said to myself, 'That is a stone.'"

In this description of a perception, the demonstrative pronoun and the word which is predicated of it stand for the two constant elements in a judgment of perception. And these two elements were present no less in each of the less articulate perceptions about the nature of the road which went before. That which is asserted in the judgment of perception is in the later case "a stone," in the former cases "hard," "smooth," "steep," "soft," etc. That which is assumed is the "that" or the "road." Where the thing of which something is predicated is designated by a descriptive word, as, *e.g.*, "road," the quality of the thing described in this word may be merely a means of designation, or it may be really part of the predicate, so that the judgment would be more truly expressed, "This is a smooth road."

The "thing," the "this," the "that," of which some predication is made is not the final reality; it *is* the primary reality. Even as a primary reality that which is described as a stone or a road carries with it a number of other perceptions, which not merely accompany it, but contribute to the surface and obvious meaning of the words in which the mere first-hand perception itself is described. And the "thing-hood," the "this-ness" or "that-ness," the "reality" of the object of perception, one may almost say, does not profess to be a complete or final reality. It begins at once—through a consideration of the predicates by which it is described—in its mere reality, to refer itself to, to resolve itself into ulterior realities. From the first it presents itself in the circumambient atmosphere of the universal reality, towards whose apprehension it may be the first step, in

its relation to which alone it will be finally intelligible as a reality at all. But it is the primary reality with which we have to do in perception; it is only through the primary reality that we have to do with any reality beyond. The stone, the road, are for the moment the means through which a world, an absolute reality, come before us; and the reality of which we are speaking as belonging to the "this," the "that," the "thing," the reality of that which we perceive as a stone, a road, is not asserted. The perception does not assert, "There is a thing," and "The thing is a stone;" it asserts that the thing is a stone; it *assumes* the thing. But it *does* assume it; and perception is not truly described, is not described so that the ordinary man would recognise in it his constant experience, if this reality, the thing, the "this" or "that," be omitted. Whatever may be the ultimate result of the analysis of perception, it is not a true description of perception as a type of experience to say that in it the predicate—stone, hard road, or what-not—is attached to or predicated of any other part or parts of its context in experience, or of the complex of experience as a whole, regarded as the universal reality. Perception is only truly described to start with as an assertion about an assumed reality.

What, then, is this reality that is assumed? Can we say anything about it? Can we say what we mean by a "thing"? Can we say any more than that it is a capacity for predication, a capacity for qualification, a point of relation to the self and to other things? It "exists." Can we say what we mean by existence? Is "existence" a

Perception is an
assertion about an
assumed reality.

What is the "reality,"
the "thing"
assumed? What is
"existence"?

predicate? If so, what is the subject of which it is to be predicated? It is existence again. The meaning

At this stage it cannot be defined, it is the subject of perpetually progressive definition ; of "existence"—and there are other terms of which the same is true in some degree—the meaning of "existence" cannot be fully defined, stated,

and set forth, to start with, in its first and simplest applications, partly because its elementary meaning is less intelligible than its later meaning. A thing is a much more baffling conception to grapple with than a person, a world, a God. But to the end it is true of such a conception, and it is pre-eminently true of existence, that it remains in some degree beyond definition. It is the perpetual subject of predication ; it challenges and defies complete definition. It will cease to challenge definition only when it can be characterised in terms in some degree adequate to the description of the universe as a whole. We shall define existence only when we can sum the universe. The question will then be answered in the sense that it will no longer be asked. We shall cease to ask what the subject is when

but to start with it is, at any rate, an element in experienced reality. the predicate has told us. At this stage, at any rate, if we are true to experience as it stands, we cannot say

more than experience itself seems to assert. Here *is* this element in experience. We perceive nothing without perceiving it *of* something, which in the perception is not asserted but assumed. If we are analysing and describing experience, it includes this element, the thing. It is not a thing, a reality, independent of experienced reality, outside it or beyond it. It is not a thing with different or unknown qualities, but with

known qualities—with those qualities, namely, which perception attributes to it. It is an element in experienced reality itself. Predication is not predication without a subject. Relation implies points of relation. The burden of existence cannot be thrown upon the predicate, nor this “solid-seeming world” resolved into a network of relations. Not that the points of relation are in themselves a substantive and final reality. The thing is not a reality underlying its qualities; the thing with its qualities is the reality. And this, again, will in the end resolve itself into other realities, and all at last into some complex or summation of realities, which will be the final reality, and is already foreshadowed in this primary reality. But we shall have emptied all experience of reality if we have, to start with, *unrealized* the first stage or phase of the experience of reality, either on the pretext that it is not the last, or on the pretext that what cannot yet be defined may be once for all disregarded.

There is one further point to be noted as to the reality assumed in perception. Though there is no

And the reality assumed in the thing is assumed as common ground of reality between the thing and the self.

explicit reference to the perceiving self in the normal unreflective perception, it may, I think, be asserted of perceptive experience that the assumption of reality in the *thing* is an assumption of a reality common to it with the *self*, placing the two on one level of existence. Indirectly therefore the existence of a perceiver is already involved in the very content of perception, and this means, further, the assumption of a common element of existence, a common ground of reality in which they meet.

The judgment of perception, then, asserts something of this reality which it assumes, the thing. What is it that it asserts? That which it affirms, whatever else may be said of it, bears this character at least, it is a relation to the perceiving self. We are describing the nature of the experience of the ordinary man when he perceives—when, for instance, he walks along the road and kicks against a stone. When we say that in the perception described in such words as “that was hard” he is describing the thing by predicating of it that which is a relation to his own perceiving self, we do not mean to say that his perception contains in it any explicit consciousness on his own part that hardness is a relation to his own perceiving self. In these descriptions of ordinary experience all that we can profess to give is what appears to the reflective philosopher to be included in unreflecting experience as he recalls it, or as he knows it in its expression in common language and practice. But he aims at giving what appears to the reflecting philosopher to be included in ordinary experience, not what turns out to be involved in it, when it is reflected on and analysed either by the philosopher or by the practical man. The question which the philosopher has to consider in such cases is this: Would the ordinary man feel his experience in perception to be the same if, for instance, the existence of the thing were *not* assumed to be common to the thing and to his own perceiving self? And in the present case it is plain that the philosopher, trying to describe what it is that is predicated of the thing perceived, can only describe it as primarily a relation

to the perceiving self—hard, soft, *e.g.*, denote different degrees and kinds of resistance. If we were to suggest to the ordinary unsophisticated subject of perception that the thing he perceived existed, but that existence did *not* mean something that he himself as the perceiving subject shared, he would demur to any distinction in the matter of existence between himself as perceiving and the thing as perceived; or, again, if we suggested to him that the hardness or the softness of the thing he perceived had no connection with his own perceiving sense, he would reply that this was what hard and soft meant, that the thing *felt* hard or soft. If, on the other hand, you pointed out to him that a stone implied a rock mass from which it had been originally detached, he would acquiesce in the statement, but he would demur to your saying that it was a part of his perception that he had kicked a fragment detached from a rock mass. This may be involved in his perception, but it is not included in it. That which is predicated then, in the judgment of perception, is a relation to the perceiving self. It is an essential part of the judgment of perception that it is so.

Further, it is a relation to the perceiving self which always carries with it a relation to other things. Not merely is the descriptive word a common term, carrying with it a reference to numberless similar elements in experience, but epithets describing colour, for instance, imply contrast and discrimination between various elements in experience. Words such as “hard,” “soft,” etc., imply the kind of resistance that is thought of as manifesting itself no less in relation to other

carrying with it a
relation to other
things;

material things than to the body of the perceiving self.

Here, as in the case of the existence of the thing, we must say of any quality predicated in the judgments of perception, that when we have defined it as including or involving any relation, or system of relations, to other things, its mere quality remains beyond definition. In its mere simplicity, and apart from the part it plays in the expression of deeper and more world-wide truths, which will in the end constitute an adequate explanation of it, the mere sensible quality, red, hard, loud, defies definition. The relations by which we define it become, as we discern them, inseparable from it, but they do not exhaust its meaning.

And yet it is the express import of the judgment to identify the thing with this relation to the self. Thing and quality are not two experiences or two parts of experience, or two kinds of experience; they are two elements of a single experience. However disparate from one another thing and quality, considered apart, may seem to be, it is the fact about perception that it is their union.

And it is in this affirmation of identity between the thing and its relation to the self, even more than in the common reality assumed to belong to both, that intellectual experience first presents us with communion with reality as the very nature of reality itself. The consideration of perception has thus led us

to a view about the experience of reality the very opposite of that which is familiar to us, whenever in one form or another we are invited to trust to the argument, "The self is real, let us attribute this reality to the thing." The argument of experience itself is rather this: The thing is real, and this means that it is part of a system of reality of which the self is also a part, and whose reality consists in their relation to one another. In asserting the thing perceived to be fact in this sense, we are already virtually grouping the thing with other things, so far known, as component parts of a whole of reality, of which the thing perceived is for the moment the central point, a whole only so far vaguely foreshadowed as a whole.

What, then, is the part played by the will in this first stage in the development of the self-conscious

intellectual life? If we look back at the feeling which lies behind the intellectual and every other form of self-conscious life, we find in it two factors

As to the part played by will in perception, mere feeling involves action and reaction,

answering to what, in the analysis of self-conscious life, are commonly called subject and object; and the changes of feeling (quite apart from any question as to its physical or physiological antecedents) seem to be necessarily due to action and reaction between the subject of feeling—the feeling thing, and other things. I do not think we can avoid thus considering feeling. The mere meaning of the word seems to unfold into this. In so far as we may be guided by the view which thus suggests itself, action, which is one of the elements in our definition of will, is already involved before we come to self-consciousness.

But will is not merely action, it is motivated action, and the question here is, how motivated action may be traced in perception, as the first form in which intellectual self-consciousness emerges from feeling. Perception is, as we have seen, the perception of fact, the apprehension of existence. The thing perceived puts itself forward, asserts itself in the intellectual consciousness as claiming existence. And perception is the acceptance of this claim, the endorsement of it, the identification of the existence of the perceiving self with the existence of the thing perceived in the act of perception. From one point of view we might describe the life of perception as a perpetual verification of our own existence in our relation to things, a perpetual widening of the basis of our belief in our own actuality. From another point of view, and one more nearly akin to the perception of common experience, in the life of perception, the various elements of reality assert themselves, and claim us as a part of their being, and we acquiesce in the claim, and surrender ourselves to take our place in this world of reality. But in any case it seems to be true to say that the common unreflecting perception presents itself to reflection, not as an act of the perceiving self, but as an act of the thing asserting itself, though an act known only in the reaction of the self, which appropriates the assertion and makes it its own. Something, as we commonly say, intrudes itself, thrusts itself on our attention, and thrusts itself upon us as claiming our acknowledgment. And this claim in the judgment of perception we endorse and adopt as our own assertion. Perception thus answers to the type of will, as action

perception involves
motivated action—
the thing asserts
itself: perception
endorses its claim

motived by something other than the self, the motive being adopted by the self, which in adopting it identifies itself with it.

Again, in this aspect of perceptive experience, where we are viewing perception as perception of reality, the

[and in this same aspect of perception the coincidence of thing and self in existence is also emotional].

assumption of existence in the thing perceived as common to it with the perceiving self, involves something of the character which we have defined in emotion. The coincidence, so to call it,

of the thing and the self in the element of existence is a qualification of the self by its relation to the thing, and of the thing by its relation to the self. But the character of emotion attaches more obviously to the

And the predicate of the perceptive judgment answers to the definition of emotion

purport of perception, the qualification attached to the assumed existence, the predicate of the perceptive judgment.

We have said that the predicate of the perceptive judgment is always a relation to the perceiving self. We may say that the judgment, in fact, characterises the thing by a certain qualification in virtue of its producing a certain effect on the self. And this is to bring the definition of this element in perception very near to the definition of emotion, as that form of self-consciousness in which something other than ourselves qualifies our consciousness, and is itself qualified in virtue of its doing so.

In this emotional appreciation of the quality of the

[this again involving also a volitional element],

thing, there is an operation of will, absorbing the action of the thing upon the self, and acquiescing in the qualification

of the self, which is expressed in the qualification

of the thing. But, as in the assumption of the thing it is the will that is more obviously present, so in the realisation of the quality it is emotion which is to the front. So that it might with some degree of truth be said that the purpose of the perceptive judgment is—"the volitional fact is the emotional fact."

We have noted, in passing, that thing and quality have both a certain undefinable character about them.

Thing and quality, the intellectual elements, undefinable as they are, are less unintelligible when we see that intellectual fact professes to be fact only as one aspect of volitional and emotional fact.

If we say that in thing and quality the intellect is taking stock of the elements of moral and emotional experience, action and feeling, we are, I think, rendering the sense of mystery in these beginnings of thought less baffling, but we are not removing it. Action and feeling, the pre-self-conscious prototypes of will and emotion, and the elements with which we start in their definition, have about them, as descriptions of elementary experience, the same baffling character. It is impossible to use a verb which does not imply the one, or an adjective which does not imply the other. The positive meaning of either term we assumed when we spoke of action in the definition of will, and of feeling in the definition of emotion.

But although the elementary forms of the moral intellectual and emotional self-consciousness are to be defined, not by analysing them into their elements, but by following out their development and growth in experience, the baffling sense of unreality with which we face the logical elements of experience, offered to us as the beginnings out of which the universal knowledge

is to grow, is in part removed, when we realise that the *mere* intellectual element is a non-existent thing, that in its most abstract form it presents itself only as one aspect of volitional and emotional fact, volitional and emotional fact which are present in it, the intellectual fact, and which contribute to make it intellectual fact.

We have thus reviewed the nature of perception in order to show how the other faculties of personality play their part in this first stage of intellectual life, and contribute to establish that communion with reality in which experience consists.

In the course of this review we have not insisted on the fact, already noted in a previous chapter,* that per-

Perception is by assumption, not individual, but social and collective.

ception of fact does not profess to be an act of the merely individual mind, but of the individual as the organ of the collective mind. The omission was deliberate; it may be justified on the very ground on which the fact was maintained. So long as we are at the stage of perception proper, the relation to the self is assumed to be a relation to the collective self. The perception does not become consciously individual until it is questioned, and challenges verification and proof. But although, whenever the self is spoken of in the pages immediately preceding, it will, I think, naturally be understood to mean the self in me which assumes itself to be one with the self in others, it may be *misunderstood* to mean the merely individual self. The combination of abstraction and complexity rendered the preceding section unavoidably difficult, and it seemed better to risk the chance of a temporary misunderstanding, not very material to the

* Page 25, and cp. Note D, on "Intersubjective Intercourse," p. 191.

points immediately at issue, rather than to introduce an additional complication by indicating the social character of the intellectual act in every aspect in which

it was considered. It becomes necessary here to note that the judgment of perception is understood by the perceiver to state not what he, as contradistinguished from others, perceives, but rather what he perceives and any one would perceive in his place. This character of perception is, as we have already seen, important in itself: it is of further importance when we pass beyond perception.

Perception is simple, positive, assured. We have now to pass from perception to another stage of intel-

II. Mediation.

Perception is (1) simple, (2) positive, (3) assured.

(1) The simple perception may pass by analysis and explanation into the apprehension of a complex reality:

lectual self-consciousness, in which the cardinal feature is that the simplicity of perception is gone. A view of reality takes its place, in which the single foreground reality of the thing perceived melts into a crowd of realities, the simple quality named by some obvious relation to the self dissolves under examination into a network of related qualities, and the mutual interdependence of these multitudinous elements of reality becomes the character, the very reality itself, of the stage of experience at which we find ourselves.

But the substitution of the mutual interdependence of a network of realities for the simplicity of the thing

(2) The perception of fact may pass into impression demanding verification, perceived is not the only change which supervenes upon perception. Following this, or, at a late stage of culture, accompanying it, or preceding it, two other changes

break the peace of the first achievement of assured communion with reality. The question may occur, as for instance where there is some apparent contradiction or inconsistency between successive or simultaneous perceptions, Is this perception a fact, or is it only a feeling, an appearance? The quality, which, it has been obvious all along to the reflecting observer of perception, has been a relation to the self, now becomes so consciously and explicitly to the perceiving mind, which now feels impelled to ask, This is an impression; is it anything more than an impression? We are not asking now how the change comes to arise, or what the perceiver, now self-conscious in a new sense, means by his distinction between impression and fact, or to what issues in the conception of reality this momentous change in the character of experience may lead. We only note a change which in ordinary experience occurs. The stone I kick in the road may fly into pieces, and suggest the question, Was it one thing or many? It may catch my eye as a pebble coated with chalk, and suggest that it was a part of a large and complex mass; or, again, its colour and texture may suggest that it *is* chalk, and my mind may fly to a summary remembrance of the geological history which that name suggests. The place of the stone as the experienced reality may thus be taken by a mass of perhaps rather dimly understood geological laws and relations, a reality of which the stone is only an outcome, a part, a subordinate feature. But in all this the communion with reality is undisturbed, the geological history is fact every bit as much as the stone. Suppose, however, that after I have kicked the stone it seems mysteriously to

disappear, or that after seeming to observe that it is chalk, I recall that I am far distant from any part of the country where chalk would naturally be found. Here we have instances of the kind of experience which gives rise to question and to distinction between fact and impression, and which sets us to work not merely to analyse, but to verify the purport of our first perceptive judgment.

This desire for verification of impression may concern one perception or all. In its simplest form, an element, **(a verification which as we have seen, of everyday experience, it has been expanded in centuries of speculation into various theories of knowledge, sceptical or the reverse. In the form in which it appears in these theories of knowledge, and even in some degree in its earlier and simpler form, it necessarily includes that explanation, that break-up of the simplicity of perception, of which we have already spoken; whereas the substitution of a multitude of interdependent realities for the simpler reality of perception does not necessarily carry with it any demand for the verification of impression.***

But there is a further change still that passes over the reality of the thing perceived, in the withdrawal

* Except in so far as what logicians call the mediation of the thing perceived through other things includes, among other details, the mediation of it through the perceiving self. For, as one of the facts about the stone is that it is chalk, so another is that it gives rise to certain sensations; and, indeed, all demand for verification of impression includes, in fact, the mediation of the reality revealed in the perceptive judgment, through the assumed reality of the self. We are virtually saying, "Was it really a stone? Well, I really am a perceiving subject, and I had the impression of kicking a stone; how did it arise?" The philosophies of knowledge which start from sensations to prove realities are, in fact, thus demanding a verification of impression, which naturally they are not likely to find—in impression.

of that assurance of reality which consisted in the instinctive assumption of a collective warrant for the verdict of perception in the individual subject. There

(3) The assurance of perception may pass into doubt and demand proof, comes a moment, again a feature in common experience, when the question arises, not—Was the perceptive experience

feeling without fact? but—“Was it my perception merely, my individual perception, a delusion, an hallucination, a freak of individual fancy? If any one were to ask me to communicate to them the assurance with which the experience was accompanied in me, how could I do so? Have I any assurance that what I perceived others would have perceived also?” The philosophical equivalent of this stage of mediation is “solipsism,” the theory that each individual *knows* only the events of his own consciousness. The point to be noted at this stage is that the assurance of common conviction which made us call fact a result of collective mind has disappeared, and that the individual, ill at ease without this assurance, is aiming at re-establishing it. This is the demand for proof, something which will produce the assurance of reality.

Normally, it includes verification of feeling as such (individual or not) in fact; we cannot re-establish the

(which includes verification and explanation). assurance of common conviction without re-establishing the sense of contact

with reality. It is itself an instance of verification, the verification of our judgment of fact by that of others. It works by an appeal to common experience of fact as fact. It includes mediation; it is by the full analysis of the individual perception, following it up into its elements and into its relations, that we

aim at producing conviction. It is itself an instance of mediation, the mediation of the individual judgment by the judgment of others; individual conviction resolves into, appeals to that of others, and stakes its own reality upon its right to claim to have succeeded in the appeal. Proof in its fullest sense thus presents in its final shape the stage of experience of which we are to speak.

This is what proof must invariably be—mediation. It involves this to start with—fact resolving itself into ulterior fact. The apparent whole which presents itself in the thing perceived gives place to other realities, which might each in turn be just such a momentary summing of the world, gathering up into itself the concentrated reality of experience. But, as it stands, these ulterior realities, into which the primary reality of perception resolves itself, are parts, fragments, connected each with the other, and with the reality from which we start. The reality of each in turn, like the reality of the thing perceived, carries us back to another, and that to another, so that the stress of reality now lies not on the things each in turn, but rather on the fact of their forming part of a connected series. But the change does not take place by the reality of perception fading, and another larger reality emerging into distinctness, as though, the foreground having disappeared, the background were to challenge attention. The perceived reality itself resolves itself into these ulterior realities, the whole into its parts, the effect into its causes. There is nothing arbitrary, disconnected, spasmodic, about the change. We cannot hold by the primary

reality and decline to pass beyond it. We find ourselves unawares at the point at which, without challenging and rejecting the primary reality itself, we cannot avoid going beyond it. The whole is not a fact except as composed of its parts. The effect is not a reality except as the effect of its conditions; they are inseparable from one another. The parts are distinct from the whole, the causes from the effect, but the reality of the parts is inextricably bound up with the reality of the whole, the reality of the causes with

whose interdependence takes the place of the fact as the self-evident reality of the world.

that of their effect. And this connection between the two, like the original reality of the thing perceived, is self-evident. The connection becomes in fact itself the reality, the fact, that which is. That which is perceived, that which exists, is, at this stage of intellectual life, the related series of things, not yet apprehended as a series, unified into a world, rounded into a whole, though such a whole, such a world is implied in their mutual relation, as including and included, as cause and effect, as conditions each of the other. Such a perception of a whole we may see to be in the background of the, as yet, imperfectly organised world of connected facts. But for the present the reality, the thing perceived, is the fact of connection itself—mediation, mutual interdependence. This is the substantive fact of the world.

Science is the great example of this stage of intellectual development. To the scientific man the

This is the reality of science.

fact of the world is not what we commonly speak of as fact. The fact of the scientific man is law, the connectedness of things. He

does not pretend that to him the circle of knowledge is closed, and the world has rounded into a whole that is all-embracing and complete. But nevertheless the fact of mediation, connection, interdependence, is to him the one commanding fact. Testimony which would be otherwise unquestioned, the positive evidence of the senses in perception, are alike instinctively rejected if they are felt to be at discord with the actual context of experience, if they violate the apparent connectedness of things. The sense of the revelation of mysteries, the dominant and imperious tone which characterise scientific utterances, are the natural outcome of an extraordinary growth of science in this direction. Science has developed, it is true, by the extension of its field, by great advances of knowledge in this province or in that, but most of all in the origination and application of great connecting conceptions. The mediation of fact by fact, the connectedness of things, has thus become more exclusively than ever the object of scientific contemplation, the dominant idea, the central fact of systematised experience. Often the scientific man is accused of inconsistency because, for instance, he resolves matter into facts of sensation, and sensations into material facts. The fact is that the mutual connectedness of groups of phenomena is more real to him than either set of phenomena in itself; it is, in fact, to him the reality of both alike.

Philosophy sometimes affords examples of a similar view of reality, where the ultimate truth of things is regarded as realising itself in the world of experience, and the method of its self-realisation, the motive or the medium

It is seen as a philosophical principle in Hegelianism.

of the passage from idea to idea, is itself conceived as the reality.

More obvious are the examples of the philosophical temper of mind which finds repose in resolving facts into ideas and ideas into one another, where the balance against one another of the different elements of reality seems reflected in an equipoise of the mind, a calm more unmoved than the conviction of ordinary men, though detached from all the definite truths and realities with which conviction is usually concerned.

It is sometimes exemplified in the philosophical temper of mind,

often in a similar temper of mind in practical people.

And even among ordinary practical folk there is often a contented repose of judgment, which seems to an outsider to be without any adequate ground, where some dim and half-worked-out perception of the relation to one another of the various aspects of a truth, or of the members of some group of facts, is in itself a satisfying experience—the sense that there is an interdependence between the members, the elements, the aspects of the reality, being itself the source of satisfaction. Hence arises the habit, common to philosophers and to practical folk, and to scientific men as well, and in all alike irritating to those who interchange ideas with them, the habit of slurring over inconsistencies, or disregarding facts which seem to clash with their theory or their practice, the imperturbable contentment with which they return to the facts from which their course of reasoning starts, or in which it is envisaged, facts whose *primâ facie* reality has unfolded into this larger and vaguer reality of related facts or ideas, in which it seems now to be merged.

For it does not wholly and finally represent the facts to say that we pass from the mere fact to the relation between the fact and other facts, and that this relation between the facts becomes the reality. When the relation between the facts becomes the reality, the facts themselves in whose relation the reality consists, modified by having taken their place as parts of an inchoate system of relations, reappear as elements in the new reality. It is an incidental feature of the reality of mediation that it reaffirms the original facts of perception as parts of the concatenation of reality, as entering into and helping to constitute the nexus of relations. It is an essential part of mediation that, when we explain a fact, or analyse it into the conditions on which it depends, in which it consists, we verify the first assertion of perceptive judgment, when we come back to it, no longer as an assertion of perception, but as an element in the truth of the world. The assurance of sense is supported and replaced by the assurance of mediation. Verification, in the sense in which the word is commonly used, goes beyond this. Verification in the sense of prediction fulfilled, where a theory or a law is shown to anticipate the facts, brings the assurance of perception once more to warrant the assurance of mediation. What happens is this. The facts perceived give rise on analysis to a law or truth which comprehends them. And in so far as this is so, the assurance of fact is merged in the assurance of truth. If the system of relations to which

ii. Mediation and explanation issue in verification,

verification, i.e., of perceived fact in reasoned truth.

Verification as commonly spoken of is the return to fact to supplement and confirm incompletely reasoned truth.

the fact is referred were complete, if the connection of the fact with other facts were convincing and secure, the explanation of the mediated fact adequate and exhaustive, no further confirmation would be needed. Verification in the common sense is of service to supplement imperfect and inadequate ratiocination. But in proportion as the mediation of the fact perceived is adequate, it restores to us the assurance of perception in a new shape, in the assurance, namely, of mediation, and thus the fact is in this, the proper sense, verified, merged in truth, confirmed by being rediscovered as an element in the connected system of things.

And mediation not only thus restores to us the sense of communion with reality, in giving us the verification of fact as truth; it also restores to us the collective assurance of knowledge, which in the moment when it challenges

iii. Mediation and explanation further issue in proof.

analysis and mediation vanishes from the perception of fact. Mediation is verification; it is also proof. In the perception of fact we assume, as we saw, that our mind is the organ of the collective mind, and this is a part of the assurance of fact. This assurance has failed. The fact has subsided and collapsed into its explanation. But once more, when the fact returns to us as truth, through the perception of the essential connection between the elements of the connected world of reality, of which the fact forms a part, it returns to us assured.

The assurance of truth is an appeal to a collective standard,

And in this assurance of truth, as in every step of reasoning or mediate perception by which we approach it, we appeal, and it is essential to the very nature of the process that we appeal, to a social or collective standard.

Proof which was merely proof to the individual—an *argumentum ad hunc hominem*—would not be proof at all. It was necessary to vindicate the social or collective character of perception. Of truth, which is the result of mediation, and of reasoning itself, it may surely be said that they never profess to be individual. When I demand proof to myself of the truth of my perception, I am appealing from a perception of fact which has momentarily, at any rate, ceased to be collective, to a standard of reasoning and of truth which is unquestionably social. This is the relief we experience in attaining to proof. In the normal process of experience there is only a momentary shrinking into self, and the proved experience is an escape from the abnormal doubt of the reality of perception to the sure footing of a reasoned apprehension, reasoned because it is common, convincing us with a conviction which satisfies us, only because we feel that it ought to convince any one. Even the "solipsist," who proves that you cannot escape from your individual impression, in proving it, does escape, by appealing to a standard which is beyond the individual consciousness and is essentially social. The -'ism cannot be "solipsist." This conviction is higher in kind than the assurance of fact, as a higher assurance than the assurance of fact, though not the highest. the reality with which we are in contact is deeper, and the truth of which we are convinced is more comprehensive. That there is a higher conviction yet, a more intimate contact with reality, will appear when we see the complexity of the truth, of the world of relations, round into the whole which is already implied in the very conception of it as a world.

Meanwhile we have to show once more at this stage the contribution of the moral and emotional factors in personality to this stage in the intellectual result. Will and emotion, not as accompaniments of reasoning, but as elements in the intellectual process of mediation, are more explicitly and obviously present than in perception.

This stage of intellectual life involves will and emotion.

Any process of reasoning is a movement, and the passage from premiss to conclusion, from fact to fact, from idea to idea, is an act of will. The analysis of perception, "breaking it up" into its causes, its conditions, its explanation, or again the synthesis, by which the elements of perception are "built up" into a conclusion, a law,—these plainly imply not merely action, but motivated action, action directed to an end. This end is supplied by perception itself. The mere succession of perceptions, to go no further, suggests a dissatisfaction with the simplicity, the apparent wholeness, of the single perception. The connection of perceptions passes before the mind as an hypothesis to be realised, a reduction to unity once more of what seemed to be one, and has now become diverse, disconnected, multitudinous. And as the process of reasoning or mediation advances, more definite hypotheses, more clearly shaped conclusions, emerge from the premisses, from the facts, correcting themselves into the forms in which they compel assent, and are not merely temporarily tested, but finally adopted by the intellectual will as the motive of the act of proof.

In the act of reasoning, the ulterior view, the hypothesis, which becomes the conclusion is the motive :

I have spoken here as though the steps in reasoning, the tentative or final conclusions, presented themselves to the mind of their own accord for acceptance. This is a view of the facts which is in accord with a good deal of popular and unreflecting language on the subject. We talk of the view of the subject which presents itself, we talk of a theory suggesting itself, of a conclusion, as we said just now, emerging from the premisses. And such language represents, it seems to me, the actually experienced fact. When we think, not merely images, but thoughts, connections, groupings of facts or of ideas, arise of their own accord and challenge assent. Sometimes, when we are listless or out of tune, mere fanciful comparisons, fruitless concatenations, are the best we have to deal with. But the better and truer our thought, the more it squares with the facts and explains them, the more is it spontaneous, presenting itself to the mind rather than presented by the mind to itself.

Not the less is it true that the mere spontaneous presentation of a thought, a course of reasoning, a conclusion, does not itself constitute the fact described in the words "I think." and is adopted. The thought thus presented is adopted; the mind identifies itself with it. Sometimes what presents itself does not commend itself. Even where it commends itself most readily, the two aspects of the thought, as presenting itself, and as adopted, are clearly distinguishable from one another. Plainly here we are giving a description of the intellectual process, very closely corresponding with the definition of will.

As an illustration of the presence of will in reasoning, we may note the familiar difficulty we find in rousing people to depart from or to question their habitual view, a reluctance which is not quite truly described as a mere unwillingness to use their minds. Often there is a general reluctance to *think*, to face the intellectual effort of mediate perception, to rouse the energy of the reasoning power. More often there is an unwillingness to turn the effort of thought in a particular direction. Or, again, there is a difficulty in bringing a conclusion, a view of the facts, effectively before the minds of others, in inducing them to entertain it as appealing to their judgment, as challenging their assent. Those who teach young children know well the state of mind in which an obstinate reluctance to think, to take in this or that particular idea, has to be conjured away. The child listens, attends, understands, but at a certain point he stops, and (with the strange sincerity of a child) he will afterwards tell you himself that he could have understood, but would not. Again, there is an exhilaration about the exercise of the reasoning power, a pleasure quite apart from any satisfaction in the conclusions reached, like the exhilaration of a physical exercise or a moral victory. Often, again, there is a difficulty in following a long course of reasoning. Partly it is a difficulty of attention—the form in which some psychologists recognise the moral element in the intellectual life. Partly it is a difficulty in the sustained effort of memory, keeping the mind in touch with a whole series of ideas. But far more it is the sheer effort of thought, the difficulty of reasoning proper, of

maintaining the electric thrill of vital and perceived connection throughout the whole train of ideas which are gathered into one. Again, in all reasoning at the point where it becomes cogent, there is a sense, of which the word "cogency" is the record, a sense of compulsion, especially when we are being led to conclusions alien from our usual habits of thought, rising sometimes to the point of pain, demanding from us a definite self-sacrifice. But always we speak, and speak truly, of being *driven* to a conclusion, *compelled* to think of the matter in such and such a way—we do not say the conclusion *is*, we say the conclusion *must be*—we are using language which describes the phenomena of will.

And as the act, the energy of reasoning, is moral, so the acquiescence in the conclusion, in the relation of a mass of mediated facts to one another, is emotional. It is so even in cases, such as those to which we have alluded above, where there does not appear to be any tangible or definite conclusion, where the interdependence of the facts or ideas which make up the intellectual world is reflected in a balanced repose, an equipoise of mind, a condition sometimes miscalled a suspense of judgment, which is rather a judgment of suspense, an acceptance of the balance of things against one another as the fundamental and absolute fact. Even here, and still more markedly in the normal reasoning of the mind untouched by sceptical and metaphysical considerations, whose processes are always more difficult to describe, the true character of emotion appears—the characterisation, *i.e.*, of the self as qualified in such and such a way, because the object is qualified in such and such a way.

The acquiescence in
the conclusion is
emotional,

Conviction, the assurance which is produced by proof, conviction in the self answering to causal certainty in the truth of fact. is the correlative of causality as attaching to the facts; of certainty, "tied by the tie of the cause," in the related truths which commend themselves to the reasoning judgment.

But the conviction which we associate with proof, though it rightly claims to be higher than the assurance of perception, is not the highest degree of assurance known to experience. The

III. Knowledge.

But the conviction of proof is not the highest degree of assurance.

The interdependent elements of experience must round into a whole, as truth,

of intellectual effort, implies an apprehension which passes beyond the merely relative conviction of proof, and returns to the simplicity of perception. "The

or as the world,

in general, is regarded not merely as connected causally or otherwise from end to end; it is regarded as a whole.

and these two wholes must become one in God.

And these two—"truth," the aim towards which proof points, and "the world," the unity of experience which lies beyond the causal connection of its facts—confront one another, and demand some further whole which shall include them both, otherwise than as each comprehends and is comprehended by the other. It is this need of a further unification of experience, which is answered to the ordinary man, so far as it is answered at all, by his belief in God.

I propose, then, to take each of these familiar aspects of experience as a whole—the world, truth, and God ; to consider what is this character of “wholeness” which they aim at realising in experience, and, in so far as they attain it, to consider what part the other faculties of personality play in this final effort of intelligence.

In speaking of the scientific view of experience we have already inevitably spoken of it as the scientific

i. The world may stand for the mutual connection of the elements of experience or for the wholeness of experience :

view of “the world.” If we speak of the causally connected elements of experience in general, it is inevitable to use of them the collective name, the world, even though it is not on the wholeness of experience, but on the mediation of its elements by one another, that the mind is at the time intent. This term, then, “the world,” covers this degree of ambiguity. It is used to describe the connected elements of reality, when the prominent idea is their connection, when the fact is mediation ; and it is used more properly to denote the wholeness of experience, towards which the contemplation of the connection of its elements leads the way. Even in this latter sense the application of the word is fluctuating and various in the extreme. But, nevertheless, its use indicates, in all its various applications, a certain tendency of thought, a tendency which may be disengaged and defined.

To the unreflecting mind the world means perhaps most obviously the aggregate of things existing in space. “There is no such thing in *the world* as a unicorn” means primarily, “You may go from place to place, and nowhere will you find a unicorn.” But “the

world" as space is, first of all, not a whole including the elements of experience, but rather the relation of these elements to one another. Space is not, it is needless to say, apprehended by the ordinary uneducated man as an entity at all. But when he talks of "in the world," he means primarily "in space." Even here, perhaps, we should distinguish two stages in his thought: first, the stage at which the world means to him something which involves the spatial relations of things to one another; secondly, the stage at which things as spatially related to one another are thought of as a whole including the elements of experience, though they are not definitely apprehended as a whole. It will not, at any rate, be disputed that he does attain to this latter point of view, and that this is to him the primary and obvious meaning of "the world" when he uses such a phrase as "in the world." But even as a unifying idea, as presenting experience as a whole, space means to him rather spatiality than space. If you offer him as a definition of space that it is an empty box, without top, bottom, or sides, no doubt he will accept the definition; but "in the world" means to him not in the limitless containing medium, but in a sphere of relations of nearness and distance of things from one another, of inwardness and outwardness of things to one another, etc. The fact, however, that the box has neither top, bottom, nor sides, does enter into the meaning of the "world" as he comes to think of the world, as, in this sense, a whole. It helps to make the spatial unity dominate in the imagination the elements which it unites. The

e.g. the world as space may stand for the spatial relation of all things, or the element including all things,

picture of space stretching on and on without the thought of definite contents of space makes a kind of imaginative substitute for abstraction, and helps the mind to grasp the idea of the relatedness of things as the universal fact. This imagination does not reach its highest point of impressiveness, and the thought which it embodies is not complete, until we add to the **which finally includes and is the sphere of the consciousness that apprehends it.** idea of what is commonly called the infinity of space the further perception of our own inclusion in the world we apprehend. By our own inclusion in it we mean primarily the inclusion of our own bodily selves. But even so, our own bodily self is only a specimen self, and when we think of ourselves as included in the world, the world impresses us as the place, the sphere, the theatre, in which this contemplation of the world takes place. The idea, the perception, upon which we are engaged returns upon us, and we find it in a sense comprehending the very perception that apprehends it. I am not dwelling upon this, it is needless to say, as a satisfactory philosophical statement of the relation of thought to space. I am only pointing out that, to the ordinary unreflecting mind, the world is a place within which all thinking minds operate, within which God Himself operates, and that the world is not to the ordinary man in the fullest sense a whole, until it thus returns upon and includes the mind that perceives it.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to do more than indicate by examples what are the essential points in the apprehension of experience as a whole. The causal connection of things, for instance, though it is instinctively assumed, is not explicitly apprehended,

in the ordinary consciousness of the unreflecting man, as a principle which binds the world of experience into

The world as a causal whole is popularly apprehended in the "inevitableness" of events, a whole. It appears, however, in the form of a recognition of the inevitableness of all that happens in the world.

And though the world, as the whole of experience, does not represent an idea familiar to the unreflecting man, he does think of experience and reality as a causal whole. Not only would he demur to any suggestion of facts which were real and yet had no causes or effects, but, as he is conscious of an assurance in perception—the thing must be, because he perceives it—so he is conscious of a general "must"

gathering to a universal "must," that pervades the facts of life. We may be right or wrong in calling this general view of the world, on its moral side, a kind of fatalism, but, on its intellectual side, it involves the recognition that the world is, as a matter of fact, bound together by this iron bond. He is even, I think, dimly conscious of this apprehension of the world, as a great "must be," as an intellectual achievement, and smiles at any suggestion of an attempt to escape from the universal law

finally including the very operation of the mind by which it is apprehended. of fact as a sign of mental inferiority. And it is a part of the assurance which gives him this sense of intellectual achievement, that the mind itself, in the recognition of the world as law, yields to the compulsion of the universal "must." Not that he conceives the mind to be forced, to yield an assent that is unwilling, or in which the spontaneity of the mind is crushed. The mind remains to him a mind; otherwise he would not feel the characteristic elation which accompanies any discovery or intellectual

achievement. But, in his perception, his own conviction and his own thinking self is included in his world, and the inevitableness of the laws of the world owes its final impressiveness to the fact that it is so.

In the scientific view of the world these principles are less difficult to disengage and to discern. There is **To the scientific mind, no need to dwell further upon the fact again, causal connection is—** that causation, law, the mutual connection of the elements of experience with one another, is the vital point in the scientific view of the world. Nor is it necessary to insist that, to the scientific imagination at least, the mutually connected elements of experience, which are the field of law and causation, do round into a whole, and that science thus claims to give a fuller and truer meaning to the term we are considering, "the world." Causal connection is to the scientific mind (1) an all-pervading medium, (2) a unifying agency in experience.

The strength of scientific conviction, the satisfying character of scientific experience, depends on the apprehension of causal connection sometimes in the one character, sometimes in the other. It is to the former, the satisfaction in the view of mediation or causal connection in itself, and apart from any question of arriving at what might strictly be called a system of mediation, completing the causal series, and making it coincident with the whole range of experience, that we have alluded to above as the characteristic conviction of science.* But the latter, the reasoned wholeness of experienced fact, the vision conjured up by

* The tendency to discard the use of the *word* cause leaves us none the less with the reasoned wholeness of experienced fact as the aim and inspiration of science. And this is here the point.

the scientific imagination, as the faculty of rational anticipation, is a no less potent factor in the working of the scientific view of the world, most obviously present, perhaps, where science appears as a substitute for theology, but present constantly in the scientific presentation of the world, and testifying wherever it is present to the working in the scientific mind of the natural impulse to pass from the view of the world as mediated fact, as causally connected, to the view of the world as

including the thinking self in the operation of law ; a whole. But it is necessary also to point out that this conviction of the

wholeness of experience in the scientific view of the world once more reaches its highest point, where the apprehending mind, the thought that apprehends the world as a whole, feels itself to be gripped within the whole which it apprehends. It is familiar and obvious enough that, in the scientific view of the world, mind and all the operations of mind are included within the scope of the causal nexus which holds the world in one, and that therefore, as a matter of fact, the scientific conviction of a particular scientific man that the world is one, is, like all other facts or events, an effect, an incidental feature in the causally connected whole of experience. But it needs to be observed that it is the inclusion of the thinking self within the sphere of the law which holds the world in one, which gives to the conviction of the wholeness of the world its comprehensive and finally convincing character, and

the reality of the world thus including its truth. makes the sphere of law to the scientific mind a closed sphere, from which there is no escape. The reality of the world includes its truth as an incidental feature in its reality.

As causation is the character of mediated facts, and causally connected facts round themselves into a single comprehensive fact, a world ; so proof

ii. Truth is
 (1) the connectedness of beliefs,
 (2) the whole of connected beliefs,

is the character of mediated perceptions or beliefs, and perceptions or beliefs connected by proof similarly suggest and round into a single system of "truth." The perception of facts as connected together, the perception of one fact by means of another, gives rise to the perception of the connectedness of beliefs as a generally pervading law of fact as perceived, and the whole body of actual and possible perceptions and beliefs thus appears before the mind as an ideal of knowledge, connected, consistent, interdependent. And this is no mere dream, accompanying the actuality of a knowledge that is limited and piecemeal enough. The word "true," as applied to belief, derives its meaning from the existence of the ideal. The word "true" means to the scientific man accordant with, taking its place in, the connected body of beliefs as a whole. It is plain enough that connectedness, the testing of perceptions by their mediation with others, by the possibility of making them parts of our connected perception, pervades the whole fabric of apprehended fact, the whole region of "knowledge," and pervades it more penetratingly and comprehensively the more "knowledge" assumes the character of "knowledge." It is plain, further, that the fabric of knowledge, as thus connected by mediation, rounds into a whole, a truth, which is a working factor in the operations in which knowledge lives and grows. But it is further to be observed that truth, a system of connected elements

of experience, includes, and includes as the most vital of all the correspondences and connexions which knit its parts together, the connexion of the whole system of truth with the mind,—by which connection the whole is converted into that which we denote

by the name "science." The name itself includes in

Science, as the knowing of things regarded as a whole with the things known, its ordinary meaning not merely the things known, but the knowing of them, regarded as a whole with the things known. And it is in this character of knowledge, as the knowledge that knows itself to know, that truth returns to the region of existence.

In knowledge as science truth becomes a fact. In the knowledge that knows itself and is known, knowledge

exists. The perceived fact is replaced as a reality by the knowledge that knows itself to know, the quintessence of experience itself, of experience as experiencing itself. To this philosophy has appealed in the enunciation—*cogito ergo sum*.

Here, then, are two views of experience as a whole. One is "the world," the causally connected system of

iii. God. the elements of experience regarded as a whole, and including the mind to which this connection is manifest. The

other is "truth," the rationally connected system of perceptions and beliefs, regarded as a whole, including the perception of rational connection itself, science. Truth at this latter point includes the whole perceived world and the perceiving of it, the whole world of fact as known, the world which, as known, is once more

fact; just as the world of fact, at the point where the mind, which perceives its causal connection, is included in it, takes on the character of truth, exhibiting truth as an element in fact. But the two unities, though each in a sense includes the other, yet stand over against one another as two. Each claims to be the whole, yet neither satisfies the intellectual demand, if for no other reason, because the other is over against it.

but approach is made from either side towards a final unity. It remains to see how from either side approach is made towards the only view of experience in which a final unification of experience is attained.

From the point of view, then, where we regard the world as a whole, whose elements are causally united together, the causal principle, which lost itself in the mutual interdependence of the elements of reality at the stage of mediation, now that the mediated elements have united into a whole, asserts itself once more, and suggests a cause of causality, not a first cause, not one more in the series of causes, nor a cause for the world itself regarded in the mass, but a cause of the unifying principle which makes experience one.

The changes of the material world suggest some underlying being or stuff, which is the subject of the change, the force that is at work in them. The combination of elements with one another, as in chemical change, suggests that this underlying being, or force, is a penetrative and combining unity. The spectacle of organic life, of beings which are ends to themselves, and assimilate matter to themselves, and build themselves into

adequate to the various grades in the scale of causality,

organisms, systems of means for maintaining the life of the individual and the species, suggest the idea of the world-cause as a self-realising unity. But this life of the world, the final reality of which the world is the self-realisation, is so far a cause immanent only. Man and the social life of men present us with a type of unity, a form of causation, very different from this.* The form of causation is a response to external stimulus, in which the resultant action bears at once the character of obedience and of spontaneity. The type of unity is one in which the self unites itself to that which is and remains distinct from it, realises itself in that which is other than itself—as other than itself. The faculty of knowledge in man, claiming as it does communion with reality throughout the whole scale of thought, claims and exercises communion with a reality, which is thus distinct from, and yet united to, itself, in the knowledge of man by man. And the moral and emotional communion between man and man are part and parcel of the same experience, suggesting a cause of the world which shall be at once immanent in and distinct from the world, and personal in the sense that it shall be the prototype of that personal communion of self and others which is the characteristic fact of human social life.

Truth again suggests a soul of the communion with reality which experience is.

Starting again from the point of view of truth and knowledge, does the system of mutually connected elements, bound together by consistent correspondence into one, suggest anything beyond itself?

It does so inasmuch as it rounds, as we have seen,

* See Note F, p. 199, on "Will and Causation."

into a whole which is not truth but knowledge, the coherence of a whole body of elements of truth in a perceiving mind, which thus claims for knowledge, and so far attributes to that which it knows, existence. In knowing, the mind knows knowledge as existing. God, then, is suggested here as the soul of this communion with reality in which knowledge consists.

Considerations such as these which we have here reviewed, have for our present purpose a very limited value. It is no part of our present purpose to give even an inadequate sketch of a representative selection of the lines of argument by which men have arrived at or have justified their belief in an absolute Being, or God. Still less is it any part of our purpose to estimate the validity of all or any of the arguments which we have indicated. Our review serves first to show, in general, how the apprehension of the world as a whole suggests as its necessary unifying principle a Being which is beyond the world and yet immanent in satisfying the intellectual cravings which experience creates, it. And secondly it serves to indicate the intellectual purpose which is practically answered by the belief in God, as an element in the apprehension of the world, by the ordinary unreflecting man.

As perception is of existence, so the first intellectual craving is the desire to attain to the knowledge of being. And the belief in God gives to this desire, what the fluctuating elements of experience deny, a permanent substratum of change, a substantia, a universal thing, manifested in the changes of the world. And the belief gives us this element of existence or permanence in such

a form that the self can find repose and a sense of stability in sharing the nature of the Eternal Being. When, again, we see in the world a scene of change, in which elements dissolve and combine into one another, the belief in God supplies the conception of an all-pervading life, the soul of all the transformations of existence. So God has been pictured as "the All-pervading," the brooding figure of Watts, enshrouding in its vast encircling wings all the mysteries of change; and our sense of communion with such a universal being has been described by Wordsworth—

"A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things."

But the mind further craves for a living organic unity in that which it knows. It longs to know the world alive. It shrinks from death as the contradiction of being, from futility as the violation of the consistency of things. It seeks for the unity of purpose which shall make the record of nature a history. And the belief in God enables it to see in the world "*des Gottheits lebediges Kleid*;" it enables it to believe that purpose is supreme, purpose akin and, in the vastness of its field and the majesty of its advance, more than akin to the purpose which we feel to pulse in our own blood.

But the belief in God appeals to a more powerful instinct even in intellectual apprehension, as the rationale and the unifying principle of the moral life of man, at once the ideal and the hope of a solution of that

conflict and contrast between freedom and law, which underlies all that is baffling and unintelligible in sin, and crime, and the slow progress of the ages towards a kingdom of righteousness upon earth. And still more is it an intellectual relief to find in the immanent world-force a response to conscience and to law in human life, a response from that which may be conceived to be at once their consummation and their source.

And again the belief in God supplies in our apprehension of the world that which is the essential craving and finally the craving of the mind, the possibility of a communion with the reality of things, such for a principle of that communion which as is suggested by the analogy of the experience pre-eminently is, communion of mind with mind, the object of knowledge in this case for the first time in the development of knowledge answering to that which knows, explaining the communion between knower and known, giving the source of the faculty and energy of knowledge in the knowing mind.

Further, the communion of man with man, in every form of social life, is increasingly felt to be the fact of commanding interest in the whole range of experience. In proportion as God has come to be conceived as the Eternal Prototype of social existence, the inspiration, the ideal, and the goal of social progress, the belief in God has come to be the natural crown of the knowledge of things. And this belief reaches its highest degree of intensity, where it carries with it the conviction that in fulfilment of the craving which has created society as it stands, God makes us capable of communion with one another by giving us communion with Himself.

The presence of moral and emotional elements in this stage of intellectual apprehension is not very difficult to discern. The special appeal to the will is in the demand for self-surrender involved in the recognition of ourselves as included in the reality in which we contemplate the world. There is a sense in which it is true of the final stage in the apprehension of any deep and comprehensive truth, such as may be said to pervade or to sum experience as a whole, that we feel ourselves not so much to apprehend as to be apprehended of it. The truth comes upon us, rather than we come upon the truth.* It comes upon us with mastery and imperious assertion. It demands the surrender of that apartness from its object, that sheer independent spontaneity of action, which belongs to the operation of the intellect, which led Hume to say of the imagination, "There is nothing so free as that faculty." We seem to have been following the course of a free and unfettered fancy in the pursuit of truth. Now we find ourselves in the grip of that which we pursued. The truth has hold of us. Our mind is active only in surrendering to its sway, to bow to which has become the necessity of its own life. The free course of thought has led it into obedience to the truth.

Hence the intellectual effort and the intellectual dignity of the apprehension of a great scientific generalisation or a great philosophical principle, and the intenser effort and loftier dignity which may be claimed by religious faith in so far as the dictate to which the judgment bows can approve itself as the rational compulsion of the truth.

* See Note H, p. 209, on "The Mind as passive to the Truth."

The strenuous energy of apprehension in the final effort of intelligence is not more obvious than the emotion with which the final achievement of intelligence is transfused. The acquiescence in the mastery of the truth as the fulfilment of intellectual desire has an emotional character more intense than that which belongs to any earlier intellectual conclusion. The apprehension of the wholeness of experience, and of ourselves as included in the whole, is of the nature of emotion as we have defined it. And the force with which a truth commends itself to us, which can be presented in such a light, the conviction of absolute existence, is the correlative of a no less vivid appreciation of the truth as affecting ourselves, who live and move and have our being in the Eternal and Universal Being. In the restless pursuit of new discovery and new opinion, the intellectual repose, which is the last intellectual energy, is apt to be lost out of life. But contemplation cannot be altogether banished where intellectual life is intense and sincere. And contemplation is the contentment of the mind in the achievement of the truth by which it is possessed and inspired. Even in the presence of the lower grades of speculative truth, the sense of intellectual achievement is raising us through the sense of intellectual inspiration to the level, where the contemplation of the truth anticipates the adoration with which the intellect bows itself in the presence of the Eternal Being.

and emotion plays its part in the acquiescence in the mastery of the truth,

in contemplation.

CHAPTER V

EMOTION

It cannot be said of emotion, as it was said of thought that it stands out against the background of feeling.

Emotion emerges from feeling, but it absorbs the feeling from which it emerges.

We have distinguished emotion from feeling, as self-conscious and deliberate, but the distinction is not recognised in ordinary language ; and, as a matter of fact, emotion and feeling pass easily one into another. Emotion emerges from feeling, as perception or desire emerge from feeling, but the antecedent feeling is in both these latter cases lost and left behind as we pass to the self-conscious energy of volition or thought. Emotion, on the other hand, as it emerges from feeling absorbs and carries on the feeling from which it emerges. The energy of emotion itself again is accompanied by flashes and scintillations of feeling, distinct, and yet not separable, from the emotion itself, and emotion, as it dies down, dies away into feeling which remains as the seed and possibility of its revival into energetic life.

The emotion of anger will serve as an illustration. It is in itself, when it has risen to the height of an emotion, both self-conscious and deliberate. It carries within it a definite consciousness of the irritating quality of that which

rouses the passion, and of the self as affected by this quality. It carries with it an energy of will, accepting and adopting the motive of passion and identifying the self with it, and yet every one is conscious, as the impulse of indignation arises, of an unself-conscious, undeliberate feeling out of which the self-conscious and deliberate emotion springs, a blind impulse, an action of indignant feeling so automatic, so spontaneous, that we can scarcely call it an impulse. And the play of passion while it has possession of the soul lives upon pulsations of feeling which quicken and stimulate the vitality of emotion. Indignation against a wrong may, and often does, settle into a permanent and habitual emotion in the soul of a man who sets himself to remedy or revenge the wrong which he resents. In such a man there will be from time to time moments when he is giving intellectual expression to his emotion, or allowing it as a motive to action, when the pulsations of feeling which mark the spontaneous rise of indignation will be revived, and fresh springs of emotion will seem to reveal themselves even to the man himself. The feeding of emotion upon feeling, which thus occurs in the revived and continuous life of a settled emotion, an emotion which in language or in act has found its way out into life, marks also the simple and vivid energy of the soul which we commonly have in mind in speaking of emotion. And, when emotions pass, as they are commonly said to do, they seldom really die; they leave behind them a residuum or deposit of feeling. When we meet a man against whom we have felt passionately angry, we are conscious of this feeling, a repulsion almost physical, an unwillingness of the hand to open or

the lips to shape the words of courtesy, a feeling which has survived the emotion whose record and remembrance it is, to whose renewal it may give rise, even when it has subsided or has been subdued by some more powerful trend of passion in the soul.

But though feeling thus passes into emotion, and emotion into feeling, emotion stands as an element in

It is nevertheless
distinct—self-con-
scious feeling, a
substantive energy
of self-consciousness,

experience, a substantive energy of self-consciousness, distinct in character from will and intelligence with which it is inseparably combined, and needing to

be systematically analysed and considered in the whole range of self-conscious feeling. It is not to be dismissed as “mere” emotion, one-sided, subjective, disconnected with the fact and reality of the world. Beauty is an elemental part of reality, and beauty and emotion are correlatives, each entering into the very definition of the other. Nor is it, in another sense, “mere” emotion, detached from the practical and effective force of will and the clear vision of intelligence. In every separable phase or moment of their life will and intelligence show, as we have seen, the presence of emotion, and, now that we turn our attention to the emotion itself, we shall find that it gathers up and includes in itself the life and force of will, the fruit and reality of perception. It covers the whole range of moral and intellectual experience. There is a complete scale of emotions differing in moral grade from one another, selfish, disinterested, social. In its intellectual basis emotion ranges from fact, vivid and direct, through the whole world of thought to the very crown and sum of things.

And through all its range and variety it bears a single character—the character of finality. It is the **bearing its own character of finality.** only thing in experience that even seems to fulfil the ideal of an end in itself. The final stages in every intellectual and moral process have borne, as we have seen, the character of emotion; in the moral region the anticipated and the realised satisfaction of desire, which complete the volition and the act, the acquiescence in the obligation of duty that is to do and the approval of duty done, the recognition of the soul as a part of the community, and the identification of the individual and the collective will, in the intellectual region the rest in the reality attained by perception, the abandonment to the play of reasoning, the acceptance of the conclusion of inference, the surrender to the mastery of the all-embracing truth, —all these in turn have been seen to be of the nature of emotion. It remains to show that, as the passion of desire and the imperious awe of duty are consummated in the motive of love, as the vivid reality of perception and the rigorous march of reason are combined in the intellectual surrender to the truth, so emotion itself consummates and combines the operation of volition and intelligence—that while the will is ever striving after what is not, and the mind is engaged in the contemplation of that which is apart, emotion is the faculty of achievement, of the intimate union with that which is other than ourselves, and alone among the faculties of man does not look beyond itself.

Pleasure, beauty, love, represent the recognised aspects of life and experience where emotion appears as

the cardinal element in the experience. What can here be said to exhibit emotion as the crowning energy of personal life, will best be said in a consideration of these familiar forms of emotion.

Pleasure * is the name of an emotion, even if it is also the name of a feeling, unself-conscious, instinctive, evanescent. Pleasurable feeling, in the proper sense of the word "feeling," is an element in experience; feeling, that is, which as it passes is caught as a phase of consciousness, fixed as an object, described and truly described by the character of the emotion into which it passes—described, *i.e.*, as pleasure. But by the name pleasure we undeniably also describe emotions that are self-conscious, deliberate, distinct, carrying with them the consciousness of an object separate from ourselves, which qualifies our feeling and is itself qualified and defined as thus affecting us.

We should, perhaps, be inclined *primâ facie* to call pleasure a merely selfish feeling, beginning in ourselves, concerned merely with ourselves, and carrying us out of ourselves. with the object only indirectly and in so far as it necessarily comes into view as the cause of pleasure. But, on the other hand, we speak of pleasure as carrying us out of ourselves, and the self with which we are concerned in pleasure is a self for the moment absorbed and possessed by something other than itself,

* Pain, often only the other side of pleasure, is not very naturally omitted, together with the rest of the negative side of the emotional life. It would assist the illustration of the principle, but it would introduce complications which would be out of place in a preliminary sketch of *Æsthetic* only intended to serve the purpose of illustration.

the consciousness of which, as an object distinct from the self, is present in the pleasure, contributes to it, and is essential to it, so that, even when the self as qualified by the pleasant object is in the foreground of consciousness rather than the pleasant object itself, it is still true to say that, if the consciousness of the pleasant object were away, the pleasure would lose its character as pleasure. Of the common bodily pleasures, such as the pleasures of eating and drinking, this is obviously true. It is more and more true as we rise to higher levels of pleasure and approach, say, the pleasures of contemplation, or, if they are still to bear the name, the pleasures of self-sacrifice. Perhaps the pleasures of which it would seem to be least obviously true are those which might be generally described as the pleasures of life—say, to take a particular example, the pleasure of warmth. Yet here it may be said generally that in the pleasures of life the pleasure is in the consciousness of give and take between the self and its surroundings. And the fact that there *are* surroundings, that there *is* give and take, is essential to the pleasures of life. And in the particular case the pleasure of warmth is a pleasure of contrast; the object is the modified self as contrasted with the self unmodified or differently modified, and the sense of an influence stealing in from without and affecting the self is essential to the pleasure. And, in fact, pleasures range from those which we more naturally describe by some such phrase as “I like,” “I enjoy,” describing the affection of the subject, to those which we more naturally describe by qualifying the object as pleasant because it produces the affection in the subject. Perhaps most pleasures

might be almost indifferently described by indicating pleasantness in the object or pleasure in the subject of emotion, and in those which lend themselves to description in the one way rather than in the other, both elements in the nature of emotion are none the less present.

Pleasure covers the whole field of emotion. The consideration of pleasantness in the object of emotion **All lives are pleasure-loving,** points on to the consideration of beauty as the quality in the object which gives us pleasure in perceiving. Nor is love itself, in any of its forms, or in any of the energies of self-sacrifice and self-devotion that belong to it, excluded from the range of the principle which makes all lives pleasure-loving.

For pleasure is in fact the result of every action and operation of the will, when the mind surveys and appreciates the achievement of purpose, the attainment of desire. In volition itself the spiritual act of volition is completed by the anticipated satisfaction of the fulfilment of the impulse, and in any action which is more than momentary the sustained operation of the will is fed by repeated emotions, as the mind in part perceives the gradual attainment of the end, in part revives the anticipation of its complete achievement. This constant and instantaneous transformation of pleasure into volition is the secret of the dominant influence of pleasure upon life. That the will is present as a factor in emotion is already implied in saying that emotion is deliberate. It is present in the way which again has already been implied in saying that emotion is an end in itself. It is the

for pleasure attends the perceived attainment of the end of every action of the will, anticipated or achieved,

emotion itself which is the motive of the will to maintain emotion ; and the presence of the will, energising and all volition takes in emotion, sustaining and prolonging its rise in the will to it, is most readily obvious in pleasure, maintain or revive where the endeavour to sustain and emotion as the conscious relation to our prolong the pleasure, as a continuous world. energy of the will, passes by imperceptible stages into the endeavour to revive the remembered emotion, or to reproduce the conditions that gave rise to it. It is commonly said that the instinct of self-assertion and self-preservation is the nature of the will ; rather it would be true to say that the maintenance of the relation to the environment of reality, in which the being of the self consists, is the root principle of volition, and that this takes its rise in emotion as the full consciousness of this relation to reality. This, again, is another way of describing the familiar fact that pleasure in one form or another is the invariable motive of the will, and this close association between pleasure and the will is a main general fact to be noted in regard to the whole field of emotion, and especially in regard to emotion, in so far as it is covered by the various uses of the word "pleasure."

Pleasure is, on the face of it, a simple and direct emotion. In a survey of the field it covers we should naturally light first on those pleasures
 i. Pleasures simple and direct— which are most simple and direct, the
 (a) pleasure in things, pleasures which attend on the satisfaction of the bodily desires. Of these desires we have remarked that it is not true to fact to describe them as desires for an object.* Of the whole mass of such

* Part II. ch. iii. p. 68.

desires it is rather true to say that they are desires of life, desires, *i.e.*, for a certain relation of communion with our surroundings. And the same is true of each individual bodily desire. The desire for food is the desire to have, to consume, to absorb, to take into ourselves. That we live by this bodily communion with our world, and that desire accordingly begins in uneasiness and want, does not alter the fact that it is towards this bodily communion that desire is directed. And accordingly it is the achievement of this bodily communion in which the bodily pleasure consists, not only in the pleasures of eating and drinking, but in the pleasure in the air we breathe, the light without which we feel alone, and all the sights and sounds and smells by which the world in which we live enters into our bodily being and self.

There is another kind of pleasures of life of which bodily pleasures are also the most obvious example—the (b) pleasures of energy, pleasures of energy, pleasures in the exercise of any faculty by which we put forth our power upon the world about us. We take pleasure in asserting our bodily selves, our powers of movement and of mastery, our powers of manifesting ourselves and giving expression to the force that is within us. And this is the pleasure of mere exercise, of the use of bodily strength, a pleasure felt even in the very vigour of living ; but this pleasure plainly extends beyond the range of energies which we commonly think of as bodily, and pursues us through every form of moral effort and in every exercise of the will, nor is it lost even when we rise to the highest energies of love and the strenuous effort of self-sacrifice and self-surrender.

And among the energies of the will, the mere activities of the soul, which are the field of this pleasure of life, are included the pleasures of intellectual activity, the pleasure in the mere energy of seeing and understanding, of reasoning and knowing. But here the pleasure in the activity shades off into the pleasure in the result. For there is a pleasure in life which may be called simple and direct, a pleasure not in the act and energy of knowledge, but in the thing that is known, in the existence, there over against us, of the world with which we may carry on the interchange of life, in which we may exercise the capacities of communion, and which, indeed, exists to us as material for the fellowship of life, as the complex of the conditions of fellowship. For the form of this pleasure, which is the most obvious and familiar element in the life of man, is the pleasure in the mere knowledge of persons, in the mere existence of our own kind, in the presence of those who come within our range, as so many possibilities of fellowship. It is the absence of this pleasure which makes solitude a pain, and which, after solitude, makes any company an unspeakable relief. It is a pleasure in itself, though prejudice and dislike, on the one hand, may intervene to obliterate the pleasure or to convert it into a pain, and though, on the other hand, it may pale and vanish, lost in the more vivid affections and emotions of any grade of love.

But besides pleasures simple and direct, our experience certainly includes pleasures that
 ii. **Complex pleasures,** into which simple pleasures resolve themselves, suggest and transfuse one another; and as in the world of thought many perceptions which present themselves first as simple

turn out on a nearer view to involve inference or mediate apprehension, so in the world of emotion there are many pleasures which may be viewed in their primary aspect, in their general result, as simple and direct, which in another view will appear to be complex.

The pleasure of a child in the presence of its mother seems at first sight simple and direct enough, a typical case of the pleasure in the knowledge of a person, and not the less so because the mother is to the child not merely a person but a world, the one all-embracing reality of life. And yet the pleasure of the child in its mother's presence is by no means simple. It is composed of simple elements. It may, in any instance of the emotion, take its rise from some almost physical pleasure—the sound of the voice, the soothing touch of the hand—but in a moment this simple pleasure, if it be so, has recalled a thousand half-remembered pleasures through which the same presence has made itself felt, and this present pleasure and all of them are pleasant, as it stands, not merely because they are pleasant in themselves, or because one such physical pleasure suggests a thousand more, but because the physical pleasure suggests and is transfused by the spiritual pleasure of love. And this transfusion of the physical by the spiritual pleasure is not simply an isolated act; it is an habitual act, and the force of past pleasures remembered and revived is communicated to the present pleasure and contributes to it. The child's pleasure in the tender touch would not be the pleasure it is, not only if it did not rise from the level of the cat that purrs when it is stroked to the spiritual level of love, but it would not be the pleasure it is if the

spiritual pleasure of love did not bring with it the remembrance of a thousand verifications in the pleasures in which it has been embodied.

But throughout all the complexity into which the simple pleasure resolves itself, it is to be observed that giving rise to a distinctive pleasure, resultant from them, we are not merely dealing with pleasures each complete in itself and associated with one another; there is, to use the logical term, a mediation of pleasure by pleasure. One pleasure is felt by means of another, and we must go further and say that this complexity and interdependence of pleasures, this sense of a wealth and world of emotion, as when the spiritual pleasure, single, simple, and supreme, is embodied in a number of emotional experiences,—this is an intensification of pleasure, and is the source of what is itself a distinctive pleasure, a pleasure in the very complexity of emotion, in the passage and transition from pleasure to pleasure.

And the presence of the will in the maintenance of emotion in this special pleasure, the pleasure in the play of emotion, is seen in a special form of volition, maintaining this movement and life of emotion, as we pass from one to another of the emotional elements which contribute to the making of a pleasurable moment or a pleasurable life.

But the pleasure of love, of which we have spoken as an element in the complex experience of pleasure, apart from its relation to lesser pleasures which are elevated to its level by its embodiment in them, is in itself complex and more than complex. Even in the apparently

iii. Mutual pleasure,
the character of the
pleasure of love,

simple case of the love between mother and child the pleasure of love obviously includes both the pleasure of loving and the pleasure of being loved. In some degree it is true of everything that deserves the name of love at all, that the lover takes pleasure in the loved, and that the loved not only in turn takes pleasure in the lover, but takes pleasure in the fact of giving pleasure to the lover. It is this that gives supreme intensity among physical pleasures to the pleasure of the passion of love, and gives to it also its supreme rank among the spiritual pleasures of the natural life of man. Mutual pleasure as here described is the highest kind of pleasure. But some anticipation of this mutual character is to be found in pleasures of less intensity and elevation. In pleasures that are common,

anticipated in various degrees by lower grades of pleasure, social, shared, the pleasure is intensified by the fact that it is shared, and this means that, *e.g.*, where father and mother take pleasure in watching their child, each takes pleasure in the child and each takes pleasure in the pleasure of the other. Here, though the pleasure is not mutual, we take pleasure in the pleasure of others; the pleasure is intensified by the communion in pleasure. Even where pleasure is not quickened by sympathy, there is a feeling after communion such as is realised in the higher and intenser pleasures. The language in which we describe the beauty of natural and material things abounds in traces of our tendency to personify the various parts and aspects of the natural world, as though its gladness, its glory, signified some response of joy to the emotion it inspires; as though it delighted in its own life, in fulfilling its purpose, in its communion

with spiritual being in ourselves. An entirely fanciful idea, let us for the moment without qualification allow, but an idea, nevertheless, which represents a real element in our experience of pleasure in nature, a foreshadowing in fancy of what pleasure feels itself foreordained to attain to in fact. But the fact that we have already observed that the simplest and most obvious pleasures in material things are pleasures not in things but in life, not in things but in communion with things, is the real anticipation of that character in pleasure which is manifested in higher degree as we mount to higher levels of pleasure, and gives their distinctive quality to the highest pleasures, the pleasures of society, fellowship, communion between spirit and spirit. In these, the highest pleasures, and in any pleasures which in any degree anticipate or attain to the character of mutual pleasure, the action of the will in maintaining the pleasure is to be seen in its highest form in the energy of self-surrender or of self-abandonment to the communion of emotion. And, on the other hand, what is in fact pleasure in its highest form, though it be an emotion which is generally considered to lie beyond the range of such a word as "pleasure," crowns the achievement of the purpose inspired by the motive of love in the act of self-devotion, the highest energy of will.

maintained by a
special form of
volition.

It is in the achieved self-surrender and self-abandonment to the emotion of pleasure of whatever grade, that another form of emotion, the emotion of beauty, takes its rise. In the effort of the will to maintain pleasure comes the

II. Beauty,

pause of perception, of contemplation, itself an energy of emotion though an energy of rest, in which the mind feeds upon the object or cause of emotion. The effort of self-surrender finds a new satisfaction in losing itself in the object, dwelling no longer on the pleasurable consciousness, except as it is reflected in the emotion of beauty, regarded as a quality of the object itself.

In passing from pleasure to beauty we pass from interested to disinterested emotion, from emotion as

a disinterested	associated with will to emotion as
emotion, associated	associated with reason and intelligence.
with intelligence.	Not that either contrast is absolute.

We have observed that pleasures range from those which we describe in terms of our pleasant feeling to those which we describe in terms of the pleasant quality of the object. But the distinction between the self and the object is always there, and this distinction is, as we have said, a sign of the intellectual element in pleasure; and again, even in the most selfish pleasures the delight in being taken out of ourselves, which is indeed the principle of emotion, is still to be traced. On the other hand, we shall find that the will is always present, and the element of self-interest never wholly absent, in the emotions which we describe in terms of the beauty of things. But it is nevertheless true to say that in these emotions the stress is on the consideration of the objects, and that an intellectual character belongs to the emotional perception of beauty.

Beauty, in fact, is primarily the word by which we describe things that give us pleasure in perceiving. Our simplest experiences of beauty are emotions of

perception, a consciousness of some quality in the thing that gives us pleasure not in possessing the thing, but

i. Simple—that which gives us pleasure in perceiving, merely in perceiving it. The pure and mere emotion of beauty has given place

to another, as soon as we are engaged with the pleasures of fruition—the pleasure of possessing that which we admire, or asserting ourselves and our own mind and power upon it. Beauty is that whose perception, that is to say, whose mere existence, is to be desired, for perception is of existence, and the motive of perception is, as we have seen, the desire of existence.*

This is the essential element in beauty, that it is that which gives us pleasure in perception, and beauty in this sense indicates a far wider field of emotion than is commonly covered by the use of the word. “Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is to behold the sun.” It may be only rarely that the perpetual pleasure in the beauty of the world rises to the intensity which demands expression, but it is a constant element in life, as constant as the pleasure which is its correlative.

an emotional appreciation which is a vital element in knowledge. Our emotional appreciation of things is, indeed, the most vital element in our knowledge of our surroundings.

Knowledge reaches back always after some underlying force, some centre of the activity which manifests itself in the qualities and attributes by which we describe the thing. But as this, the thing in itself of philosophical theory, is known and can be known only in the attributes and qualities by which we describe it, so they in their turn and all that we can predicate of it

* Part II. ch. iv. p. 90.

are "qualities" only as describing the thing in relation to ourself, the general and collective self, as affected by it; and the reality of conviction, assertion, predication, varies with the presence in our apprehension of the terms of a vivid appreciation of the thing as it affects the self—that appreciation which in its more pressing and obvious form we describe by the use of such words as pleasure and pain, beauty and ugliness, and the like.

That there is an intellectual element in the emotion which we describe in such terms as "This is beautiful,"

is plain enough. Apart from the judgment of perception which gives rise to the emotion, there is in this case evi-

Intellectual and volitional elements in the emotion of beauty. dently an emotional judgment which aims at expressing the emotion itself. And the will is present in the emotion of beauty as in the emotion of pleasure, insisting on the emotion and maintaining it.

But the action of the will as maintaining the emotion takes a special form in the case of the emotion

of beauty, carrying us on, in the effort

ii. Complex. The will is especially obvious in developing simple into complex perceptions of beauty. to dwell upon and prolong the emotion, beyond the mere simple perception of beauty. For perceptions of beauty

which appeared to be simple turn out as we dwell upon them to be complex. In the effort to prolong them we unfold them into other perceptions of beauty, which appear to be involved in them, and for our first simple judgment of beauty we have a series of judgments, the beauty of one thing carrying us on to and resolving itself into the beauty of others. The beauty of a spring morning as we first wake to the sunlight, or step out

into the air, is compounded of a thousand beauties and pleasures. We do not suppose it to be simple, even when we sum up its beauty in words whose simplicity of form often conceals the fulness of their meaning. But if we dwell upon the beauty of the day to prolong our enjoyment of the moment, we instinctively note point after point, and make judgment after judgment of beauty, and as we speak of the beauty of pure air and bright sun, of the refreshed and lovely life of the world, we are not merely noting intellectually a number of facts, each of which played its part in giving us the moment of emotion. We are unfolding the emotion itself into separate emotions, and it is the instinctive desire to prolong the emotion which leads us to do so.

The simplest perceptions often involve others.

The beauty of one note in the song of a bird, of the scent of a flower, of a touch of colour in the hedge, might seem to give us a pleasure simple and complete in itself, but who shall say what flashes of remembrance and association reach us through the seemingly simple emotion and reawaken a thousand others? In a well-known passage in the opening paragraph of the "Lamp of Memory," Mr. Ruskin showed how the beauty of a wild and natural scene is robbed of half its power, if we deliberately take from it the emotions belonging to the peaceful happiness of settled human life, with all the history that lies behind it, by supposing it far away from human habitations, the unsuspected memory of whose near neighbourhood was all the while qualifying the mere beauty of natural things by a context of other and very different emotions.

The beauty of a person is an instance of a different

kind of interdependence of emotions upon one another, where the beauty of a face, or the carriage or the lines of a figure, not only suggest but convey emotions of another order—beauties of character and intelligence, the traditional courtesies and charities of social life, the capacities and habits of upright loyal bearing, of genuine and sympathetic sincerity, of tenderness, self-sacrifice, and love.

In many cases, if not to a certain extent in all cases where one emotion or apprehension of beauty suggests

The relation of pleasure to pleasure intensifies each, and gives rise to a distinct emotion of beauty which consists in their relation.
E.g. music.

or conveys another, there is an intensification of pleasure in both through their relation to one another, even if there be not a distinct emotion arising directly out of their relation to one another. Music, though it carries us prematurely into the region of art, affords an instance of this. A single pure note is a pleasurable and beautiful sound. In melody we have something more than this—a series of notes, each having this simple beauty of sound, but having, as a succession, a new and distinct beauty arising out of their relation to one another. In harmony, again, we have an added beauty, in the combination of successions of notes with one another such that the combinations of melodies or each successive combination of single notes is in itself beautiful. Both kinds of relations of notes to one another, melody and harmony, are beautiful in themselves, and both are beautiful as relations of notes already beautiful in themselves. The emotion of beauty of the more complex kind arises from the relation to

one another of emotions of the simpler kind. The distinct character of the more complex emotion cannot, from the nature of the case, be tested by isolating it from the simpler emotions. But an approach to such isolation is obtained in the case of musicians who are too deaf to hear musical sounds, but who still find pleasure in reading a musical score. Memory and imagination no doubt in such cases supply a likeness of the actual sounds, though faint and dim in comparison with reality. But in any case, the survival of a keen pleasure in the relations of sounds to one another, where the sounds themselves are at best the far echoes of reality, helps us to see that there is a real and distinct beauty in the relation of beautiful sounds to one another. Instances might be taken in other arts, as, for instance, the beauty of mere colour, and the beauty of the scheme of colour, the beauty of mere line or form, and the beauty of composition. And instances no less real, though less obvious for purposes of exposition, might be found without straying from the regions of nature and fact into the domain of the constructive imagination of the artist.

But it is difficult to separate the two regions from one another. For the will to maintain emotion, which is radical to emotion itself, takes shape in art. Every work of art must take its rise in an initial moment of emotion, a vision, a perception, which the artistic temperament is able to recover and revive. Nor must the impulse to maintain the level of the emotion of beauty be limited to the immediate moment and the prolongation of a particular emotion. When the perception of beauty

Art arises from the
impulse to maintain
emotion,

is not definite enough for this, it may still fill the mind with a vague impulse to maintain the element of beauty in some way in the life, though, in the majority of mankind, it will be by acquiring rather than by creating what to the individual mind, at such a stage of culture, commend themselves as works of art. And in most handicrafts and occupations there is some scope for effort after something that resembles an æsthetic standard, although the characteristic results of the creative effort, by which mankind endeavour to prolong and to perpetuate their perceptions of beauty, belong to the arts which are commonly dignified with the name.

And eminent among the endowments of the artist properly so called is his sense for the relations of beauty.

and especially what we have called complex emotion.

He has the ear for mere tone, the eye for pure colour, pure line, pure form—this is the first grade of artistic endow-

ment; and he is even more separated from his fellows by his perception of harmonies in the beauties of sound or sight. But though the pure artist is often said to be this and no more, the endowments which enable a man to produce really great art go far beyond

“The finer dress
Of flesh that amply lets in loveliness
By eye and ear,”

even if we add to this as a separate endowment the impulse to reproduce, unless we further include in loveliness, the moral and spiritual beauty of which we have said that physical beauty is the exponent. A

E.g. landscape pictures.

landscape picture in its motive as a whole almost always includes some human association. Often, where it seems to contain

no such element, its motive is the modern love for solitary places, the renewal of the simple sense of communion with the world in which we live, of which we allow ourselves to be robbed by the complexity and din of a crowded and busy life. But it includes in its details, and as a subordinate element in its main endeavour, the mere aim to reproduce the conditions of natural beauty. And the simplest aim of the kind involves, in the artist who paints the picture, and in those who are to appreciate its beauty, a sensitiveness not only to colour and line and form, but to endless contrasts and harmonies of colour and line and form, and the beauty of each detail of the picture is itself a complex beauty, an emotion arising from the fusion and harmony of emotions. And in the picturing of nature the sense of communion claims a larger share of the motive, as we include in the picturing of nature the picturing of the life of tree and bird and beast, of which the world is full. Man himself, with whom we enter on a region of real spiritual communion, appears first upon the scene of nature as pictured in art, as a part of the life of nature itself. "Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour until the evening."

In the pictures of human life for its own sake, it is the picturing of the social scene rather than the portraiture of the individual which is first to be noted. Here first the beauty of human life strikes the mind, and our emotion is a pleasure in beholding the beauty of what more than all before, as beautiful, deserves the name of life. We have been dwelling often on the fact of spiritual intercourse and communion between

Human life as the
subject of art takes
us to a higher level
of emotion,

human persons as the cardinal fact of experience. This common life of man, this communion of person with person, is the aspect under which man is first the subject of art. The group upon a Greek stèle, touched with some tenderness of feeling which made it fit its end, the children round their mother at a cottage door, the charge of a regiment of cavalry, or the busy preparation for an Athenian pomp,—in these and in a thousand other instances it is the common life and the communion of life which has touched the artist's mind, and given him the emotion which he perpetuates and communicates to us. And of this emotion it is more than ever true that it is complex; it is something more even than the emotion resultant on the play of emotions upon one another. For at this point already we are beginning to pass to a higher level of the emotion of

iii. *Sympathy*, beauty, and a higher grade in art. If we chance upon the actual living scene, the parting of lovers, the meeting of a mother and her son, and are touched by the beauty of what we see, it is because first of all the emotion of the scene we witness is communicated to ourselves. There is something of this sympathy, this communicated emotion, in every grade of emotion. But here it is unmistakable, and is the main fact to be noted. The emotions which arise on a survey of human social life begin in sympathy. And this sympathy is not spontaneous; it is roused in us by the object which arouses the emotion itself, which we describe in speaking of a scene as pitiful or touching; and further still, the power of such emotion is greatly increased by the fact that the single scene of emotion stands to us, and we know it, for the whole world

of human emotional experience—"mentem mortalia tangunt." There is a sense of revelation in every such experience. The convincing fact of human life and love comes upon us with a fresh and, for the moment, an overwhelming force.

"Trades, arts, the politics of life,—
 Say, have they, after all,
 One other object, end, or use,
 Than that for girl or boy
 The punctual earth should still produce
 This golden flower of joy?"

"Ay, years may come and years may bring
 The truth that is not bliss,
 But will they bring another thing
 That can compare with this?"

This level of emotion may be illustrated in the corresponding grade of art. In all art, the artist must and a correspondingly communicate to us his emotion; but higher level of art, there are pictures where the primary object of the artist is the representation of the beautiful object, though in order to represent it he must represent to us his own emotion in perceiving it; and there are others where his primary object is to communicate to us his own view of the object represented, his own emotion in imagining or perceiving it, where he reckons upon the sympathy of the beholder and where the artist appeals to sympathy, where this sympathy is, so to say, his aim. And it is characteristic of this stage of art, not only that the emotion of the beholder is an emotion sympathetic with that of the artist, but creates in us a new emotional experience, that it is evoked and created rather than merely revived by the embodiment of the emotion of the artist in the picture. We

owe to the artists emotions, which but for them we should not have. And once more the power of this emotion upon us is largely dependent upon its discerning a universal element in life and experience.

a reading of universal emotional fact. It is a reading of the emotional fact,

not merely of the individual artist or the individual beholder, but of the world. In a landscape picture the artist does necessarily, as a matter of fact, communicate to us his own emotion, his own perception of beauty. And in many landscape pictures we owe our perception of beauty to the perception of the artist, whose unique susceptibility and power of discernment enable him to awaken in us dormant powers of emotion, and to enrich us with faculties for perception of beauty to which we should not otherwise

have attained. But—to take only the most obvious and familiar instances of another grade of art—in such pictures as Sir Edwin Landseer's "Shepherd's Chief Mourner," or Mr. Watts's "Love

and Death," the aim of the artist is to create a sympathy with his own emotion, and the emotion roused in us is distinctively the artist's own and communicated to us, and its power over us is in great part due to the fact that its pathos is part of the common human life within which artist and beholder live, revealed to the artist in his own perception and to the beholder through his embodiment of it. But it is not a particular class of pictures only which have this kind of power over us. All art has it in various degrees. The emotion created may be merely simple pity or affection appealing to the sympathy of all mankind. It may be the rare and

indefinable emotion of a moment, a summer hour of pause laden with feeling, suggested or conveyed to us—who shall say how?—by a Venetian landscape, peopled with those whose pose speaks to us of no character, no action, and yet is penetrated by the spirit of the slow music which we almost seem to hear, the harmony which might express the emotion that broods over the remembered hour. It may rise to the mystic and sublime solemnity where in the grandeurs and solitudes of nature, or in the tragedies of a spiritual life that bows to or defies inexorable laws, man is taught to feel himself face to face with a Divine and universal presence.

Language, in tenderness of tone, in the cadence of a voice, in the rhythm of passionate words, is a universal

Language is a universal medium for this conveyance of emotion, the medium of the arts of literature and poetry.

medium for the expression and conveyance of emotion. And language has become once more what through legend and ballad it was in the earliest days, the most widely effective medium of artistic expression. Every use of spoken or printed word, which adds to the appeal to the will and reason the further appeal which speaker or writer makes, when, through some magic of soul or tongue, he conveys to others the emotion which gives his thoughts their hold upon himself, is an instance of the same principle at work. And in literature, the art of written words, the dignity of the name may be said to be deserved, when the form of the words is such as to convey the emotion of the writer to the soul of the reader through the universal language of beauty. And through poetry, the intenser art of words, and lyric poetry, the poetry

of poetry itself, we pass only to language more and more laden with feeling, more and more transfused with emotion, with the sense of communion with nature, or man, or God. And to the poet, as to the artist in any other manner, this is, as artist, the end, —the crown of contemplation, that under the form of beauty,

“The right,
And good, and infinite,
Be named here as thou call'st thy hand thine own
With knowledge absolute,
Subject to no dispute.”

Art, throughout its age-long history, is the record of the perceptions achieved by mankind at each stage in its civilisation. The effort of the intellect after the knowledge of the truth may energise in every form of science or philosophy. Science and philosophy may pass on from age to age the results, tentative or conclusive, fragmentary or systematic, of the theoretic side of human activity. And in the form assumed by sheer philosophy the eloquence and poetry of the contemplative reason seldom fail to give some expression to emotions, from which once more the speculative impulse springs. But art embodies the perceptions and ideas of the wider human mass. The artists and the poets show us life and truth, and earth and heaven, as they lived in the experience of the intellectual community of the time. They show us life as they saw it, when, living, they paused to contemplate themselves and their life. Beauty is too narrow and too poor a word to describe the emotions of contemplation with which they recognised

In art emotion records the perceptions of humanity.

the pathos, the mystery, the glory of the world, and knew that thus far at least by them

“The truth of man, as by God first spoken,
Was re-uttered.”

Of the emotion that belongs to man's perception and contemplation of his own life and world, art is the record. Art is the record, but life itself is the embodiment of the emotion. But the will to maintain the emotion leads not only to the expression of emotion, Art is only the record of the moment of pause, the moment of contemplation but to its embodiment in life. in the life of an emotion. The will to maintain emotion gives rise not only to its expression in literature and art. Art, rather, is only a subordinate and incidental feature in the embodiment of emotion in life, one form which is taken by the will to prolong emotion—the form which it takes, as we have said, in the moment of pause, when the mind perceives or contemplates the achievement of the will. Within the scope and field of emotion are included the whole of life, every activity and every achievement of the will and mind of man. Emotion is their beginning and their end. The will to prolong emotion is, as we have seen, the radical character of will. And will is, as we have also seen, the principle at work, not only in what we call the moral, but also in what we call the intellectual life. The intellect, again, both as pervading the moral life and in what we call specifically the intellectual life, is always feeling its way towards a result which bears more and more the character of emotion. Emotion is the constant element in experience, its embracing medium. Emotion is experience; not emotion as contradistinguished from will and

intellect, but as including them. Emotion, as contradistinguished from will and intellect, follows on the act of will as intellectually perceived, and thus closes what may be called on a large scale or a small alike one cycle of life. But the energy of emotion overflows in fresh activity. The sustaining will that is in it, moved by satisfied or dissatisfied contemplation of the result, finds its way out in fresh efforts directed towards a renewed or completed satisfaction. This is the inexhaustible creative energy of emotion which is the life of life itself. What remains for us here is to dwell upon the emotions of which this is pre-eminently true, those which are most obviously the formative principles of life—the emotions, namely, which can be summed up and treated of under the name of love.

Love indicates a region, a character, of experience, which above all else makes experience what it is. The primary meaning of the word has been narrowed by a similar limitation to that which we noted earlier in the case of the word “person.” It remains the designation of the highest type of emotion, but the emotion itself of which it is the name is thought of rather as the feeling and capacity of the individual than, as we have here to treat it, the final social bond, the crowning reality of life and experience. We have already found in emotion that which seals the achievement and prompts the endeavour of every stage and step in the moral and intellectual life. We have now to note how emotion, in this its highest stage, gives to the most familiar and comprehensive realities of life the character which they bear,

III. Love is the highest type of emotion,

the formative principle of the institutions of human life,

as the supreme creations of the spirit that lives and moves in human things. For, after all, the supreme realities for man are the realities which man has made. And in the realities that man has made, in the institutions of human life, if we select for the illustration of this character of emotion the institutions, the permanent forms of human life, in which above all the ruling emotions of life are embodied, we may say that in the family, in society, in the various forms of religious communion, we see the embodiments of emotion in this its final character. Institutions are valued as the vehicles of emotion, as emotion realised in fact. They are valued because they give us the life that takes us out of ourselves and absorbs us in that which comprehends our very being and self. Not only these which we have taken as the typical and central human institutions, but whatever is established as a permanent social fact, obligation, law, science, philosophy, art, hold their place in the scheme of human things, as doing necessary service towards the upbuilding of the fabric in which this social spirit dwells. Its *raison d'être*, its substantive existence in the world, is, in this definite and final sense of emotion, its emotional character. Not that, in the sense in which we commonly use the word "emotion," emotion is in itself the end; rather it would be true to say that the true being of emotion is not in this sense "in itself." For the emotion of which we speak under the name of love, as creating and maintaining the institutions of human life, is the crown of many endeavours, the sum of many activities, carrying in its very substance the virtue and activity of the efforts which it rewards. It is the soul and self of social

institutions, not a disembodied soul of "mere" emotion, a soul rather which is one aspect of the body that it is said to inhabit, the substantial reality and being of human life itself.

Of the family it may be said, in a unique and special sense, that it gives us the life that takes us out

i. In the family we wake to a life that takes us out of ourselves ; of ourselves, for in the family the individual soul and self emerges into conscious being. To the child the family

is the world. The wider world, except in so far as it intrudes upon the scene of family life, is like what lay beyond the ringed Oceanus in the childlike geography of early days. And this first world to which we wake is far more intimately knit to our own awakening self than the wider world is to the man in the broad daylight of life. What is it, then, that gives to the family its intimate hold upon our life? It is to us

it is our moral and intellectual world, the field of all desire, the instruction of every instinct, the source of every motive, that bears upon the will. The family is to the child the supreme reality, first as the commanding and comprehensive moral fact. As agents we live and move in our childhood within the wills of others. The objects of desire are set before us, or put within our reach. The laws of restraint are imposed upon us. The principles of conduct are infused into us, until they grow up into the beginning of our own moral selves. And the family is also our first intellectual world. It is to us, to begin with, that which exists, the first type and test of reality, the region of existence within which we ourselves exist. The family is to us that which is, and the nature of the wider

world and of the universe is first interpreted to us by analogies which are drawn from the field of family life. But neither of these aspects of the family life as the sphere of childish existence is adequate to explain itself, or to account for the vivid reality which even in memory the family must still retain. It is in the emotional stage of the moral and intellectual life that the family becomes to us the moral and intellectual sphere. And it is by the energy proper to emotion itself that we identify ourselves with the family and throw ourselves into its life as our own. It is not merely a moral effort of self-surrender, or an intellectual recognition of a fact by which we regard ourselves as bound up with and included in the family, or regard the family as living in ourselves. Love is the principle by which we thus find ourselves in something other than ourselves. There are many grades of intensity in this particular form of the emotion of love. There are large tracts of human life where nothing that could seem to answer to the family acts as the first school of love. And there are examples enough of family life, in lands where our own civilisation prevails, in which it would still be true to say that the characteristic development is not given to the dawning powers of love, and the supreme lesson of early life is never learnt. But the family must none the less be viewed as the social institution in which that emotion is embodied, with which the self-conscious being, as it emerges into self-consciousness, recognises the source and support and sphere of his own being, and identifies himself with it. This is the characteristic of family affection, that the family itself is approved,

valued, appreciated, as a whole, including the self, and the modification of the self, in virtue of which this as a whole in which the self is absorbed. quality is attributed to it, is that it is included in this whole. This is the sense of intimacy, of unquestioned safety, of harbouring existence, of familiar reality, above all of uncalculated and instinctive self-surrender which we sum in the name of "home." And the characteristic quality of this emotion attaches not only to the relation of the child to the home, to the father or the mother; father and mother too, in their love for their child, love it as already carrying in it their own being and selves; and increasingly as life goes on, where the parental relation is fully developed and undisturbed, the life of the parent is, as we commonly say, absorbed in that of the children. And as in earlier days the child only thought of itself as a part of the life made by the love of father and mother, so now father and mother think of themselves as incidental and subordinate features in the life of the child. In this spirit they watch the child grow up and re-enact the mysterious drama of the self-surrender of love of which the family is born, under the impulse which, aiming at the fusion of soul with soul, produces this unity of life within which the individual comes into being.

But outside of and beyond the family life of which he is born, the individual finds himself the member ii. The individual emerges from the family to find himself a member of society, of a wider society. He *finds himself* the member of such a society, for here too, as in the case of the family, the society legitimately claims to be prior to the individual; and society in all its forms is the

creation not of the individual, but of the collective human spirit. Of and into family life the individual is literally born. We may say of the individual, as he is launched from family life upon a wider world, that he has already learnt instinctively to look upon an individual as the fragment of a society, or that he brings with him the same instinctive tendency to create social unions of which the family is itself an example. In any case he must say that, through whatever history the existing forms of social union have come into being, the impulse which maintains them is the desire for society itself, the spirit which animates them is an

emotion whose object is the relation maintained by an emotion whose object is social union itself.

another. Society as such, the social character, is the final cause of the various forms of social union. The delight in social union, this is the emotion which we feel after, which we wish to recover or prolong in the creation and maintenance of the various forms of social life.

The state, the political society, comes nearest to the family in the nature of its hold over the individual.

Into the state, as into the family, the individual emerges into life.

It is the embodiment of emotions of natural piety. It is not only an inevitable fact, existing independently of any action of the individual in creating it, but its hold over himself is independent of any action of the individual in attaching himself to it. He, as he is launched upon life, with his rights and capacities as an individual, is a creation of the state in which he exercises these capacities. He, as he is, owes his being to the state, inasmuch as it is the state which makes what we call

the country, the nation, and gives to the individual who is born in it his national character and language and mind. To the state, again, as he comes to live his life, he owes his support. Under the nurture and protection of its laws the economic conditions of life have grown up and are maintained, within which he renders to his neighbours and receives from them the vital services of daily existence. Patriotism and loyalty,

Patriotism and loyalty are the emotions that maintain it.

the emotions of this form of social life, come into play, at least in modern days, only at rare times of urgent collective feeling. But the civil society exists, and the individual as a member of it, in virtue of the perpetual play of a loyalty not less real in its effects upon life, because it only gives birth to a passion where it is flagrantly violated or transgressed, the loyalty through which law is an operative and governing fact far more than through the machinery of police and punishment. It is in this unobtrusive emotion of sympathy with the law, the peaceful patriotism, the latent loyalty of daily life, that the individual identifies himself with the society, regarding his own being as a social unit as involved in its maintenance, regarding its order and system as having an absolute claim upon himself.

It inspires other emotions, such as loyalty to a political party.

There are instances of more vehement emotion, giving birth to passion, in the attachments to the principles of a political party or a social creed. But these exceptional emotions are all rooted in and secondary to the primary emotion of loyalty to the society itself whose traditions or whose system we wish to maintain in some character of it that is threatened, or to amend in some principle

that is ignored. The same emotion, again, may give birth to the passion for national aggrandisement—to enlarge the field of national life—in which, mingled with less worthy elements, is exemplified the instinctive will of the emotion of patriotism to maintain and extend the type of social life of which the individual is born, and in which he is absorbed. And the patriotism which in the soldier fuses the emotions of disciplined fellowship into the self-devotion of a soldier's courage owes its life to the same original inspiration.

The emotions which are identified with social life, in the form in which we have just been considering it, are emotions of which the society itself is the object, though it is the society as embodying the social character, the social relations of man with man. Loyalty is to the state, or to its ruler as embodying the state. Patriotism is the love of our own country. But the state, the country, are the object of these emotions, as embodied ideals of social life. The Englishman, in giving expression to his love for his country, would describe it in terms which would show that the real object of his emotion is the ideal of social union, which has been presented to him in the particular social life in which he finds himself engaged. But there are forms of social union where the emotion of delight in social union does not take shape in a devotion to the society itself as a collective whole, but rather in the emotions with which the members of the society regard some common ideal or standard of life. "Society," in the sense in which the word is generally used in a particular circle of our society, is a form of social union, in which individuals,

In "society" the social union is more directly the end.

at the cost of no small sacrifice of individual liking, are content to merge their own individuality, and this devoted loyalty in such regions of practice as fall within the range of fashion affords a signal illustration of the principle that in this stage of social affection it is society itself for its own sake which is the end desired. In this case one may say that the superficial social relation becomes an end in itself, and social relationships of this meagre and unsatisfying quality are by no means confined to the class which composes what is commonly called "society." But there are emotions of a higher

In "discipline" and order, which, in the discipline of a
 "esprit de corps" regiment or the *esprit de corps* of
 the social ideal is a school, combine with those which
 again the end.

may be said to have the regiment or the school as their object—emotions in which not the regiment but the ideal of discipline, not the school but a certain ideal of social life, are the element, the bond of the social relationship which is the object of the emotion. And there are phases of social relationship, sometimes temporary phases of feeling or opinion, scarcely to be dignified with the name of institutions, though they may give rise to some temporary association, whose common ideals are the object of common emotions, communicated from one to another very much after the manner of fashion, though their moral and emotional worth may be misrepresented when they are stigmatised by such a name.

These various forms of social relationship embody and give birth to collective emotions, where the mutual loyalty to one another of the members of a society, or their common loyalty to a common law or ideal, leads

to this as its result, that the individual finds himself to be the organ of a collective emotion, like the individual soldier in the charge of a regiment, or the individual voice in the enthusiasm of an assembly. Of these collective emotions, the highest instances are those which are the outcome of the religious communion.

Collective emotions result from these social unions from the lowest to the highest.

For religion on one side of it may be viewed as a social bond among men, as the principle of union

In the religious communion above all, the emotion of social union has been an effective power,

between those who share the belief in the Power that they worship. One of the purposes answered by the religious communion has been this, that it has

given the crowning satisfaction to the instinct by which men make for social union as in itself a good. In many ancient societies there are facts which may be expressed

in various kinds of combination with political association.

by saying that religion was utilised to give a sanction to political union, or that religious union found its natural expression in political association, or that a union which was on one side of it political was on another side of it religious. All of these ways of viewing the facts would alike lead us to say that the strongest degree of political union is associated in its origin with the collective devotion to a common object of worship. In more modern times, when the religious and the political union have existed side by side, it has frequently been the case that they have coincided in the individuals of which they were composed—sometimes, as in the Mediæval Empire, almost to the point of being different aspects of a single institution. And this coincidence

or fusion has allowed the association with religion to strengthen the bonds of political or social union, just because the religious communion has this merely social aspect. As a social union it is an end in itself, giving in a common creed and practice and worship a medium of communion, a principle of collective action among men.

The combination has been the more effective when the spirit of communion itself was the object of worship,

When the object of worship is itself conceived as the spirit of communion, the alliance with it of a political union which calls for self-devotion to a common cause is the more natural, and

the social force communicated by the higher inspiration given to membership of a community is the greater. Now that the lines of religious communion cross and transcend the boundaries of national or political union, it still remains true that religion, even where it is not national, reinforces national sentiment. And religion

inspiring finally the collective emotions of humanity,

is in an increasing degree rendering to mankind the higher service of inspiring as a passion the emotions which in

promise and hope will always claim to be universal—the emotions of humanity.

But the highest grade of that kind of emotion for which we are taking the name of love to stand, is to be

iii. Religion as the love of God, where God is Love,

found in religion itself; in religion, such as it has now learnt itself to be, where the love of God for man evokes, creates,

and comprehends the love of man for God.

For religion itself is the emotion belonging to the relation of man, individual and collective, to God; the aspiration of the

is the consummation of fellowship,

communion of collective humanity, after an author,

an ideal, a consummation of the fellowship of life. It is the instinct of self-devotion to others finding its issue in collective self-devotion to the spirit of self-devotion

and its cause,

itself. And the love of God is apprehended as the source and sphere of the whole of human life, and finally, of the love of man, individual and collective, for Himself, concentrating in a definite social union, devoted to this specific purpose, the maintenance of the emotional relation of man to God, and all the energies by which this emotion absorbs and inspires the social life of men. But when we speak of religion as the final form of the emotion of love,

and the relation of love between God and humanity is here itself the institution in which the emotion lives.

which in all its variety of forms is the soul and being of social institutions, the institution here is not the external society or fellowship of those who in the Church or religious communion live in the interchange of life and love with God. Religion itself is here the institution. There is no longer a distinction to be drawn between an emotion and an institution which it inspires. For the institution is this actual living relation of humanity with God, the Universal Being, in the religion of love.

We have said that the highest stage of the moral life is where the motive of love leads a man to regard himself, and gladly to regard himself, as a part of a whole. This highest motive of the will receives its consummation where man, the individual man, as man, as a member of collective humanity, surrenders Himself to God, as the source, the soul, the satisfaction of this impulse of

In the moral life, the highest motive of the will—the social motive—is consummated in self-surrender to the love of God,

self-devotion. And where the love of God is present and the motive of the love of God passes into the emotion of the love of God, which, as the end, is seen to have been also the beginning of the moral development from desire through duty to love, in this sense as a motive, the motive of love passes into the emotion of love, which from this standpoint is seen to have been the original source, and to give the final satisfaction, of every form of volition throughout the whole range of the moral life. God Himself, the Provider, appears as the final satisfaction of desire, who, acting on the will, evoked the first outward movement of the soul, through which, by the inexorable logic of the moral life, we have been led to this final point. And in every step of the progress, by which the satisfaction of desire compels us to the control of conscience, by which the desire of lower things grows into the desire for righteousness, the movement, the drawing of the will towards the further fulfilment of the moral ideal, is felt to have been at work. In the religious consciousness of men, civilised and savage, these several elements appear sometimes as mere fossils, wrecks and relics of an inchoate development of religion. Such fossils of arrested development are to be seen in the beliefs in a God of righteousness, existing side by side with alien and inharmonious elements of religion, in savage or backward races left in far-away corners of the earth by the eddies of the stream of time.* Much of the popular and thoughtless religion of civilised nations is made up of beliefs in Providence, or in the ruling righteousness of God, which have been similarly detached from their living relation with the growing spiritual life of mankind, and remain distorted, frag-

* Cp. *e.g.*, the instances adduced in Mr. Lang's "Making of Religion."

mentary, isolated, discrediting the life of religion, of which they are nevertheless the easily explicable outcome and result. But to the generations of men who have lived in the central stream of the history of religion, the moral logic has been irresistible by which the belief in God's providence identified itself with the belief in His righteousness, and the revelation of righteousness merged in the revelation of love. I would not attempt here to indicate the lines of a development which is still the task of the religion of to-day. The living tradition of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Christian Gospel, and the history of the Christian Church—not least when our indignation is roused by back eddies of reaction, such as the Calvinistic caricature of the Divine hatred of sin—teach us increasingly to see behind the stern, unbending righteousness the love that will not be denied, and beyond the painful struggles of conscience and law, the vision of that society which God Himself shall be when through the discipline of duty the work of love is done. The point here to be observed is that, as a matter of fact, in the religious experience, love as a religious motive does pass into love as a religious emotion, and into this emotion the whole moral life of desire, duty, and affection is absorbed, by this emotion it is transformed and inspired, by this emotion the moral life of men is now making such progress as it may towards the ideal which no doubts deny.

and absorbs them
into itself as regions
of its own life.

In the religion of love, again, the reason of humanity finds itself, in the contemplation of the love of God, absorbed in the one object of contemplation, which

gives to the instincts of the reason their supreme satisfaction. In the intellectual life, contemplation—the highest energy of the reason—reaches satisfaction in the contemplation of the love of God, faction and their rest. And as the emotional act with which the intellect thus recognises its own knowledge as the outcome of the vitality of that Eternal Intellectual communion, which in know-

ledge it is allowed to share, as this intellectual emotion passes into emotion proper, into the emotion of the love of God, the love of God, drawing us into communion with itself, “the far-off Divine event” of all the processes of reason, is felt to have been at work in all the growth that lies between the initial perception of an existence in which our own existence was involved, and the wide and reasoned field of the operation of the Universal mind. Through the in-

and as the intellectual emotion of contemplation passes into the emotion of the love of God, this object of contemplation is seen to have been at work throughout the progress from perception through reasoned apprehension to the knowledge of the love of God as the Eternal Being.

finitely various advances of knowledge we are more and more entering into intellectual communion with Him, who already in and through the whole and every part of the intelligible world has said to us, “I am the Truth.” And in the love of God, again God asserts Himself to us as the one supreme inevitable fact, the one conceivable self-existing thing; at once the source and sphere of every grade of existence; the existence which, once conceived, is seen to warrant and yet to supersede the substantial being which is claimed by all that is. So that as we apprehend this, the communion of spirit with spirit, as the supreme intelligible existence, it may be said of the whole substantial world and of our own substantial

selves that in Him, the Eternal Love, we live and move and have our being.

And here, again, the point to be observed is that, as a matter of fact, in the religious experience, the emotion of the love of God does give to men this unique satisfaction of the intellectual desire of man.

And of this emotion itself, the love of God, as the crown of the life of emotion, it is to be said that its character as an emotion is this: "We love Him because He first loved us." The love of God comprehends our love for Him, in the sense that our love for Him is itself a part of the operation of the very love which we give back. This is the supreme example of emotion, as the delight in self-surrender; it is the emotion in which we dwell upon this delight in self-surrender itself, as the life in us of the Spirit of self-surrender, giving Himself to us, by giving it to us as an endowment of our nature to give ourselves to Him. This is the final emotion in which emotion, whose nature it is to be an end to itself, identifies itself with the core and sphere of the Universal Love, with that which is the Beginning and the End, in the emotional act by which the soul takes it as the very law of its being to be in love with Love.

And into this final emotion are absorbed and taken up every fruit and result of that impulse of emotion to maintain itself, which in pleasure we have seen to be the principle of movement in the will. Through all the mazes of human action, through all the wayward courses of the will, the impulses of the human spirit have been

In the emotional region the supreme emotion is the self-surrender of love to the Spirit of self-surrender in the love of God,

the consummation of every emotion of pleasure and of beauty.

finding or losing the way that led to their final satisfaction, where the soul gives itself to be absorbed in the bliss of the Self-Existent Life of the Eternal Love. The glory that broke upon the soul in the first perception of beauty is now seen as the first touch of the dawn of this overpowering revelation of the Beauty of Love. We have passed, as Plato said long ago, from earthly to heavenly beauty ; but, unlike Plato, as we pass from glory to glory we leave nothing behind, and every sight and sound of beauty is still lovely to our eyes and music in our ears, as we see and hear in them fragments of the vision of the love of God, the fore-echoes and the prelude of the song of the Eternal Day.

Once more, this emotion of the religion of love is a fact of religious experience. Apart from its workings

The religion of love thus presents us with an ideal of reality—of vivid, comprehensive, intense experience.

direct and indirect, apart from its issue in the effort and endeavour by which the worst men find their one escape from evil, and the best men do what best deserves the name of good, as an experience, it challenges attention. Apart from all questions of its basis on historical fact or theological doctrine, as an experience, it presents us with an ideal of reality. It gives to life, to experience, to reality itself, to every term by which philosophy, practical or theoretical, attempts to describe its subject or its aim, a vivid intensity of meaning, a hold upon the actual facts of life, which are a prime need of a philosophy that pretends to be in touch with experience as it is.

CONCLUSION

IN the review of experience which it has been the purpose of the latter part of this essay to present, a subordinate principle has been in view. We asked, as the first question of philosophy—What is the reality which is pre-eminently real? And the answer was—Personality, (1) as the capacity for communion, (2) realised through the combination of the various faculties or capacities which play their part in personal life. The immediate object, therefore, has been to show that each of the various faculties or capacities of personal life reaches its development and its goal only in combination with the others. But the ultimate object has never ceased to be to show that the development, the goal which they reach in common, is—fellowship, communion.

In attempting to exhibit the faculties of personality in their union with and dependence on one another, it has been unavoidable that we should glance at many problems, psychological, moral, logical, æsthetic, and that we should suggest or imply a solution, wherever the problem itself seemed to have been misconceived from the cause which we were endeavouring to counteract, the isolation of the faculties of personality from one

another. In a discussion covering so wide a range, where each subject of consideration as it comes before our view engages our interest for its own sake, it is not likely that I have altogether avoided the treatment of questions that were extraneous to the main subject of this essay. The danger of my straying from the proper field of inquiry was, no doubt, increased by the fact that, in every region of inquiry, I wished, above all things, to keep in touch with the living facts of experience as it is. Facts have a fascination of their own—above all, the facts of human life and experience. We cannot turn to them for the illustration of a theory without being caught up into the stream of the complex experience which we recall, and carried away from the remoter truth which we desire to illustrate. If it were possible, I should be glad in these concluding words to divert attention from this or that particular point of controversy, in any branch of the subjects on which I have touched, in order once more to return to the main thesis, which it has been my object throughout to envisage and commend to attention, as a view of experience deserving the first consideration of those who care for philosophy.

Incidentally, and sometimes more than incidentally, I have indicated the lines of argument by which I should endeavour to establish this hypothesis as a truth in the various regions of philosophy. Nor would I attempt to divert criticism from any argument which I have used, or from any conclusions which I have indicated in psychology, morals, logic, or æsthetics, in so far as they are essential points in the presentation of the hypothesis as to the nature of experience. But this, the conception

of the nature of experience, is the thing that I have desired to make clear. And it is in order to mark the outcome as to the essential nature of experience, that I wish now to review our consideration of the different fields of experience. In summarising the result attained as to the primary nature of fact and reality, it will be essential to note, as a subordinate element in the main conclusion, the part that is played in the experience of reality by the neglected members of the threefold capacity of personal life.

In the course of the endeavour to define experience, as it is experienced, I have been constantly impelled to ask myself the question, which may probably have occurred to the reader no less frequently than to myself : “ This subtlety of psychology or metaphysic, this vague and wide generalisation, this refinement of religious emotion, has it anything whatever to do with the experience of the ordinary man ? ” And my answer to the reader must be that which has been my answer to myself—that the experience of the ordinary man is, even to the ordinary man, part and parcel of the experience of mankind. I cannot attempt to present the experience of the ordinary man without following out into their most characteristic expression the various elements of experience which are, after all, to be found represented in the experience of the ordinary man. And I should not truly represent the experience of the ordinary man, if I did not recognise the great efforts of human reason and human endeavour, in which the ordinary man, as an ordinary man, does not profess, as an individual, to share, but which are a part, and no unimportant part, of the world in which and for which he lives. The

ordinary man is not a hero, or a philosopher, or a theologian; he is not at all scientific; he is probably mistaken in believing himself to be artistic. But the self-devotion of heroes, and the speculations of philosophers, and the visions of theologians, and the discoveries of science, and the glories of art are facts to him all the same, part of the general human experience to which he feels himself to belong. And while I do not profess to withdraw from the position which the whole argument of this essay demands, that the experience with which philosophy begins is not the experience of any individual man, but the experience of mankind, I may nevertheless here point out that our inquiry has led us to lay stress on elements in experience in which the most ordinary man feels himself to be at home.

To the English mind two things are obviously and indisputably real—matter, and the fellowship of men. Each of these is a type of reality, and represents an element in reality, more markedly present it may be at this or that point in experience, but present presumably in some degree throughout the whole of experience. The undeniable reality of matter has often been represented as due to the undeniable testimony of feeling and sense. I do not believe that this is the element in our experience of material reality which makes that experience seem undeniable. The appeal to present feeling is the appeal of the introspective philosopher rather than of the practical man. Dr. Johnson's kick represents an appeal, not to the sentient subject, but to the thing—there, outside you, over against you. This is the primary view of reality with which the Englishman

instinctively declines to part company.* And it is not even to a merely material reality that he clings. It is the thing as a thing, as a thing that exists, as a thing that resists you or compels you, as a thing that affects you. The essential element in the reality of material things remains with us as the essential reality of things that are least material. Not only is it essential to the reality of perception that it is the perception of a thing, which is the subject of sensible qualities (Part II. ch. iv. p. 76); not only is it essential to the moral reality of desire that it is directed outwards to an object of desire (Part II. ch. iii. p. 55); not only is it essential to pleasure that it should take us out of ourselves (Part II. ch. v. p. 129), and arrest our attention upon the thing that pleasantly affects us. At this first stage of self-consciousness throughout it is undoubtedly true that fact and reality demand that there shall be something for the will to grit its teeth upon, something that stands out over against us as existing in its own right, something that affects us in this way or in that, but affects us only because it is beyond and independent of our feeling. But in the final stages of the moral, intellectual, and emotional life, that which we have seen in every case to be the final and convincing reality would disappear unless this first apprehension of reality as distinct from the self were presupposed. The final moral motive we saw to be the society into which the individual gives himself, with whose will he identifies his own (Part II. ch. iii. p. 60). The final reality for the intellect is the whole—the world, the

* The positive element in Agnosticism is the belief that, in the universe at large, there is something *there*, something, though we know not what.

truth, the God—in which the individual finds himself to be included and to have his being (Part II. ch. iv. pp. 110–124). The final stage of the emotional life is the emotion embodied in a social life, in which it is our delight to be taken out of ourselves (Part II. ch. v. p. 154). The surrender of self to some overmastering reality is possible only if the reality is there, and is separate from, over against the self which it comes upon and includes.*

And it is in this element in reality wherever we recognise its presence, from the rude contact with matter to which Dr. Johnson appealed up to the highest spiritual experience, that I think we must see the moral or volitional element in reality to be most conspicuous and most indispensable (Part II. ch. iv. pp. 90, 92). Matter is so convincingly real to us, because it resists, because it is impenetrable, insubordinate, in the long run irresistible. Force is the secret of its reality, and force is a volitional reality. Desire, the most invincible reality of the moral life, though it seems to stir within us, is always a response. What moves the desiring will is the experienced and anticipated contact with reality (Part II. ch. iii. p. 68), the grappling of the force within with some encountering force without. Pleasure,

* The line of thought here suggested as to matter and spirit might be pursued much further. What I say here amounts to no more than this, that the mutual externality of the parts of matter is an analogue to the mutual otherness of the personal members of the human fellowship—that otherness which is essential to the fellowship itself. Cf. "Man's Place in the Cosmos," pp. 176, 177, where Mr. Seth, commenting on Mr. Bradley's "Does not the self lose itself in love? Absolute self-fruition comes only when the self bursts its limits and blends with another finite self," replies, "Of love, whether sexual or divine, the poet's words (in another sense) are true, that 'Its dearest bond is like in difference.'"

as we have said, takes us out of ourselves, and the will to maintain pleasure, of which we have spoken (Part II. ch. v. p. 132), is the will to keep in touch with that which affects us, the refusal to let it go, the protest against subsiding into ourselves.

Reality is that which is other than ourselves, and only as other than ourselves enables us to identify ourselves with it. That is the character of all spiritual experience, represented first by the ineradicable belief in matter, but to be traced throughout the various fields of experience which we have surveyed.

On the other hand, the fellowship of mankind in which we live is the supreme and urgent reality of human experience, and the fact that man is capable of this fellowship is, to the Englishman perhaps above all men, the dominant principle of his practical philosophy of life. In the survey of experience which we are now bringing to a close, the principle of fellowship has taken its place as the motive, the rationale, and the close of the whole development of the life of experience.

The highest principle of the moral life we have seen to be the ideal of communion, of mutual helpfulness, mutual sympathy, social affection (Part II. ch. iii. pp. 69, 70). And we have viewed this principle as the result of a moral development, which, starting from desire, as desire of *life*, desire for communion with our environment (Part II. ch. iii. p. 68), has reached this social ideal as its necessary and predestined result.

The highest ideal after which the intellect has aspired we have seen to be the conception of a communion with the ultimate reality of things, such as is suggested by the analogy of the communion

undoubtedly achieved between mind and mind, the ultimate reality of the Universe of Knowledge and Existence being conceived to be itself the inspiration and the source of the communion of knowledge which actually subsists between mind and mind, where man knows his fellowman (Part II. ch. iv. p. 122). And this communion with the ultimate principle of the communion of knowledge is the outcome again of an intellectual development continuous from the first perception in which the perceiving mind finds common ground of existence with the thing perceived (Part II. ch. iv. p. 85).

Finally, in the emotional region of experience we have passed from pleasures of life (Part II. ch. v. p. 130) to pleasures of love (Part II. ch. v. p. 136), from pleasures in bodily communion with the outer world to pleasures in which the lover takes pleasure in the loved, and the loved not only takes pleasure in the lover, but takes pleasure in the fact of giving pleasure to the lover. And from the family life, to which this love gives birth, the life that makes us delight to live in others (Part II. ch. v. p. 155), we have passed on to the conception of a life in God Who is Love, a life pervaded by the communion with the Personal principle of communion, animated by the love of the Personal principle of love (Part II. ch. v. p. 163). In other words, we have claimed for this, the emotional principle of communion, that from the first achievement to the highest aspiration of the life of man, it is the dominant factor in experience. To this deep and comprehensive principle of human life we have given the name of love,—widening, no doubt, strengthening and deepening

the meaning of the word beyond its common acceptation. But of love in this sense it may be said, not only that it pervades the whole of life—*nihil humanum a se alienum putat*,—but that it represents that character of common experience which gives to philosophy what is at once a challenge and a vocation—to be adequate to experience.

Of all these final apprehensions of reality it is true to say that they satisfy that which I should describe as the characteristic demand of the English mind in philosophy. The Englishman will never be content to be told that reality means what I feel, or even that reality means what I am obliged to think. Rather, he will hold it to be true that it is the reality itself which is the cause of his knowing it as real, and this, whether he is a materialist or a Christian, is what he does hold to be true.

The statement of the metaphysical problem which is here set forth leaves the way open to a solution, which shall neither explain away the primary reality of the experience of sense, nor yet ignore the cardinal reality of the experience of human life, but which, taking the latter as the key to the former, shall enable man to attain to the spiritual apprehension of a spiritual universe.

APPENDIX

NOTE A (page 3)

PROOF *

We are to look for reality within, and not beyond the field of experience. This is, as we have said, the limitation of philosophy. Experience is the beginning and end of philosophy. We accept, to start with, the fact of experience as it stands. We ask what it involves, what it implies, what it reveals, and philosophy in the end is only the *rationale* of experience discovered in experience itself.

But at this point a question arises about the knowledge of reality. Experience is the beginning and end of philosophy. But the view of experience with which philosophy ends is not the same as the view of experience with which it began. How does the transition come to be made from the one view to the other—from the knowledge of the primary realities to the knowledge of the final reality—from experience as it presents itself to philosophical inquiry, to experience as it emerges from the inquiry? What is the “method” of philosophy, the “way by which we pass” from the beginning to the end?

* This expansion of the summary statement in the text is a transcript from a former work, “Experience, a Chapter of Prolegomena.”

The question challenges consideration mainly because there is a kind of knowledge—"science"—claiming, by its very title, the prerogative of knowledge, and basing the claim on its method—the method of proof. Science professes to be science, because its method is to pass from irrefragable premisses by unimpeachable reasoning to what are accordingly undeniable conclusions. And science would seem to demand of philosophy that it should not be less than scientific, that it should justify its conclusions by proof.

And knowledge does involve proof. When we say that philosophy aims at the knowledge of reality, the knowledge of which we speak is proved knowledge. That which is known means that which is proved. Knowledge, *i.e.*, is the result of a process starting from premisses, ending in conclusions; starting from beliefs which we are justified in assuming, ending in other beliefs assured as the consequence of the former.

But how do we guarantee the transition from premiss to conclusion? Does the *method* of proof give us the guarantee? If we wish for scientific proof, *e.g.* that a certain bacillus is the cause of a certain disease, the rule for the most certain method of proof would tell us that if a case in which the disease occurs, and a case in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common, except that in the one case the bacillus in question was received into the system, and in the other it was not, this would give us the proof we desire. There is no doubt that this rule indicates the lines on which a certainty, for practical purposes absolute, is to be looked for. But is it the method that gives the certainty?

As a matter of fact, the method does not describe an actual process of thought at all. (1) It is theoretically impossible to be sure that the two cases have every circumstance in common save one. The method is inapplicable to facts; its conditions can never be satisfied.* And (2) if they were satisfied, if the two instances had every circumstance in common save one, there would be no process from premiss to conclusion. We should have already arrived at the conclusion. The premisses are only a description of the conclusion in different words. It is not the method, then, that gives certainty to the conclusion.

If this is the case in inductive reasoning, in the process of generalisation by which science establishes laws, no less may it be shown to be the case in the deductive reasoning by which generalisations are applied. (1) We cannot be theoretically certain that any given individual is a "man" in the precise sense in which we say that all "men" must die. The circumstances in which men agree and differ cannot be exhaustively known. The method is inapplicable to facts. And (2) it has been shown in a familiar logical criticism † that the premisses of a syllogism, as formally stated, *assert* the conclusion. Here, again, it is not by the method that the conclusion is assured.

But this is only to say that proof is not mechanical. A method such as the syllogism, or the method of difference, is not a truth-making machine. The conclusion is not proved *by* the method. It is proved in accordance with the method. Even this

* Balfour, "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," Part I. ch. iii.

† That of Mill.

statement, however, must be interpreted in the sense (1) that the rules of the method describe a standard at which we aim, but to which we never attain; and (2) that if we did attain it, there would no longer be any process of proof. We endeavour to attain to a collocation of facts, which enables us to *see* the law in the facts. We endeavour to attain to an apprehension of the law such as enables us to anticipate the facts. The method only supplies a formula as a guide in framing the evidence for a given conclusion.

None the less is it a fact that proof takes place. There is such a thing as proof, reasoning, or connected thought, in which, certain truths being assumed, a truth distinct from them becomes manifest as a consequence of the truths assumed,* and in which it is essential that the conclusion should be (1) distinct from the premisses, but (2) involved in them. We find, as a matter of fact, that when we entertain certain judgments as true, they inevitably point to some further judgment, to a conclusion, which, on a survey of the premisses, it is impossible to deny without also denying the premisses. This is what we mean by proof, and proof, in this sense, is not only essential to our idea of knowledge, but is an actually experienced fact.

But the method and its formula are only a general description of such and such a kind of inference. Each particular inference is not valid because it conforms to the method. It is the witness of its own validity. An inference may be called a self-evident mediate perception. Experience presents us with self-evident mediate perceptions. A method of proof is a

* Aristotle, *l.c.*

description of the way in which, as a matter of fact, truths thus become manifest by means of other truths. This is the nature of experience, the character of truth—mediate manifestation. Begin where you like, you pass from truth to truth. Through the truths you know other truths are evidenced, or reveal themselves to you.

And proof, or mediate perception, gives, if not a greater degree of certainty than immediate perception, at any rate a higher kind of certainty; as we may say that an act of self-sacrifice gives a higher kind of pleasure than, *e.g.*, the innocent satisfaction of a bodily appetite. The first instinctive recognition of the character of a person, or the truth of a principle, however free it may be from doubt or hesitation, does not partake of the same certitude and assurance as the knowledge of the same person or principle, through all the various touching points and relations through which its nature and significance are manifest in experience.

Nor is the relation between premiss and conclusion exhausted when we say that the conclusion follows from the premisses. The conclusion reacts upon the premisses. It is natural that the premisses of an argument should primarily be regarded as stable and immutable principles, which never add to their content or increase their certainty. But the fact is rather that the original premisses of an argument are imperfectly significant, and provisionally sure; and their significance and certainty are never fully seen except in the conclusions which follow from them.

There are many and various ways in which the conclusion of an argument reacts upon the premisses.

The conclusion may confirm the premisses, and make assurance doubly sure ; it may amplify their meaning ; it may absorb them into a wider truth ; it may limit and define their first and vague significance ; it may deepen a shallow and inadequate conception ; it may correct the primary misapprehension of their purport. The one thing which reasoning never does is to leave the premisses as they were.

In fact, we do not leave our premisses behind. We take them with us. Premiss and conclusion interpenetrate one another. There is a perpetual give-and-take between them as the argument proceeds. They mutually support and interpret one another. It represents an inadequate view of reasoning to say that we reason *from* premiss *to* conclusion. Rather the premisses are transformed into and reappear in the conclusion. They stand to the argument not so much in the relation of the foundation to the building, laid once for all, and then buried out of sight ; rather in the relation of the seed to the living growth of thought, expanding into that which issues from them.

When we say, then, that knowledge is proved knowledge, we mean that we experience truths by means of other truths, that one stage of intellectual apprehension carries us to another. But what is the secret of the advance ? What justifies the expansion of the partial view into the completer apprehension ? The answer appears to be only that the completer apprehension itself justifies the advance by which we reach it, that the conclusion becomes self-evident in the premisses, and that it is itself the source of assurance in the process by which it manifests itself in them.

If this be true of proof in general, it will not less be true of the supreme instance of proof, of the method in which, starting from the primary, partial, superficial view of experience as it is, we reach the deeper and completer apprehension of supreme reality. Philosophy has been described as the *rationale* of proof. It is, in fact, the search for that ultimate truth of things—that truth the impulse towards apprehension of which is the animating spirit of all reasoning. And philosophy is the supreme instance of proof, the systematic exposition of the self-evidence of that reality which manifests itself in all experience, and in experience as a whole.

NOTE B (page 8)

I may quote here, as compact statements of the philosophical doctrine alluded to in the text, a few sentences from Mr. Haldane's article on Hegel in the *Contemporary Review* for February, 1895. The italics are mine.

Page 238 : "The ultimate in analysis, *the finally real, is experience* itself, behind which we cannot go."

Page 235 : "*Experience is* a comprehensive name for every kind of direct *knowledge*."

Page 237 : "*The ultimate reality is* just this consciousness, *experience or knowledge* in its widest sense."

Page 238 : "*Experience tends* on the one hand to *resolve itself into pure thought*, . . . and on the other hand into *feeling*, by elimination of the relations of thought."

Page 241 : "*Feeling* . . . has *only* the negative character of being *an indefinable residuum* that always remains, however far we strip it of intelligible relations. Experience, it is true, can never be wholly resolved into intelligible relations. . . . But the residue is itself nothing apart from the intelligible relations which give it meaning."

NOTE C (*page 22*)

The sense of isolation on the part of the individual is expressed in Matthew Arnold's lines [*Switzerland*, 5. *To Marguerite* (continued)].

“Yes ! in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live *alone*.
The islands feel the encircling flow,
And then their endless bounds they know.

“But when the moon their hollows lights,
And they are swept by balms of spring,
And in their glens, on starry nights,
The nightingales divinely sing ;
And lovely notes, from shore to shore,
Across the sounds and channels pour—

“Oh ! then a longing like despair
Is to their farthest caverns sent ;
‘For surely once,’ they feel, ‘we were
Parts of a single continent !
Now round us spreads the watery plain—
Oh might our margins meet again !’

“ Who order'd that their longing's fire
Should be, as soon as kindled, cool'd ?
Who renders vain their deep desire ?—
A God—a God their severance ruled !
And bade betwixt their shores to be
The unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea.”

NOTE D (*page 26*)

I can only indicate the bearing on what is said in the text of the discussion on the relation of individual experience to intersubjective intercourse, in chapters xv. and xvi. of Professor Ward's recent book, "Naturalism and Agnosticism."

My contention is that in our experience there is no such thing as individual experience which does not presuppose intersubjective intercourse and involve the results of intersubjective intercourse, and that individual experience which is independent of intersubjective intercourse, "confined" on Professor Ward's theory "to the child, the savage, and the brute," has in my view only a conjectural and hypothetical reality. It is no part at all of the experience from which philosophy starts. There is no stage of experience known to us "before the stage at which experience is extended by intersubjective intercourse" ("Naturalism and Agnosticism," vol. ii. p. 155).

NOTE E (*page 40*)

CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

In this chapter on "Feeling," and, again, in the earlier part of the chapter on "Intellect"—that part, namely, which treats of perception,—I am in touch with psychology. The general point of view of this essay is obviously not the psychological point of view. I am endeavouring to indicate the vital element in ordinary experience. The psychologist deals with ordinary experience, but he deals with it *as* consciousness, abstracting, so to say, from the fact that experience as it stands is consciousness of reality.

But it has been unavoidable that I should use terms that are commonly used in psychology, and that I should use them in a different sense from that in which they are used by the psychologists, and it seems desirable to indicate briefly the relation of the language used in the text to the language of psychology.

On some points I shall be adopting the views of one psychologist rather than another. In part I shall be deprecating the suggestion that psychological results can be the starting-point of logic or philosophy. But in the main the object of this note is to indicate the

relation of the view of experience given in the text to the language and teaching of psychology and psychological logic, and as far as possible to clear away any obscurities that may have arisen where I have touched on the domain of psychology. With the subjects touched on in this note I hope shortly to deal in a separate book.

The ordinary man's ordinary consciousness is in the main composed of perceptions; it is consciousness of things, of a world of reality.* We need not for the moment concern ourselves with the consciousness of the ordinary man, except to put it aside.

The psychologist is throughout reflective. In so far as psychology rests on introspection or observation—and, except as interpreting the data of introspective psychology, experimental psychology would not be psychology at all—every proposition in a psychological treatise is a judgment of reflection—reflection which, as Professor Ward has said, is the “consciousness of consciousness.” Psychology therefore offers a classification of the different kinds of consciousness of which we are conscious.

1. We are conscious of feeling;† not specifically volitional, intellectual, or emotional, but from which all three emerge; not discriminate, though various; selfless, thingless. I have quoted a passage from Mr. Bradley, in illustration of the statements in the text on this. Professor James's chapter on the “Stream of Thought” (“Principles of Psychology,” vol. i.) contains observations which are most suggestive on the subject,

* Perception is here used in a wider sense than is usually assigned to it, for reasons which will appear below. It covers any discriminate consciousness.

† “Feeling” is commonly used in psychology to cover every grade of what I have called emotion.

though he by no means draws the line between feeling and thought where it seems to me imperative to draw it. In the main I believe it is true to say that psychologists begin to deal with consciousness when it emerges from the stage which I have called "feeling."

2. We are conscious of volition, thought, emotion. I have quoted Professor Ward and Professor Ladd—in confirmation of what I have said in the text—to the effect that these are three aspects of consciousness rather than three kinds of consciousness; that they are all three elements in every phase and form of consciousness. Psychologists differ as to the use of particular terms for particular stages of volition and thought especially. I have purposely ignored these distinctions. Holding that every form of volition, thought, and emotion, known to us, is, in the sense explained in the text and in this note, "self-conscious," I wish to emphasise the unity of character throughout the whole range of the volitional, intellectual, and emotional course of consciousness respectively.

3. Psychology tries to get back to the earliest forms of volition, thought, and emotion, and especially of thought. The endeavour is made by a combination of various methods. The most important element in the process for our present purpose is the endeavour made by the psychologist, and encouraged in the psychological student, to catch himself elementarily thinking. Psychologists differ as to recognizing or not recognizing a subject or self in even the earliest, the least developed, the most primitive form of thought.

As to this latter point, Professor Ladd has recently said ("Outlines of Descriptive Psychology," ch. ii.)

that a "primary 'discriminating consciousness' is the prerequisite of all distinguishable elements or states of consciousness;" that "whatever unity any complex mental state possesses must be imparted to it by so much of discriminating consciousness as is in it;" that a state of consciousness is "such portion of the actual life of consciousness as may be by discriminating activity of consciousness considered as a unity both with respect to its own so-called constitution and also with respect to its own relation to other states of the same life;" that "discrimination . . . seems to belong to all conscious life."

This seems to me to be true observation, and it means that an integral part of every observable form of consciousness is something which contrasts phases or parts of consciousness with one another, and separates them from one another.

And the word "presentation," even if it describes only the vague presentation of an undifferentiated complex of a world, is as presentation—as presented—a presentation *to* a *presentee*.

The "presentation," the "image," the "idea" *may* be profitably treated in psychology as though it were a picture appearing in a field of vision, without reference to the seeing eye; and the play between the pictures, or between the various parts of the picture, *may* be rightly treated of, apart from any explicit mention of the consciousness which is conscious of these consciousnesses. But all this is only the psychological way of looking at experience. As experience the presentation can only be described in a judgment—not less a judgment because it is vague and inarticulate. In

so far as it is an experience, however vague and inarticulate, a judgment it is of the kind of which Mr. Bosanquet has spoken ("Essentials of Logic," p. 33), where he describes "the single immense affirmation, the continuous affirmative judgment of the waking consciousness . . . so far as aware of a world."

The psychologist can describe this consciousness as a picture, a presentation, because (1) he purposely abstracts from reality, treating the world-of-reality of ordinary experience as a world-of-consciousness only, and (2) because he considers the presentation, the *presented*, without noticing the subject, the *presentee*. With the *presentee*, the subject, he is not, as psychologist, concerned, until the subject becomes self-conscious in the second sense, conscious *of* self.

These two senses of self-consciousness have often been distinguished, and the distinction is here all-important. I am a self-conscious being, (1) because all the consciousness I have involves a self; (2) because, at a certain stage, I become conscious *of* a self.

The self of self-consciousness, in the former sense, is an inferential reality.

How far in current psychology the progress towards a consciousness *of* self is truly described, or how far it is confused with familiar and persistent elements in that which is presented in consciousness, are questions with which I am not here at all concerned. That we should become, in this second sense, conscious *of* our "self," attach predicates to it, gain a definite idea of its character, is all important for our moral development. That this kind of consciousness of self appears in our psychological history as late and derivative in

no way affects the fact that discriminate consciousness is, in the other sense of self-consciousness, self-consciousness from the first, consciousness therefore in which there is a *this* or *that* set over against the self and described as *such and such* in relation to the self.

4. With this way of viewing the presentation, or image, or idea, the language used by Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet, as to the relation of the psychological idea to the logical judgment, becomes inadmissible. The "idea in my head"* is an "idea in my head" only to the psychologist. What the psychologist views as an "idea in my head" is in ordinary experience the predicate of a judgment—a judgment to which there is no good reason for denying the name of judgment because it does not satisfy the artificial standard as to the distinction between truth and falsehood, which is derived from later intellectual development.

Mr. Bosanquet, at the beginning of "Essentials of Logic," recalls to the beginner in logic the view which he has already gained in this study of psychology "of the mind as the course of consciousness, a continuous connected presentation, more or less emphasizing within it various images and groups of images and ideas, which may be roughly said to act and react upon each other, to cohere in systems, and to give rise to the perception of self." Psychology, he is told, "treats" thus "of the course of ideas and feelings; Logic, of the mental construction of reality." "The world is a sort of building of which the materials are our ideas and perceptions." Judgment is, so to say, the constructive act. And even though the distinction between the

* Bradley, "Principles of Logic," ch. i.

data of sense presentation and the constructed sense presentations is only relative, the idea of sense presentation as material for judgment remains, in a sense in which it cannot remain if, as we have maintained, presentation is in itself judgment, and every form of consciousness observable by us self-consciousness.

NOTE F (*page 53*)

WILL AND CAUSATION

The purport of what is said in the text may fairly be represented to be that volitional action should be viewed as one form of causation. The sense in which it must be maintained that, as a mere fact of observation, this is true may be further explained, and the explanation will perhaps throw at least a side light on the subject of this essay.

Professor Ladd, in his recent "Outlines of Descriptive Psychology" (p. 366, note), quotes, in order to repudiate, a dictum of Höffding, "Psychology must be deterministic, that is to say, it must start from the assumption that the causal law holds good even in the life of the will, just as the law is assumed to be valid for the remaining life (Qy. for the rest of life) and for material nature."

With Professor Ladd's repudiation of this position I should entirely agree, not merely on the merits of this particular case, but on the general principle of loyalty to fact. Professor Ladd lays down, "Psychology has no right to any such assumption; it must stick to the facts of consciousness, discuss and describe them just as they are, then, if it can, explain them, but it must not sophisticate them. Among these facts it finds

the conscious and deliberate choice. Its appearance is not that of a fact in which the causal law holds good ; it is rather that of a fact arising in the mysterious depths of the self-directing mind."

The claim of fact thus to assert itself in spite of any theory or principle which it may appear to contradict is all-important. To allow the challenge of fact against every law, however far reaching, and every principle, however profound, is the only way to give to principles the genuine verification of universal experience. And there are no scientific or philosophical principles the method of whose statement or the form of whose apprehension may not need to be readjusted in accordance with a more extended or a juster view of some one particular region of observation and experience. The question suggested, then, is whether causation itself can be rightly conceived when it is stated in terms which bring it into conflict with indisputable fact.

The facts of consciousness are thus stated by Professor Ladd (pp. 361-366)—

"Between the desire to move and the idea of the movement desired on the one hand, and the actually accomplished movement on the other hand, something intervenes which is unique in psychical character, and which we express fitly by the words 'I will.'"

Of "choice," "the highest form of volition," he says that we can describe it, but "explanation is at a minimum." "A man's choices often appear to him to come out of the mysterious depths of himself, nor is this appearance diminished on examining the influences under which he is said to act."

Choice involves—

- (1) Mental *representation of ends*.
- (2) Excitement of *desire* implying a feeling of the value of these ends.
- (3) *Deliberation*, weighing of values.
- (4) *Decision*, appropriation to self of one of the ends.
- (5) Consciousness of *doing* something, the issuing of the executive volition.

Of these elements (4) "decision" is "the unique function of the will," but volition is also present in (1), (2), and (3); in deliberation especially, which begins in that "inhibitory suspense" whose formula is, "Hold on while I think," "the conscious suspension of a deciding judgment." And "in the very act of deliberating or estimating our feelings or ideas, we are ourselves voluntarily determining the conditions of the subsequent choice."

"Deliberation" is, in fact, "will preliminary to choice." But "it is the 'decision' or cutting short of the process of deliberation in which the will gives supreme expression to itself as self-developed activity." And here once more, Professor Ladd insists, the psychological fact must be described as it is, however it may be explained. We are influenced by motives; some attract and some repel, but even so, "we will our way to a decision." The decision is our own: "if any of our conscious states are our own, then a decision is, *a fortiori*, ours."

"To the existing science of psychology there is nothing known that makes any less unique, mysterious, or impressive the assumption of an inexplicable

spontaneity of conscious mind in making, after a deliberation, a decision."

Will, as thus defined, is, in Professor Ladd's description of consciousness, only the final development of that "conation" (pp. 112-116) which is the fundamental fact of consciousness itself.

"Physiology may or may not be justified in speaking of every amoeba as having a will of its own," but in any case the psychical fact is that "all psychic life manifests itself to the subject of that life as being in one of its fundamental aspects his own spontaneous activity. This fact (datum) is irreducible and beyond dispute."

"Every sensation" (p. 112), "idea, or feeling passively considered is a sort of challenge to the mind to act, to put forth a volition, to do something." And, "No state of suffering or of happiness is so purely passive that it is not accepted or striven against by that spontaneity of the mind which belongs to its very nature."

He quotes from Höffding: "We speak of volitions whenever we are conscious of activity and not merely receptive. But . . . we never are purely receptive."

The word conation "marks the bare fact of the spontaneity of mind as entering into every phase and aspect of its own life."

This "conative element in all psychic life" is an independent fact, though it finds its "physiological correlate" in "automatic or centrally initiated nervous activity."

Accordingly (p. 355), we are to note "the interpenetration of all the other so-called faculties during the whole course of their development with the growing influence of will." "It is the willing mind regarded

as definitely adopting ends, selecting means, checking or indulging appetencies, planning, controlling, or 'succumbing' as respects the trend and issue of the stream of consciousness which is the fundamental and the impressive thing about all human mental life."

Our consciousness of freedom (pp. 369, 370) is expressed in the assertion "*I will*," and this means not merely I am influenced, but not compelled, or I act, but I don't know why. "When I deliberately choose, the complexion of the stream of my consciousness, so to speak, is the very opposite of that which can properly be described as passive, compulsory, or determined by unknown causes."

This is the description of an experience in plain contradiction to "causal law."

No explanation of it as a delusion has ever yet escaped the accusation of tampering with the facts before they are explained.

It may well be that the contradiction is one which in the end and in the nature of the case is insoluble. But it may well be also that the facts of volition, as stated, for instance, by Professor Ladd, may suggest a statement of causal law, which will make the contradiction of causal law a much less baffling breach than it is in the continuity of our rational apprehension of the world.

The psychological fact, then, as stated by Professor Ladd, is this—Consciousness is conscious spontaneity. To deny the spontaneity is to deny the consciousness. Partly from the specific nature of the facts as to this aspect of consciousness, and partly in conscious controversy with those who warp the facts, a special stress

is laid, throughout the chapters on "Conation" and "Will," on the spontaneity of consciousness. But to the statement that consciousness is conscious spontaneity must be added the qualification which is indeed implied throughout—spontaneity, yes, but spontaneity of response. The three points noted in the definition of volition in the text all appear in Professor Ladd's description of the facts, (1) I act, but (2) I am moved to act by something distinct from myself, though (3) I identify myself with that by which I am moved.

The theological controversies over the reconciliation of individual freedom with the Divine Predestinating Will afford an illustration of this double character of volition. The disputants on either side have their antagonists at their mercy whenever either of the two aspects of the life of communion with God are ignored, which are summed up in the title of a recent devotional work, "The Christian Life a Response."

But, as the conscious spontaneity which asserts itself as the psychological fact is a spontaneity of response, and the whole operation of will requires impulse from without, so the causal law with which psychological fact is at war is in its turn a law of response.

Professor Ladd alludes to the anticipations of volition in lower forms of conscious life—to the "automatic or centrally initiated nervous activity," or to the "amoeba" with "a will of its own." But in organic life, giving its own shape and character to what it feeds upon, in chemical action and reaction, and even in the motion which results from the action of a force upon a body, we have examples of various kinds of causal law, in all of which it is equally true to say that

the active cause is met by a spontaneous response in that which it affects, though the impression of spontaneity which we gain in the different cases is different in degree and in kind. So that the general statement that nothing acts in a particular way except under an external stimulus to act in that particular way, must be always interpreted to mean that nothing acts in a particular way except in spontaneous response to an external stimulus to act in that particular way.

The question therefore is, if all events alike are spontaneous reactions in response to stimuli, where is the differentia of will to be found?

If we are not to say, other events are determined, will is spontaneous, how are we to express the contrast or distinction between acts of will and other natural events? Whatever the answer to this question may be, it is something gained to see that this is the form in which the question should be asked.

The answer as to the distinctive character of volitional events is not to be found, I think, where it has been the fashion to look for it, in the dubitative will. Professor Ladd has indeed pointed out, in a passage already quoted, that deliberation implies a special type of volition, the inhibitory suspense of the ultimate volition which is in view. But as regards this ultimate volition itself, the moment of deliberation is emphatically not a moment of volition. And the distinctive character of volitional spontaneity, whatever it may turn out to be, is much more likely to be discerned in what Professor Ladd calls decision, or in any whole-hearted identification of the self with an impulse acting upon the self.

If we regard volition as one of the forms of response to stimulus, and further as the highest level attained by the development in nature of causation as response to stimulus, then we should say that the ideal suggested by the survey of experience, as the goal of this development, is not freedom in the sense of absence of external stimulus; it is freedom in the sense of the highest degree of spontaneity of response, combined with the exertion of the strongest impulsion of the motive from without.

The self-devotion of love would afford the best example of the living experience of moral freedom. And freedom itself may be said to bear its full and true meaning only when it is applied to action of this type. So that inverting the formula, "Will is a form of Causation," we might rather say—"other forms of causation are anticipations in a lower degree of that spontaneous response to stimulus of which the will of self-devoted love is the supreme and standard example," or, shortly, "Causation is a form of Will."

NOTE G (*page 62*)

On conscience, see Pater, "Marius the Epicurean," p. 5: "A sense of conscious powers external to ourselves, pleased or displeased by the right or wrong conduct of every act of daily life—that conscience of which the old Roman religion was a formal habitual recognition;" p. 9: "Religion lent sanction to a sort of high scrupulosity especially in the chief points of domestic conduct."

On that general conception of the relation of the gods to social life which gave meaning to such terms as "pietas," see Robertson Smith, "Religion of the Semites," p. 29: "The circle into which a man was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk or fellow-citizens, but embraced also certain divine beings, the gods of the family and of the state, which to the ancient mind were as much a part of the particular community with which they stood connected as the human members of the social circle; . . . the worshipper and the gods made up one natural family, with reciprocal family duties to one another; . . . the social body was not made up of men only, but of gods and men."

See also Warde Fowler, "The Roman Festivals," p. 371: "Pietas, which, as Cicero defined it, was *justitia erga deos*, righteous dealing towards the gods, in expectation of righteous treatment on their part." "In

this pietas we find a very sensitive conscientiousness, arising from the dread of neglect or trespass in the discharge of religious observance, in the trust committed by family or state to its constituted representative."

NOTE H (*page 123*)

Cf. Mozley, "Essays," vol. ii. (article on "Blanco White"), on the Christian search for truth: "Truth penetrates into him rather than he into Truth; Truth finds him out and not he It. He looks out for Its approach, waits for It, prepares himself for Its reception. He knows the signs of Its approach, and can tell Its features through the distance; he is alive to the slightest stir of the air, to a whisper, to a breath. But he looks on It all the while as something without himself, as something to advance and act upon him. The tender wax expects its impress, the air its motion."

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